Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this expedited elections case, the Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition to prevent the Delaware County Board of Elections (the Board) from placing a township zoning referendum on the November 2018 ballot, holding that the referendum petition lacked sufficient signatures for placement on the ballot.The Board found that the petition had 127 valid signatures, eleven more than necessary, and certified the referendum to the November 2018 ballot. After their protest was rejected by the Board, protestors filed this prohibition action. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition and ordered the Board to remove the referendum from the ballot, holding (1) one of the part-petitions was invalid because a person other than the circulator indicated the number of signatures that the circulator had witnessed; and (2) without the signatures on that part-petition, the referendum lacked sufficient signatures and could not proceed to the ballot. View "State ex rel. McCann v. Delaware County Board of Elections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Ohio savings statute, Ohio Rev. Code 2305.19, does not apply to a federal or state court action commenced in another state that fails otherwise than upon the merits, and therefore, the attempted recommencement in an Ohio state court of the medical malpractice action in this case was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The federal court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Less than one year later, Plaintiffs filed an identical action against the same defendants in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. The trial court, relying on Howard v. Allen, 283 N.E.2d 167 (Ohio 1972), concluded that the action was untimely and granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the savings statute applied, and therefore, Plaintiffs were permitted to file the case within one year after the action failed otherwise than upon the merits, even if the applicable statute of limitations had expired. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the savings statute did not apply to this action. View "Portee v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that using a prior juvenile adjudication of delinquency for the commission of an offense that would have been felonious assault if committed by an adult as an element of the offense of having a weapon under disability, as set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2923.13(A)(2), does not violate due process under the Ohio or United States Constitutions.Appellant was indicted on one count of having a weapon while under a disability. The alleged disability stemmed from Appellant’s prior adjudication of delinquency as a juvenile for committing a felonious assault. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that his juvenile adjudication could not be used as a predicate for criminal conduct under section 2923.13(A)(2). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Appellant was subsequently convicted and sentenced. The court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a previous juvenile adjudication may be an element of the weapons-under-disability offense set forth in section 2923.13(A)(2) without violating due process. View "State v. Carnes" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) was how best to determine the true value of a low income housing property that is both rent restricted and rent subsidized.Appellant, the property owner in this case, argued that rents as derived from rent-restricted comparable should be used in determining the true value of such a property but that the property’s rent subsidies should be excluded from consideration. The board of education, however, argued that the property’s actual rents, which include tenant-paid rent and rent subsidies, should be used. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision, holding that the BTA failed to weigh and analyze a potentially material piece of evidence presented by Appellant, and given the BTA’s failure to discharge its duty as the finder of fact, the case must be remanded with instruction that the BTA “explicitly account” for the evidence at issue, along with other evidence. View "Columbus City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopting the property value stated in an appraisal report presented by the Licking Heights Local Schools Board of Education (BOE), holding that the property owner’s jurisdictional challenges to the decision below were unavailing.On appeal, the property owner argued (1) its withdrawal of the complaint it originally filed for tax year 2011 deprived the Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) of jurisdiction to proceed on the BOE’s countercomplaint; and (2) the BOR’s jurisdiction was limited to consideration of the land value because the property owner’s original complaint contested the land value and not the value of improvements. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding (1) the voluntary dismissal of a complaint filed under Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(A) does not retroactively invalidate a complaint filed under section 5715.19(B); and (2) the administrative tribunals’ jurisdiction under the BOE’s complaint was not limited to determining land value. View "Licking Heights Local Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals that affirmed Appellant’s convictions and sentence, holding that the juvenile court’s failure to consider and apply Ohio Rev. Code 2152.021 - Ohio’s safe harbor law that benefits certain human-trafficking victims charged with juvenile delinquency - did not invalidate the court’s discretionary transfer of Appellant’s case to adult court.The juvenile court in this case found that Appellant had suffered a “very clear history of human trafficking.” Despite this finding, the juvenile court did not make any finding with respect to whether the charges related to Appellant’s victimization and did not appoint a guardian ad litem for her in the juvenile court. The court then transferred her case to adult court. Appellant pled guilty to aggravated murder and was sentenced to twenty-one years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that by pleading guilty, Appellant had waived her ability to raise the juvenile court’s error in failing to consider section 2152.021(F). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant did not object to the juvenile court’s failure to consider the applicability of section 2152.021(F), the criminal plain-error standard applied; and (2) Appellant did not carry her burden of demonstrating plain error. View "State v. Martin" on Justia Law

At issue was whether an exception in Ohio law providing that jail-time credit does not apply to the portion of a prison sentence that is imposed for a firearm specification, as applied in this case, violates equal-protection guarantees.Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate prison term that included two mandatory terms for firearm specifications. Before sentencing, Defendant filed a motion to credit the time that he had served in jail prior to sentencing toward the four years that he needed to serve for the firearm specifications. The trial court determined that the jail-time credit should be applied only to Defendant’s prison terms imposed for the underlying felonies. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the failure to apply jail-time credit to Defendant’s firearm-specification terms would risk an equal protection violation should Defendant be granted judicial release. The Supreme Court revered, holding (1) the plain language of Ohio Rev. Code 2929.14(B)(1)(b) does not allow jail-time credit to be applied to mandatory firearm-specification sentences; and (2) there was no equal protection violation in this case. View "State v. Moore" on Justia Law

In this original action brought under Article II, Section 1g of the Ohio Constitution, the Supreme Court sustained the challenge brought by Relators regarding an initiative petition to place a proposed constitutional amendment on the November 6, 2018 ballot, concluding that Relators showed that Ohio law required invalidation of the petition.The proposed constitutional amendment at issue was called the “Kidney Dialysis Patient Protection Amendment.” Relators - the Kidney Dialysis Patient Protection Committee and its individual members and Secretary of State Jon Husted - argued in part that the petition must be invalidated because several circulation managers failed to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 3501.381(A). The Supreme Court invalidated the petition, holding that Relators demonstrated violations of section 3501.381(A) and that the constitutional challenges to that statute were without merit. View "Ohio Renal Ass’n v. Kidney Dialysis Patient Protection Amendment Committee" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant’s complaint for writs of prohibition and procedendo against Darke County Court of Common Pleas Judge Jonathan P. Hein, holding that Appellant was not entitled to either writ.In his complaint, Appellant asked for a writ of procedendo directing Judge Hein to vacate an order confirming the sale of property at a foreclosure sale. The court of appeals dismissed the procedendo claim as seeking the wrong form of relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that procedendo was inappropriate because Appellant sought to undo a court order rather than to compel the judge to issue a ruling. As to the request for a writ of prohibition, the Supreme Court held that even if Appellant had sought to undo the confirmation order through a writ of prohibition, that request would be moot because the court of appeals had already vacated the confirmation order. Lastly, Appellant had an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal. View "State ex rel. Sponaugle v. Hein" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question certified to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit by holding that Ohio Rev. Code 1707.43, a provision of the Ohio Securities Act, does not impose joint and several liability on persons who aided in the purchase of illegal securities but did not participate or aid in the sale of the illegal securities.Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in federal court seeking to hold Defendants, two trust companies, liable under the Ohio Securities Act, Ohio Rev. Code 1707.01 et seq., for their alleged roles in a Ponzi scheme. The district court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss, holding that the trust companies’ mere involvement in the transactions at issue was insufficient to impose liability on them under the Act. The court of appeals then certified the above question to the Supreme Court. The Court answered that section 1707.43 does not impose joint and several liability on a person who, acting as the custodian of a self-directed individual retirement account (IRA), purchased, on behalf and at the direction of the owner of the self-directed IRA, illegal securities. View "Boyd v. Kingdom Trust Co." on Justia Law