Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this tort action against Cuyahoga County the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the lower courts applying Ohio Rev. Code 2744.09(B) to reject the County's assertion of political subdivision immunity, holding that section 2744.09(B) does not require a plaintiff to have been employed by the political-subdivision employer at the time the plaintiff filed the lawsuit.Section 2744.09(B) provides that the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act does not apply to civil actions by an employee "against his political subdivision relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship between the employee and the political subdivision." Plaintiff sued the County, her former employer, for false-light invasion of privacy based on a statement allegedly made regarding the termination of Plaintiff's employment. The trial court denied the County's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's claim arose out of her employment relationship with the County, and the County was not immune from liability pursuant to the express exception in section 2744.09(B). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute does not require an ongoing employment relationship between the plaintiff and the political-subdivision employer; and (2) Plaintiff's false-light claim was relative to a matter that arose out of the employment relationship in this case. View "Piazza v. Cuyahoga County" on Justia Law

In this case involving the correct interpretation of Ohio Rev. Code 3107.07(A), the statute that sets forth when the adoption of a minor child may proceed without a parent's consent, the Supreme Court held that a parent's nonsupport of his or her minor child pursuant to a judicial decree does not extinguish the requirement of that parent's consent to the adoption of the child.Appellant, the child's stepfather, filed a petition seeking to adopt B.I. and arguing that Father's consent was not required under section 3107.07(A) because Father had failed to provide support for B.I. during the year preceding the filing of the petition. During that year, Father was not subject to a child-support order pursuant to a zero-support order. The magistrate concluded that Father's consent to the adoption was not required. The probate court overruled the magistrate, concluding that a valid, zero-support order provides justifiable cause for a failure to provide maintenance and support under section 3107.07(A). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, pursuant to section 3107.07(A), a parent's nonsupport of his or her minor child pursuant to a zero-support order of a court of competent jurisdiction does not extinguish the requirement of that parent's consent to the adoption of the child. View "In re Adoption of B.I." on Justia Law

In this case involving the manner in which earnings from commissions figure into the calculation of child support, the Supreme Court held that Ohio Rev. Code 3119.05(D) covers income earned from commissions and that the juvenile court and court of appeals erred by failing to apply its mandatory terms.After a magistrate awarded child support to Mother, Father objected to the child-support determinations, asserting that the magistrate erred in including projected commissions when calculating his gross income. The juvenile court adopted the order of the magistrate. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that commissions were not governed by section 3119.05(D), and therefore, the trial court did not err by including Father's projected commissions in its calculation of his gross annual income. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that commissions are included with the terms of section 3119.05(D) and must be calculated as provided in that section when determining a parent's annual gross income. View "A.S. v. J.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this original action in mandamus for failure to state a claim, holding that Relator was not entitled to mandamus relief.Relator, an inmate, brought this action against Respondents, nine public officials in Scioto and Franklin Counties, seeking to compel Respondents to investigate and prosecute his allegations of criminal activity and to issue arrest warrants based on the allegations. Respondents filed motions to dismiss, arguing that the complaint failed to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25's filing requirements. The Supreme Court denied the motions to dismiss because section 2969.25 did not apply. Under an independent assessment of the sufficiency of the mandamus complaint, the Court nonetheless dismissed the complaint, holding that the complaint failed to state a claim for relief in mandamus because Relator failed to allege facts that, if proved, would establish a clear legal duty to act on the part of Respondents. View "State ex rel. Evans v. Tieman" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Ohio Power Siting Board approving the application of 6011 Greenwich Windpark, LLC to add three new wind-turbine models to the list of turbines suitable for Greenwich Windpark's proposed wind farm in Huron County, holding that the Board's approval of Greenwich Windpark's application did not require an amendment of its certificate.On appeal, Appellant argued that, in approving the proposed changes, the Board acted unlawfully and unreasonably by refusing to subject Greenwich Windpark's application to the enhanced minimum turbine-setback requirements applicable to any certificate "amendment" under the current versions of Ohio Rev. Code 4906.20 and 4906.201. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Board adopted a reasonable and practical approach for determining when an amendment is necessary for purposes of the statutes and that, under the circumstances, the Board's decision was not unlawful or unreasonable. View "In re Application of 6011 Greenwich Windpark, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) that modified and approved an electric-security plan (ESP) for the FirstEnergy Companies, holding that the Commission erred in modifying the ESP to add a distribution modernization rider (DMR) that was not part of the original application.The Commission concluded that the DMR, which allowed the FirstEnergy Companies to collect between $168 to $204 million in extra revenue per year, was valid under Ohio Rev. Code 4928.143(B)(2)(h) because the revenue it generated would purportedly serve as an incentive for the companies to modernize their distribution systems. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission's order as it related to the DMR and remanded with instructions to remove the DMR for the companies' ESP, holding that the DMR did not qualify as a proper incentive under section 4928.143(B)(2)(h) and that the conditions placed on the recovery of DMR revenue were not sufficient to protect ratepayers. View "In re Application of Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted C.V.'s request for a writ of prohibition against the Greene County Juvenile Court judge, holding that C.V. was entitled to a writ of prohibition against the Greene County Juvenile Court judge on the ground that he patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to approve C.V.'s agreement to permanently surrender her child to the custody of Adoption Link, Inc.C.V. did not know she was pregnant when she gave birth to N.V. Four days later, C.V. executed a permanent surrender of child agreement, assigning permanent custody of N.V. to Adoption Link. The juvenile court judge approved the surrender agreement, granted Adoption Link permanent custody, and terminated C.V.'s parental rights. The Supreme Court held (1) the juvenile court judge's purported approval of the surrender agreement between C.V. and Adoption Link was a legal nullity and must be voided; (2) C.V.'s request for a writ of prohibition against the Greene County Probate Court judge to prevent him from exercising power over N.V.'s adoption proceedings is denied; and (3) C.V.'s request for a writ of habeas corpus is denied because C.V. has an adequate remedy available to her in the ordinary course of law. View "State ex rel. C.V. v. Adoption Link, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the court of appeals correctly concluded that Appellant's petition failed to comply with the requirements of Ohio Rev. Code 2725.04(D).Appellant was imprisoned for various offenses. Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the warden of the Marion Correctional Institution claiming that his maximum aggregate sentence had expired. The court of appeals granted the warden's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, holding that Appellant had failed to attach relevant commitment papers and that his claims were barred by res judicata. View "Dailey v. Wainwright" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Appellant's petition for a writ of prohibition to bar East Cleveland Municipal Court Judge William Dawson from continuing to preside over Euclid Lake Properties, LLC. v. Tri Eagle Fuels, LLC, East Cleveland M.C. case No. 17CVG01000, holding that jurisdiction was not patently and unambiguously lacking in the municipal court.Lessee signed a commercial lease to rent certain property from Lessor for fifteen years. After Lessor alleged that Lessee was in default of the lease and served Lessee with a notice to vacate the premises Lessee filed suit alleging that Lessor, in fact, had breached the lease. Before Lessor filed an answer it filed a forcible-entry-and-detainer (FE&D) action against Lessee. The case was assigned to Judge Dawson. Lessee filed an original action for a writ of prohibition alleging that Judge Dawson lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the municipal court case based on the jurisdictional priority rule. The court of appeals denied the writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge Dawson was not deprived of jurisdiction over the FE&D action. View "State ex rel. Tri Eagle Fuels, LLC v. Dawson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals vacating Defendant's convictions for violation of Defendant's right to a speedy trial, holding that speedy-trial time is tolled when a defendant's request for a continuance is made in open court and on the record or the reasons for the request are evidence from the record.The trial court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the misdemeanor charges against her for violation of her right to a speedy trial, concluding that, after factoring in the periods of delay attributable to Defendant, ninety days had not elapsed from the date of her arrest to the date she filed her motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed and vacated Defendant's convictions, holding that the continuances in this case, while entered on behalf of Defendant, must be charged against the State because the trial court's journal entries either failed to identify Defendant as the requesting party or failed to explain the precise reasons for the delay. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that speedy-trial time is not chargeable to the State when the reasons for the defendant's request for a continuance are evident from the record, regardless of whether or not the trial court specifically journalizes those reasons on its docket sheet. View "State v. Martin" on Justia Law