Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case involving the manner in which earnings from commissions figure into the calculation of child support, the Supreme Court held that Ohio Rev. Code 3119.05(D) covers income earned from commissions and that the juvenile court and court of appeals erred by failing to apply its mandatory terms.After a magistrate awarded child support to Mother, Father objected to the child-support determinations, asserting that the magistrate erred in including projected commissions when calculating his gross income. The juvenile court adopted the order of the magistrate. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that commissions were not governed by section 3119.05(D), and therefore, the trial court did not err by including Father's projected commissions in its calculation of his gross annual income. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that commissions are included with the terms of section 3119.05(D) and must be calculated as provided in that section when determining a parent's annual gross income. View "A.S. v. J.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this original action in mandamus for failure to state a claim, holding that Relator was not entitled to mandamus relief.Relator, an inmate, brought this action against Respondents, nine public officials in Scioto and Franklin Counties, seeking to compel Respondents to investigate and prosecute his allegations of criminal activity and to issue arrest warrants based on the allegations. Respondents filed motions to dismiss, arguing that the complaint failed to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25's filing requirements. The Supreme Court denied the motions to dismiss because section 2969.25 did not apply. Under an independent assessment of the sufficiency of the mandamus complaint, the Court nonetheless dismissed the complaint, holding that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief in mandamus because Relator failed to allege facts that, if proved, would establish a clear legal duty to act on the part of Respondents. View "State ex rel. Evans v. Tieman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Ohio Power Siting Board approving the application of 6011 Greenwich Windpark, LLC to add three new wind-turbine models to the list of turbines suitable for Greenwich Windpark's proposed wind farm in Huron County, holding that the Board's approval of Greenwich Windpark's application did not require an amendment of its certificate.On appeal, Appellant argued that, in approving the proposed changes, the Board acted unlawfully and unreasonably by refusing to subject Greenwich Windpark's application to the enhanced minimum turbine-setback requirements applicable to any certificate "amendment" under the current versions of Ohio Rev. Code 4906.20 and 4906.201. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board adopted a reasonable and practical approach for determining when an amendment is necessary for purposes of the statutes and that, under the circumstances, the Board's decision was not unlawful or unreasonable. View "In re Application of 6011 Greenwich Windpark, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) that modified and approved an electric-security plan (ESP) for the FirstEnergy Companies, holding that the Commission erred in modifying the ESP to add a distribution modernization rider (DMR) that was not part of the original application.The Commission concluded that the DMR, which allowed the FirstEnergy Companies to collect between $168 to $204 million in extra revenue per year, was valid under Ohio Rev. Code 4928.143(B)(2)(h) because the revenue it generated would purportedly serve as an incentive for the companies to modernize their distribution systems. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission's order as it related to the DMR and remanded with instructions to remove the DMR for the companies' ESP, holding that the DMR did not qualify as a proper incentive under section 4928.143(B)(2)(h) and that the conditions placed on the recovery of DMR revenue were not sufficient to protect ratepayers. View "In re Application of Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted C.V.'s request for a writ of prohibition against the Greene County Juvenile Court judge, holding that C.V. was entitled to a writ of prohibition against the Greene County Juvenile Court judge on the ground that he patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to approve C.V.'s agreement to permanently surrender her child to the custody of Adoption Link, Inc.C.V. did not know she was pregnant when she gave birth to N.V. Four days later, C.V. executed a permanent surrender of child agreement, assigning permanent custody of N.V. to Adoption Link. The juvenile court judge approved the surrender agreement, granted Adoption Link permanent custody, and terminated C.V.'s parental rights. The Supreme Court held (1) the juvenile court judge's purported approval of the surrender agreement between C.V. and Adoption Link was a legal nullity and must be voided; (2) C.V.'s request for a writ of prohibition against the Greene County Probate Court judge to prevent him from exercising power over N.V.'s adoption proceedings is denied; and (3) C.V.'s request for a writ of habeas corpus is denied because C.V. has an adequate remedy available to her in the ordinary course of law. View "State ex rel. C.V. v. Adoption Link, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that Appellant's petition failed to comply with the requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2725.04(D).Appellant was imprisoned for various offenses. Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the warden of the Marion Correctional Institution claiming that his maximum aggregate sentence had expired. The court of appeals granted the warden's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, holding that Appellant had failed to attach relevant commitment papers and that his claims were barred by res judicata. View "Dailey v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition to bar East Cleveland Municipal Court Judge William Dawson from continuing to preside over Euclid Lake Properties, LLC. v. Tri Eagle Fuels, LLC, East Cleveland M.C. case No. 17CVG01000, holding that jurisdiction was not patently and unambiguously lacking in the municipal court.Lessee signed a commercial lease to rent certain property from Lessor for fifteen years. After Lessor alleged that Lessee was in default of the lease and served Lessee with a notice to vacate the premises Lessee filed suit alleging that Lessor, in fact, had breached the lease. Before Lessor filed an answer it filed a forcible-entry-and-detainer (FE&D) action against Lessee. The case was assigned to Judge Dawson. Lessee filed an original action for a writ of prohibition alleging that Judge Dawson lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the municipal court case based on the jurisdictional priority rule. The court of appeals denied the writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge Dawson was not deprived of jurisdiction over the FE&D action. View "State ex rel. Tri Eagle Fuels, LLC v. Dawson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals vacating Defendant's convictions for violation of Defendant's right to a speedy trial, holding that speedy-trial time is tolled when a defendant's request for a continuance is made in open court and on the record or the reasons for the request are evidence from the record.The trial court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the misdemeanor charges against her for violation of her right to a speedy trial, concluding that, after factoring in the periods of delay attributable to Defendant, ninety days had not elapsed from the date of her arrest to the date she filed her motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed and vacated Defendant's convictions, holding that the continuances in this case, while entered on behalf of Defendant, must be charged against the State because the trial court's journal entries either failed to identify Defendant as the requesting party or failed to explain the precise reasons for the delay. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that speedy-trial time is not chargeable to the State when the reasons for the defendant's request for a continuance are evident from the record, regardless of whether or not the trial court specifically journalizes those reasons on its docket sheet. View "State v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals denying Appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment and denied the five motions that Appellant filed in this case, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion.Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus arguing that he was entitled to be released from prison. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint, concluding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus. Appellant then filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion seeking relief from the court of appeals' judgment. The court of appeals denied the motion. Appellant later moved for relief from judgment on the same grounds previously asserted. The court of appeals denied the motion on res judicata grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed after denying the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction's motion to dismiss, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly denied Appellant's second Civ.R. 60(B) motion on the basis of res judicata; and (2) none of Appellant's pending motions had merit. View "State ex rel. Richard v. Chambers-Smith" on Justia Law

In this quo warranto case in which the attorney general sought to dissolve Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque, Inc. the Supreme Court granted Appellants' motion for reconsideration of the Court's decision affirming the decision of the court of appeals granting the writ, vacated its earlier decision, reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, and remanded the case with instructions to deny the writ, holding that this Court's initial decision was in error.The Ohio attorney general filed a complaint for a writ of quo warranto seeking to dissolve the corporation and appoint a receiver, alleging that the corporation violated three rules of corporate governance. The court of appeals issued a writ of quo warranto. The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court subsequently granted Appellants' motion for reconsideration and held that the writ should not issue. View "State ex rel. Yost v. Omar Ibn El Khattab Mosque, Inc." on Justia Law