Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant on postrelease control for a prior felony must be advised, during his plea hearing in a new felony case, of the trial court’s ability under Ohio Rev. Code 2929.141 to terminate his existing postrelease control and to impose a consecutive prison sentence for the postrelease-control violation.While on postrelease control for a prior felony conviction Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of heroin. The trial court did not inform Defendant that once he pleaded guilty the court would have the authority under section 2929.14 to terminate his existing postrelease control and impose a prison term to be served consecutively to the term of imprisonment imposed for the possession offense. The trial court subsequently sentenced Defendant to a nine months in prison for the possession offense and, for the postrelease-control violation, ordered Defendant to serve a one-year prison term under section 2929.141 consecutively to the sentence for the possession offense. The appellate court reversed and vacated Defendant’s guilty plea, concluding that the trial court erred by failing to advise Defendant, at the time of his plea, that he could have to serve an additional, consecutive sentence for his current postrelease control violation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Crim.R. 11(C) requires that advisement. View "State v. Bishop" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s complaint for a writ of mandamus against the director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC), holding that there was no error in the court of appeals’ judgment.Appellant, an inmate, filed a complaint requesting a writ of mandamus to order DRC to remove a federal detainer that Appellant alleged was erroneously placed on his prison record. After DRC removed the detainer, the director filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion for declaratory judgment seeking to prevent placement of future detainers. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) properly dismissed Appellant’s complaint because the detainer was no longer on Appellant’s prison record; (2) correctly denied Appellant’s motion for declaratory judgment; and (3) did not err in denying Appellant’s motion for summary judgment. View "State ex rel. Evans v. Mohr" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered two state-law questions from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals by holding that the failure to identify a person who has initialed, signed, and acknowledged a mortgage agreement by name in the body of the agreement does not render the agreement unenforceable as a matter of law against that signatory.The panel specifically asked whether a mortgage is invalid and unenforceable against a signatory who is not identified by name in the body of the mortgage agreement. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that, as a matter of general contract interpretation, it is possible for a person who is not identified in the body of the mortgage, but who has signed and initiated the mortgage, to be a mortgagor of her interest. View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Rhiel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question from the Unitde States District Court by holding that Ohio Rev. Code 4123.35(O) is not unconstitutional as applied to the tort claims of an enrolled subcontractor’s employee who is injured while working on a self-insured construction project and whose injury is compensable under Ohio’s workers’ compensation laws.Daniel Stolz was injured while working as a concrete finisher for Jostin Construction. Jostin was a subcontractor of Messer Construction Company, the general contractor for the project. Under section 4123.35(O), Messer provided workers’ compensation coverage on the project for employees of subcontractors like Jostin that chose to enroll in Messer’s self-insurance plan. Stolz eventually sued Messer and several subcontractors for negligence. Messer and three enrolled subcontractors argued that they were immune from liability under section 4123.35(O). The Supreme Court concluded that the statute provides immunity to both general contractors and enrolled subcontractors from tort claims brought by employees of other enrolled subcontractors. Stolz later amended his complaint to allege that section 4123.35(O) is unconstitutional. The enrolled subcontractors petitioned the district court to certify a question of state law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that section 4123.35(O) does not violate the Ohio Constitution’s right-to-remedy, right-to-jury, or equal-protection provisions. View "Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals denying Byington Builders, Ltd.’s request for a writ of mandamus compelling the Industrial Commission to vacate its award to Thomas Trousdale of additional compensation for Byington’s violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), holding that although aspects of the Court of Appeals’ analysis were flawed, that court reached the correct result.Trousdale fell from a pitched roof of a two-story building while working for Byington. Trousdale’s workers’ compensation benefits claim was allowed for several injuries. Trousdale then filed an application for an additional award for a VSSR, claiming that Byington violated specific safety requirements. The Commission denied Trousdale’s VSSR application in part and granted it in part and awarded additional compensation in the amount of forty percent of Trousdale’s maximum weekly rate due to this VSSR. Byington then filed its mandamus complaint seeking a writ directing the Commission to vacate its prior decisions and to enter an order denying Trousdale’s request for a VSSR award. The Court of Appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in granting Trousdale a VSSR award, and the Court of Appeals did not err in denying Byington’s request for a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Byington Builders, Ltd. v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant’s complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition against Richland County Court of Common Pleas Judge James DeWeese seeking to compel Judge DeWeese to enter a final, appealable order on prior rulings made by Judge James Henson, vacate several orders Judge DeWeese had entered in the underlying case, and bar Judge DeWeese from moving forward with a trial, holding that Appellant was not entitled to the relief it sought.Appellant filed a complaint for breach of contract. Judge Henson granted summary judgment in favor of Appellant as to certain defendants. The trial court then awarded Appellant attorney fees. While appeals that were ultimately dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order were pending Judge Henson retired, and the case was reassigned to Judge DeWeese. Judge DeWeese vacated the summary judgment orders and granted summary judgment for one defendant. Appellant then filed this action. The court of appeals denied relief, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Judge DeWeese clearly exercised jurisdiction in the underlying case, and that exercise of jurisdiction was authorized; and (2) because Appellant could not show that it had clear legal right to relief, it was not entitled to a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Technical Construction Specialties, Inc. v. DeWeese" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court determining that Ohio Rev. Code 2947.23(C) permits trial courts to waive, modify or suspend payment of only those court costs that were imposed after the statute’s effective date, holding that the statute does not authorize a trial court to waive, modify, or suspend the payment of court costs that were imposed prior to March 22, 2013, the effective date of section 2947.23(C).In this case, the trial court ordered Defendant to pay court costs at a sentencing hearing in 1999, and Defendant failed to move for a waiver of costs. The Supreme Court noted that section 2947.23(C) provides that for sentences entered on or after March 23, 2013, the trial court retains jurisdiction to waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of prosecution at time. The Court then held that for sentences entered prior to that date, an offender may only seek waiver of costs at sentencing and any subsequent collateral attack on the court’s order is barred by res judicata. In the instant case, the Court held that res judicata precluded the motion Defendant filed to waive the payment of all fines and costs. View "State v. Braden" on Justia Law

At issue was whether Intermessage Communications and members of a proposed class of retail cellular-telephone-service subscribers seeking to recover treble damages under Ohio Rev. Code 4905.61 for regulatory violations related to the wholesale cellular-service market committed in the 1990s, as determined by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO), had standing to bring this action.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s decision to certify the class and dismissed this matter, holding that Intermessage and the proposed class of retail cellular-service subscribers lacked standing to bring an action pursuant to section 4905.61 because the language of the statute limits recovery of treble damages to the “person, firm, or corporation” directly injured as a result of the “violation, failure, or omission” found by the PUCO. View "Satterfield v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant’s conviction and discharging him from further prosecution after the trial court accepted Defendant’s plea of no contest to a charge of cruelty to animals and finding Defendant guilty but neglecting to ask for an explanation of the circumstances, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar Defendant’s retrial.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to obtain an explanation of the circumstances before finding him guilty. The court of appeals agreed, reversed Defendant’s conviction and, reasoning that the reversal was based on insufficient evidence, concluded that jeopardy had attached and barred further proceedings against Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the reversal of Defendant’s conviction was not based on insufficiency of the evidence, but, rather, on a procedural error; and (2) therefore, the double jeopardy protection did not bar Defendant’s retrial. View "Girard v. Giordano" on Justia Law

At issue was what type of reference within a chain of title is sufficient to preserve an earlier-created interest under Ohio’s Marketable Title Act, which generally allows a landowner who has an unbroken chain of title to land for a forty-year period to transfer title free of interests that existed prior to the beginning of the chain of title unless sufficient reference is made to interests within that chain of title.Landowners sought to extinguish an oil-and-gas royalty interest created in 1915. Landowners argued that a reference in a deed in their chain of title to the royalty interest, as well as the original holder of the interest, was not sufficient to preserve the interest because it did not include either the volume and page number of the record in which the interest was recorded or the date on which the interest was recorded. The court of appeals concluded that Landowners’ title remained subject to the royalty interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a reference that includes the type of interest created and to whom the interest was granted is sufficiently specific to preserve the interest in the record title. View "Blackstone v. Moore" on Justia Law