Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney Michael C. O’Malley a writ of prohibition and ordered Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Judge Cassandra Collier-Williams to vacate her journal entry granting intervening-respondent Kelly Foust’s renewed motion for a capital resentencing hearing before a jury, holding that Judge Collier-Williams patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to empanel a jury for a resentencing hearing in this capital-murder case when Foust validly waived a jury trial.Foust filed a renewed motion for a penalty phase hearing before a jury based on Hurst v. Florida, __ U.S. __ (2016), arguing that Hurst guaranteed a capital defendant an unequivocal right to a jury determination of every fact necessary to impose a death sentence and that he was entitled to withdraw his earlier jury waiver. The judge granted Foust’s renewed motion. The Supreme Court granted O’Malley a writ of prohibition, holding that O’Malley established that Judge Collier-Williams patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to invalidate Foust’s previous jury waiver and empanel a jury for his resentencing hearing. View "State ex rel. O'Malley v. Collier-Williams" on Justia Law

In this expedited election case, the Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought by Heaven Guest seeking to compel Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted and the Columbiana County Board of Elections to place her name on the ballot on the November 6, 2018 ballot as an independent candidate for judge of the Columbiana County Court of Common Pleas, holding that Guest failed to show by clear an convincing evidence that Husted abused his discretion in finding that Guest remained “affiliated with the Democratic Party” and denying Guest’s nominating petition. Specifically, the Court held that Guest failed to show that Husted abused his discretion or disregarded the law when he rejected her petition. View "State ex rel. Guest v. Husted" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant’s petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Ohio Parole Board to hold a parole hearing at which Appellant’s parole request would be given “meaningful consideration,” holding that Appellant did not demonstrate that the parole board failed to give his parole request meaningful consideration.On appeal, Appellant argued that the parole board did not give his parole request meaningful consideration as a result of materially false or misleading information in his parole record. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that that Appellant failed to demonstrate that his parole record contained false or misleading information that might have adversely affected the board’s consideration of his parole request. View "State ex rel. Keith v. Department of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Ohio Rev. Code 3314.08 authorizes the Ohio Department of Education (ODE) to base funding of an Internet-based community school - or e-school - on the duration of student participation.The Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow (ECOT), Ohio’s largest e-school, sought a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment seeking to bar ODE from requesting or considering data showing the duration of a student’s participation during its review of the e-school. The trial court denied ECOT’s claims, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 3314.08 is unambiguous and does not bar the ODE from calculating funding based on a student’s participation. View "Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow v. Ohio Department of Education" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing Appellant’s complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition against Judge Patrick M. McGrath of the Court of Claims, holding the complaint was properly dismissed.Appellant, then an inmate, filed a negligence action against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. Judge McGrath dismissed the suit. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings. While Appellant’s negligence action was pending on remand, Appellant filed his complaint for writs of prohibition and mandamus seeking an order prohibiting Judge McGrath from conducting proceedings on the defendant’s liability and requiring the judge to hold a damages-only hearing on Appellant’s negligence claim. The Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the complaint on the grounds that Appellant had misunderstood the Court of Appeals’ order to the Court of Claims, which held only that Appellant had met the liberal pleading standards required for complaints of negligence and not that Appellant had prevailed on the merits; and (2) nothing in the record suggested that Judge McGrath was refusing to comply with the Court of Appeals’ mandate, nor did the judge lack the authority to preside over a claim for relief in negligence. View "State ex rel. Evans v. McGrath" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) upholding a use-tax assessment on the purchases of natural gas by East Manufacturing Corporation (East) and not granting an exemption under Ohio Rev. Code 5739.011(B)(4), (B)(8), or (C)(5).East manufactures custom aluminum truck trailers. The tax commissioner issued a use-tax assessment for East’s natural gas purchases, exempting only the portion of natural gas used in painting operations. On appeal to the BTA, East argued that the natural gas used to heat the its buildings was exempt because maintaining the temperature at fifty degrees Fahrenheit or higher in the plant’s buildings was essential to its manufacturing process. The BTA affirmed the commissioner’s assessment on the portion of the natural gas that East used to heat its plant and denied East’s claim for exemption in its entirety. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA correctly determined that East did not qualify for an exemption for total environmental regulation of a “special and limited area” of the facility, for items used in a manufacturing operation, or for gas used in a manufacturing operation. View "East Manufacturing Corp. v. Testa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the valuation of a parcel of land with a supermarket owned by the Kroger Company by the Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) of $2,390,000 conformed to Ohio Rev. Code 5713.03, and the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) erred in determining otherwise.The BOR reached its determination by relying on Kroger’s appraiser’s valuation of the property, which was primarily based on using the sale prices of comparable retail properties and then making adjustments to reflect the unique characteristics of the Kroger property. The BTA, however, concluded that Kroger’s appraiser’s adjustment accounting for the fact that Kroger did not have parking lot on its parcel improperly removed from the parcel’s value the benefit of Kroger’s parking easement that allowed its patrons to park on adjacent property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the BTA erred by treating the appraiser’s adjustment as subtracting the value of Kroger’s parking easement. Rather, the appraiser evaluated the site as if it included the associated parking area and then determined the true value of the fee simple estate, as required by section 5713.03. View "Worthington City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s complaint for a writ of procedendo against Summit County Common Pleas Court Judge Christine Croce.Appellant was convicted of multiple offenses, including two counts of aggravated murder with capital specifications. Later, a visiting judge sitting by assignment held a resentencing hearing to correct a notification regarding Appellant’s postrelease control and issued a new sentencing entry. The court of appeals concluded that the visiting judge’s corrective entry should have been labeled a nunc pro tunc entry and remanded the case for that correction. On remand, Judge Croce issued the nunc pro tunc sentencing order. Appellant then filed his petition for a writ of procedendo alleging the neither the sentencing entry nor the nunc pro tunc entry was a final appealable order and asked the court to issue a writ of procedendo to compel Judge Croce to enter a revised journal entry that would be final and appealable. The court of appeals granted Judge Croce’s motion to dismiss, concluding that a writ of procedendo was not appropriate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to state a claim for a writ of procedendo. View "State ex rel. Williams v. Croce" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing Appellant’s complaint for a writ of procedendo against retired Judge Richard D. Reinbold Jr. and Summit County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mary Margaret Rowlands.In his action for a writ of procedendo Appellant alleged that he had never received a final, appealable sentencing order and asked the court to order Judge Reinbold and/or Judge Rowlands to issue a “proper” final sentencing entry. The court of appeals dismissed the case sua sponte because Appellant had an adequate remedy at law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to an extraordinary writ in this case. View "State ex rel. Payne v. Reinbold" on Justia Law

In this mandamus action, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant’s motion to waive court costs and denied Appellant’s motion to appoint counsel.Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to review a correction officer’s alleged deployment of a chemical spray in Appellant’s face that caused severe burns. Appellant also sought a waiver of the prepayment of filing fees. The court of appeals dismissed the case sua sponte. Appellant then filed a motion asking the court of appeals to waive all court costs and filing fees on the ground that he had previously been declared indigent. The court denied the motion to waive costs. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion to waive costs and moved for appointment of counsel. The Supreme Court denied the motion to appoint counsel and affirmed the denial of Appellant’s motion to waive costs, holding that Appellant’s argument was raised for the first time on appeal and was therefore beyond the scope of the appeal. View "State ex rel. Russell v. Department of Rehabilitation and Correction" on Justia Law