Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals denying Byington Builders, Ltd.’s request for a writ of mandamus compelling the Industrial Commission to vacate its award to Thomas Trousdale of additional compensation for Byington’s violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), holding that although aspects of the Court of Appeals’ analysis were flawed, that court reached the correct result.Trousdale fell from a pitched roof of a two-story building while working for Byington. Trousdale’s workers’ compensation benefits claim was allowed for several injuries. Trousdale then filed an application for an additional award for a VSSR, claiming that Byington violated specific safety requirements. The Commission denied Trousdale’s VSSR application in part and granted it in part and awarded additional compensation in the amount of forty percent of Trousdale’s maximum weekly rate due to this VSSR. Byington then filed its mandamus complaint seeking a writ directing the Commission to vacate its prior decisions and to enter an order denying Trousdale’s request for a VSSR award. The Court of Appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in granting Trousdale a VSSR award, and the Court of Appeals did not err in denying Byington’s request for a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Byington Builders, Ltd. v. Industrial Commission" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant’s complaint for writs of mandamus and prohibition against Richland County Court of Common Pleas Judge James DeWeese seeking to compel Judge DeWeese to enter a final, appealable order on prior rulings made by Judge James Henson, vacate several orders Judge DeWeese had entered in the underlying case, and bar Judge DeWeese from moving forward with a trial, holding that Appellant was not entitled to the relief it sought.Appellant filed a complaint for breach of contract. Judge Henson granted summary judgment in favor of Appellant as to certain defendants. The trial court then awarded Appellant attorney fees. While appeals that were ultimately dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order were pending Judge Henson retired, and the case was reassigned to Judge DeWeese. Judge DeWeese vacated the summary judgment orders and granted summary judgment for one defendant. Appellant then filed this action. The court of appeals denied relief, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Judge DeWeese clearly exercised jurisdiction in the underlying case, and that exercise of jurisdiction was authorized; and (2) because Appellant could not show that it had clear legal right to relief, it was not entitled to a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Technical Construction Specialties, Inc. v. DeWeese" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court determining that Ohio Rev. Code 2947.23(C) permits trial courts to waive, modify or suspend payment of only those court costs that were imposed after the statute’s effective date, holding that the statute does not authorize a trial court to waive, modify, or suspend the payment of court costs that were imposed prior to March 22, 2013, the effective date of section 2947.23(C).In this case, the trial court ordered Defendant to pay court costs at a sentencing hearing in 1999, and Defendant failed to move for a waiver of costs. The Supreme Court noted that section 2947.23(C) provides that for sentences entered on or after March 23, 2013, the trial court retains jurisdiction to waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of prosecution at time. The Court then held that for sentences entered prior to that date, an offender may only seek waiver of costs at sentencing and any subsequent collateral attack on the court’s order is barred by res judicata. In the instant case, the Court held that res judicata precluded the motion Defendant filed to waive the payment of all fines and costs. View "State v. Braden" on Justia Law

At issue was whether Intermessage Communications and members of a proposed class of retail cellular-telephone-service subscribers seeking to recover treble damages under Ohio Rev. Code 4905.61 for regulatory violations related to the wholesale cellular-service market committed in the 1990s, as determined by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO), had standing to bring this action.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s decision to certify the class and dismissed this matter, holding that Intermessage and the proposed class of retail cellular-service subscribers lacked standing to bring an action pursuant to section 4905.61 because the language of the statute limits recovery of treble damages to the “person, firm, or corporation” directly injured as a result of the “violation, failure, or omission” found by the PUCO. View "Satterfield v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing Defendant’s conviction and discharging him from further prosecution after the trial court accepted Defendant’s plea of no contest to a charge of cruelty to animals and finding Defendant guilty but neglecting to ask for an explanation of the circumstances, holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar Defendant’s retrial.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to obtain an explanation of the circumstances before finding him guilty. The court of appeals agreed, reversed Defendant’s conviction and, reasoning that the reversal was based on insufficient evidence, concluded that jeopardy had attached and barred further proceedings against Defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the reversal of Defendant’s conviction was not based on insufficiency of the evidence, but, rather, on a procedural error; and (2) therefore, the double jeopardy protection did not bar Defendant’s retrial. View "Girard v. Giordano" on Justia Law

At issue was what type of reference within a chain of title is sufficient to preserve an earlier-created interest under Ohio’s Marketable Title Act, which generally allows a landowner who has an unbroken chain of title to land for a forty-year period to transfer title free of interests that existed prior to the beginning of the chain of title unless sufficient reference is made to interests within that chain of title.Landowners sought to extinguish an oil-and-gas royalty interest created in 1915. Landowners argued that a reference in a deed in their chain of title to the royalty interest, as well as the original holder of the interest, was not sufficient to preserve the interest because it did not include either the volume and page number of the record in which the interest was recorded or the date on which the interest was recorded. The court of appeals concluded that Landowners’ title remained subject to the royalty interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a reference that includes the type of interest created and to whom the interest was granted is sufficiently specific to preserve the interest in the record title. View "Blackstone v. Moore" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court’s decision denying Defendant’s Motion to Vacate Judicial Sanction and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that postrelease control was properly imposed.Defendant was sentenced by the common pleas court to a prison term and to post-release control. Defendant later pleaded guilty to robbery and theft. The trial court found that Defendant was on post-release control at the time he committed the offenses, terminated the post-release control, and ordered that the remainder of the post-release control be served as a prison term. Defendant moved to vacate the judicial sanction, but the trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the failure to the common pleas court sentencing entry to advise Defendant to the consequences contained within Ohio Rev. Code 2929.141(A) prohibited the sanctions from being imposed. The Supreme Court reversed based on State v. Gordon, 109 N.E.3d 1201 (Ohio 2018), and State v. Grimes, 85 N.E.3d 700 (Ohio 2017), holding that a trial court is not required to notify an offender of the penalty provisions for violating postrelease control contained in section 2929.141(A). View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Cora Sue Bell and concluding that Embassy Healthcare could pursue its claim against Cora individually under Ohio Rev. Code 3103.03, Ohio’s necessaries statute, and was not required to present its claim to the estate of her deceased husband, Robert Bell, holding that a creditor’s failure to present its claim for unpaid expenses to a decedent’s estate within the six-month statute of limitations in Ohio Rev. Code 2117.06 bars a later action against the decedent’s surviving spouse under section 3103.03.The court of appeals concluded that Embassy could pursue its claim for Robert’s unpaid nursing-facility expenses against Cora individually under section 3103.03 and was not required to present its claim first to Robert’s estate under section 2117.06. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that a creditor must present its claim for unpaid necessaries to the decedent’s estate under Ohio Rev. Code 2117.06 before it can pursue a claim individually against the surviving spouse under section 3103.03. View "Embassy Healthcare v. Bell" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) that the service provided by Seaton Corporation to Kal Kan Foods, Inc. was not a taxable “employment service” under Ohio Rev. Code 5739.01(B)(3)(k) and 5739.01(JJ) was reasonable and lawful.Seaton agreed to furnish, manage and supervise supplemental staffing to assist in production operations at Kal Kan’s manufacturing plant in Columbus, Ohio. The tax commission levied a sales-tax assessment against Seaton and a use-tax assessment against Kal Kan. The BTA found that the service at issue was not taxable because Seaton, not Kal Kan, supervised and controlled the workers that Seaton supplied to Kal Kan’s plant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA properly analyzed which entity exercised supervision or control over the work performed by Seaton’s workers at Kal Kan’s plant, and those factual findings were supported by the record; and (2) therefore, the BTA’s decision was reasonable and lawful. View "Seaton Corp. v. Testa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this defamation case to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the cap in Ohio Rev. Code 2315.18 that applies to tort actions seeking noneconomic loss as a result of an alleged injury or loss to a person or property also applies to defamation.Plaintiff filed this civil complaint against Defendant, alleging several claims. At trial, the only claim submitted to the jury was for defamation. The jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded her $800,000 in compensatory damages and $750,000 in punitive damages. Defendant appealed, arguing that the amount awarded in damages was in excess of the applicable caps on damages set forth in section 2315.18(B)(2). The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the cap on damages for noneconomic loss set forth in section 2315.18(B)(2) unambiguously caps the noneconomic damages that can be recovered as a result of defamation. View "Wayt v. DHSC, LLC" on Justia Law