Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s complaint for a writ of mandamus against Montgomery County Common Pleas Court Judge Dennis J. Langer, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law and thus was not entitled to relief in mandamus.Appellant was convicted of four counts of rape and other offenses. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Appellant later filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus asking the court of appeals to compel Judge Langer to issue a revised sentencing entry that complied with Crim.R. 32(C), asserting that his sentencing entry was not a final, appealable order. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint, concluding that Appellant could have raised his mandamus claim in an appeal from the trial court’s judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the entry denying Appellant’s motion for a new sentencing order was a final, appealable order pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2505.02(B)(1), and therefore, Appellant was not entitled to relief in mandamus. View "State ex rel. Henley v. Langer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence of Appellant, who murdered his mother, but reversed an aggravated robbery charge against him that was used as one of three specifications supporting the prosecution’s effort to seek the death penalty.The Supreme Court held (1) the trial court did not err in overruling Defendant’s motion to suppress; (2) no prejudicial error occurred during jury selection; (3) the trial court erred in admitting certain other acts evidence, but the errors were harmless; (4) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing argument; (5) Defendant’s sentence was appropriate; (6) any error on the part of defense counsel during the penalty phase was harmless; (7) cumulative errors did not render Defendant’s trial unfair; and (8) the evidence failed to support the finding that Defendant “deprived” the victim of property or that Defendant’s “purpose” was to deprive the victim of the property at issue. View "State v. Tench" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant’s petition for writs of mandamus and/or procedendo that he filed against Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge John J. Russo, holding that Appellant could not prove entitlement to either writ because the record demonstrated that he had an adequate remedy by way of an appeal from the denial of his motion for a final, appealable order.Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated murder and two counts of aggravated burglary. Appellant later filed a motion in the trial court for a final, appealable order, arguing that the sentencing entry in his case violated Crim.R 32. Judge Russo denied the motion. Appellant then filed this action. The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of Judge Russo and denied the writs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding Appellant was not entitled to a writ of mandamus or procedendo because he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law in the form of a direct appeal from Judge Russo’s entry denying Appellant’s motion for a new sentencing entry. View "State ex rel. Daniels v. Russo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part the writ of mandamus requested by Relators to compel the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction (DRC) to release records related to DRC’s acquisition and supply of lethal-injection drugs, holding that Relators had a clear legal right to access certain sealed records with protected information redacted but that other information was exempt from public disclosure.At issue was sealed records identified in DRC’s Exhibit 7 log and Exhibit 8 log. The Supreme Court held (1) Relators had a clear legal right to access the sealed records in the Exhibit 7 log with only protected information redacted that could identify an entity requesting confidentiality under Ohio Rev. Code 2949.221; (2) because one letter in Exhibit 7 contained protected information that was inextricably intertwined with nonprotected information, it was exempt from disclosure; and (3) Relators failed to establish a clear legal right to compel DRC to produce the sealed records identified in the Exhibit 8 log, which were created or received by DRC after the date of Relators’ request. View "State ex rel. Hogan Lovells U.S., LLP v. Department of Rehabilitation & Correction" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s complaint for a writ of mandamus against Mahoning County Common Pleas Court Judge Lou A. D’Apolito, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.In his complaint for a writ of mandamus Appellant sought to vacate a default judgment and a foreclosure judgment foreclosing on his property. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Appellant before the entry of the default judgment and the foreclosure decree, Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law by a direct appeal of those orders. View "State ex rel. Washington v. D'Apolito" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying David Murray’s petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the State Employee Relations Board’s (SERB) dismissal of Murray’s unfair labor practice charges against the City of Columbus and the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) as untimely, holding that the SERB did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Murray’s unfair labor practice charges.After being fired from his job as a police officer, Murray sought to regain his employment through arbitration involving the City and his union, the FOP. Dissatisfied with the way the arbitration was handled, Murray brought two unfair labor practice charges against the City and the FOP. SERB dismissed all of the charges, concluding that they had been filed outside the ninety-day statute of limitations applicable to each charge. Murray then filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel that the charges be set for a hearing. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the SERB correctly dismissed the charges as untimely. View "State ex rel. Murray v. State Employment Relations Board" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant on postrelease control for a prior felony must be advised, during his plea hearing in a new felony case, of the trial court’s ability under Ohio Rev. Code 2929.141 to terminate his existing postrelease control and to impose a consecutive prison sentence for the postrelease-control violation.While on postrelease control for a prior felony conviction Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of heroin. The trial court did not inform Defendant that once he pleaded guilty the court would have the authority under section 2929.14 to terminate his existing postrelease control and impose a prison term to be served consecutively to the term of imprisonment imposed for the possession offense. The trial court subsequently sentenced Defendant to a nine months in prison for the possession offense and, for the postrelease-control violation, ordered Defendant to serve a one-year prison term under section 2929.141 consecutively to the sentence for the possession offense. The appellate court reversed and vacated Defendant’s guilty plea, concluding that the trial court erred by failing to advise Defendant, at the time of his plea, that he could have to serve an additional, consecutive sentence for his current postrelease control violation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Crim.R. 11(C) requires that advisement. View "State v. Bishop" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant’s complaint for a writ of mandamus against the director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC), holding that there was no error in the court of appeals’ judgment.Appellant, an inmate, filed a complaint requesting a writ of mandamus to order DRC to remove a federal detainer that Appellant alleged was erroneously placed on his prison record. After DRC removed the detainer, the director filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion for declaratory judgment seeking to prevent placement of future detainers. The court of appeals dismissed the complaint as moot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals (1) properly dismissed Appellant’s complaint because the detainer was no longer on Appellant’s prison record; (2) correctly denied Appellant’s motion for declaratory judgment; and (3) did not err in denying Appellant’s motion for summary judgment. View "State ex rel. Evans v. Mohr" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered two state-law questions from the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals by holding that the failure to identify a person who has initialed, signed, and acknowledged a mortgage agreement by name in the body of the agreement does not render the agreement unenforceable as a matter of law against that signatory.The panel specifically asked whether a mortgage is invalid and unenforceable against a signatory who is not identified by name in the body of the mortgage agreement. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that, as a matter of general contract interpretation, it is possible for a person who is not identified in the body of the mortgage, but who has signed and initiated the mortgage, to be a mortgagor of her interest. View "Bank of New York Mellon v. Rhiel" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a certified question from the Unitde States District Court by holding that Ohio Rev. Code 4123.35(O) is not unconstitutional as applied to the tort claims of an enrolled subcontractor’s employee who is injured while working on a self-insured construction project and whose injury is compensable under Ohio’s workers’ compensation laws.Daniel Stolz was injured while working as a concrete finisher for Jostin Construction. Jostin was a subcontractor of Messer Construction Company, the general contractor for the project. Under section 4123.35(O), Messer provided workers’ compensation coverage on the project for employees of subcontractors like Jostin that chose to enroll in Messer’s self-insurance plan. Stolz eventually sued Messer and several subcontractors for negligence. Messer and three enrolled subcontractors argued that they were immune from liability under section 4123.35(O). The Supreme Court concluded that the statute provides immunity to both general contractors and enrolled subcontractors from tort claims brought by employees of other enrolled subcontractors. Stolz later amended his complaint to allege that section 4123.35(O) is unconstitutional. The enrolled subcontractors petitioned the district court to certify a question of state law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that section 4123.35(O) does not violate the Ohio Constitution’s right-to-remedy, right-to-jury, or equal-protection provisions. View "Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc." on Justia Law