Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition against Robert C. McClelland, a Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court judge, holding that Appellant was not entitled to either writ.Appellant pleaded guilty to five counts of gross sexual imposition and was sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. Appellant later filed a petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition in the court of appeals seeking an order compelling Judge McClelland to vacate as void a journal entry dismissing the first indictment in his criminal case. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court properly dismissed the first indictment and that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even if the dismissal had been granted in error, Appellant did not demonstrate that he lacked an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. View "State ex rel. Steele v. McClelland" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s suppression of 150 individually wrapped pieces of marijuana-infused candy contained in two sealed Priority Mail envelopes located inside an open box on the back seat of Defendant’s vehicle during a traffic stop, holding that the search of the envelopes and the duration of the traffic stop were not in violation of Defendant’s constitutional rights.Specifically, the Court held that after finding marijuana and other drug paraphernalia in Defendant’s car, the arresting officer had probable cause to open the envelopes and had the right to detain Defendant for as long as reasonably necessary to complete the search of the vehicle. View "State v. Vega" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the Industrial Commission and granted Jackson Tube Service Inc.’s request for a writ of mandamus compelling the commission to vacate its order that granted Chad Thompson’s application for an additional award due to the violation of a specific safety requirement (VSRR) and to issue an order denying the VSSR application, holding that there was no evidence to support the commission’s decision to grant the VSSR award.Thompson’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for a femur fracture. Thompson also filed an application for a VSSR award. The commission granted the VSSR application and rejected Jackson Tube’s argument that it was impossible to comply with the specific safety requirement. On appeal, Jackson Tube argued that the court of appeals erred when it rejected Jackson Tube’s impossibility defense. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the commission abused its discretion in granting the VSSR award because it relied on speculative testimony regarding the existence of alternative means of performance proved nonexistent and that the evidence demonstrated that Jackson Tube established the defense of impossibility. View "State ex rel. Jackson Tube Service, Inc. v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

In determining whether John Klein was entitled to continued temporary-total-disability compensation where he voluntarily left his position of employment for reasons unrelated to his workplace injury, the Supreme Court overruled State ex. Rel. Reitter Stucco, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 881 N.E. 2d 861 (Ohio 2008), and State ex rel. OmniSource Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 865 N.E.2d 41 (Ohio 2007), and applied the longstanding principles of voluntary abandonment to Klein’s claim for temporary-total-disability compensation.On Klein’s request for mandamus, the court of appeals determined that the Industrial Commission of Ohio abused its discretion in determining that Klein voluntarily abandoned his employment at Precision Excavating & Grading Company for reasons unrelated to his workplace injury without determining whether Klein was medically capable of returning to work. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and denied the writ of mandamus, holding that when a workers’ compensation claimant voluntarily removes himself from his former position of employment for reasons unrelated to his workplace injury, he is not eligible for temporary-total-disability compensation even if he remains disabled at the time of his separation from employment. View "State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co." on Justia Law

At issue was how to determine whether a plaintiff who alleges that he or she suffers from lung cancer as a result of asbestos exposure is a “smoker” who needs to satisfy the requirements listed in Ohio Rev. Code 2307.92(C)(1), including a medical diagnosis that exposure to asbestos was a substantial contributing factor to a plaintiff’s primary lung cancer.Plaintiff in this case did not attempt to make the prima facie showing required under section 2307.92(C)(1). Union Carbide argued that medical records showed that Plaintiff had a history of smoking and, therefore, Plaintiff should be required to prove that he is a nonsmoker by means of a written medical report. The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that whether someone is a smoker is a question of fact, rather than a medical determination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a defendant can require a plaintiff to make a prima facie case that satisfies the requirements listed in section 2307.92(C)(1) only by submitting a written report from a “competent medical authority” that specifies that the plaintiff has smoked the equivalent of “one-pack year” during the last fifteen years. View "Turner v. CertainTeed Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio’s (PUCO) motion to dismiss LMD Integrated Logistic Services, Inc.’s appeal from a civil forfeiture order, holding that a party appealing an order of the PUCO pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4923.99 is not required to file a notice of appeal with PUCO to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court.LMD initiated its appeal in this case by filing its notice of appeal with the court of appeals and serving a copy of that notice on the member of PUCO, in accordance with section 4923.99(D). PUCO, however, argued that the appeal should be dismissed because LMD did not file its notice of appeal with PUCO. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the appellate court did not err in ruling that its jurisdiction had been properly invoked. View "In re LMD Integrated Logistics Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In this real-property tax case, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopting a certain property’s sale price without considering the appraisal offered by the property owner, holding that the BTA did not properly perform its fact-finding duties.The property at issue was a single-tenant office building occupied by J.P. Morgan Chase under a net lease. On appeal, the BTA noted that under the applicable version of Ohio Rev. Code 5713.03, the fee-simple estate must be valued as if unencumbered. Nonetheless, the BTA adhered to caselaw applying an earlier version of the statute that emphasized the use of the sale price to determine value. The BTA then adopted the November 2013 sale price as the property value for tax year 2013. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that appraisal evidence is relevant and admissible, that no threshold showing was required before a tax tribunal must give full consideration to appraisal evidence, and that remand was required for further proceedings. View "Westerville City School District Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

In this real-property tax case, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopting a certain property’s sale price without giving full consideration to the appraisal offered by the property owner, holding that the BTA did not act reasonably and lawfully.At issue was the tax-year 2014 value of a single-tenant building occupied by J.P. Morgan Chase under a net lease. Although, under the amended version of Ohio Rev. Code 5713.03 appraisal evidence is admissible and competent alongside sale-price in determining a property’s value, the BTA adopted the property’s sale price without giving full consideration to appraisal evidence. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the BTA, holding that the BTA did not properly perform its fact-finding duties in this case. View "GC Net Lease @(3)(Westerville) Investors, LLC v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Ohio Supreme Court centered on whether whether oil-and-gas land professionals, who help obtain oil-and-gas leases for oil-and-gas-development companies, must be licensed real-estate brokers when they engage in the activities described in R.C. 4735.01(A) with respect to oil-and-gas leases. Specifically, the Court addressed address whether R.C. 4735.21 precluded a person not a licensed real-estate broker from bringing a cause of action to recover compensation allegedly owed for negotiating oil-and-gas leases. The Court concluded the plain language of R.C. 4735.01 did not exclude oil-and-gas land professionals or oil-and-gas leases from the relevant definitions set forth in the statute; appellants Thomas Dundics and his company, IBIS Land Group, Ltd., engaged in activities that required a real-estate-broker’s license and were precluded from bringing a cause of action to recover compensation for those activities. View "Dundics v. Eric Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ of mandamus sought Relators seeking to compel the Board of Trustees of Perry Township in Stark County to place a tax levy on the November 6, 2018 ballot, holding that Relators did not establish that they were entitled to a writ of mandamus.The Board disqualified the proposed levy from the November 2018 ballot because Relators’ resolution and the proposed ballot language stated that the renewal and increase would have commenced in tax year 2018, the final year of the existing levy. The Supreme Court denied Relators’ request for a writ of mandamus, holding that Relators failed to establish that (1) the Board had a clear legal duty to place the proposed renewal-and-increase levy, commencing in the final year of the existing levy, on the ballot; or (2) Secretary of State Jon Husted failed to perform any clear legal duty. View "State ex rel. Perry Township Board of Trustees v. Husted" on Justia Law