Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal was whether a private sanitary landfill is a public utility that is exempt from township zoning regulations pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code. 519.211. The trial court concluded that the private landfill was a public utility not subject to the zoning restrictions of the township. The court of appeals held that the landfill was entitled to the trial court's declaration that it was a public utility for purposes of section 519.211. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a privately owned sanitary landfill cannot be a common-law public utility exempt from township zoning when there is no public regulation or oversight of its rates and charges, no statutory or regulatory requirement that all solid waste delivered to the landfill be accepted for disposal, and no right of the public to demand and receive its services; and (2) thus, the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's declaration that the landfill was a public utility for purposes of section 519.211. Remanded. View "Rumpke Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Colerain Twp." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Hamilton Township, a limited-home-rule township, was authorized under Ohio law to impose its system of impact fees upon applicants for zoning certificates for new construction or redevelopment within its unincorporated areas. Appellants, several development companies, brought this action against Appellees, the Township and its trustees, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages, alleging that the impact fees were contrary to Ohio law and were unconstitutional. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Township, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the impact fees charged by the Township in this case constituted taxes; and (2) since those taxes were not authorized by general law, the Township was unauthorized to impose them pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 504.04(A)(1). View "Drees Co. v. Hamilton Twp." on Justia Law

Robert Clifton owned property contiguous to property owned by J&M Precision Machining. The Village of Blanchester annexed J&M's parcel and rezoned the entire parcel for general industrial use. Clifton filed a complaint alleging that the rezoning of J&M's property resulted in a regulatory taking of his property without just compensation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Village. The court of appeals reversed and remanded in part after finding that the trial court had failed to inquire as to whether the rezoning resulted in a partial taking. On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Village, finding that Clifton had no standing to bring a taking claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was an insufficient nexus between the rezoning of J&M's property and the alleged diminution in value of Clifton's adjacent property to indicate that Clifton was a proper party to bring a regulatory-taking claim; and (2) furthermore, because Clifton's property was outside the Village limits, the Village had no authority to appropriate his property for an alleged regulatory taking, and therefore, Clifton had no redressable claim against the Village for a regulatory taking. View "Clifton v. Blanchester" on Justia Law

The Madison County Board of Commissioners filed an appropriation action against Greg and Marcia Bell. The common pleas court entered judgment in favor of the Board. The court of appeals affirmed. The Bells then filed a civil action against various Defendants, including the Board and the common pleas court judge. The common pleas court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. Greg Bell subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court judge that presided over the earlier action, a magistrate, and certain attorneys and entities, from proceeding in the case. The court of appeals denied Bell's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Bell could prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested writ of prohibition. View "State ex rel. Bell v. Court of Common Pleas (Pfeiffer)" on Justia Law

Stanley and Kathryn Wasserman requested a writ of mandamus to compel the city and its mayor to commence an appropriation action to determine whether a taking occurred when the city's actions when constructing a reservoir on the Wasserman's property constituted a taking and how much compensation, if any, was due to the Wassermans. The court of appeals granted the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in granting the a writ of mandamus to compel the city and its mayor to commence an appropriation proceeding when the court had not yet determined that the Wassermans' property had been taken by the city. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Wasserman v. Fremont" on Justia Law

Relators, owners of land located downstream from the western spillway of Grand Lake St. Marys, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, the Ohio Department of Natural Resources and its director, to initiate appropriation proceedings for the physical taking of their property resulting from flooding caused by a spillway constructed by Respondents and the state's lake-level-management practices. Respondents contended that Relators' claim was time-barred by Ohio Rev. Code 2305.09(E). The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) based on the Court’s precedent, Relators’ mandamus claim was not barred by the four-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.09(E) because Respondents’ ongoing control tolled the running of the limitations period; (2) relators in mandamus cases must prove their entitlement to the writ by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) Relators in this case established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents, by their actions, effected a taking of at least some of Relators' property. View "State ex rel. Doner v. Zody" on Justia Law

The owner of certain property improved with a hotel challenged a valuation of its property, seeking a reduction of true value. The School District filed a countercomplaint, seeking to retain the auditor's valuation. The County Board of Revision (BOR) assigned a reduced value to the property. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed and adopted the BOR's reduced valuation. The School Board appealed, contending that the BTA erred by according deference to the BOR's decision rather than relying on its own independent weighing of the evidence. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the BTA's decision, holding that the BTA unlawfully accorded a presumption of validity to the BOR's determination of value. Remanded so that the BTA could determine whether there was sufficient evidence to permit it to perform an independent valuation of the property. View "Vandalia-Butler City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, lakefront property owners and others, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and mandamus against the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR) and the State, seeking declarations that owners of property abutting Lake Erie hold title to the land between the high-water mark and the actual legal boundary of their properties as defined in their deeds or a writ of mandamus to compel ODNR to compel the State to compensate them for its alleged taking of the property. The trial court subsequently consolidated the action of other Plaintiffs claiming ownership of their land to the low-water mark of Lake Erie. The trial court concluded that the public-trust territory of Lake Erie was a moveable boundary consistent with the water's edge. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's holdings regarding the boundary of the public trust. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the territory of Lake Erie is held in public trust and extends to the natural shoreline, which is the line at which the water usually stands when free from disturbing causes; and (2) the boundary of the public trust does not change from moment to moment, and artificial fill cannot alter the boundary. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Merrill v. Dep't of Natural Res." on Justia Law

The South Euclid City Council enacted an ordinance that amended the zoning for certain property. Relators, city residents, filed a referendum petition seeking submission of the ordinance to the city's electorate. The city council denied the petition because Relators had not filed a certified copy of the ordinance with the city's finance director. Relators then filed the present action, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the city council clerk to determine the referendum petition was valid, to compel the clerk to communicate that determination to the city council, and to compel the city council to repeal the ordinance or submit it to the electors. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that Relators established their entitlement to the requested relief as (1) the clerk of council and city council abused their discretion and disregarded Ohio Rev. Code 731.32 by determining that Relators had not complied with the statute by filing a copy of the ordinance with the clerk of council instead of the city's director of finance; and (2) the ordinance was not exempt from referendum even though it contained an emergency declaration. View "State ex rel. Julnes v. S. Euclid City Council" on Justia Law

The Liberty Township board of trustees approved a zoning amendment that rezoned three parcels of township land. Subsequently, a group of petitioners filed a referendum petition seeking to submit the board's action approving the rezoning of the property to the electors of the township. Relators, the owner of the property at issue, the developer of the property, and the developer company's president, submitted a protest to the county board of elections against the referendum petition. The board certified the referendum petition and placed the rezoning issue on the general-election ballot and rejected Relators' protest grounds. Relators then filed this action for a writ of prohibition and a writ of mandamus to compel the board to sustain their protest. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition, holding that the board of elections abused its discretion by denying Relators' protest, certifying the referendum petition, and submitting the zoning amendment to the electorate because the petitioners did not timely file their referendum petition pursuant to statute. View "State ex rel. Edwards Land Co., Ltd. v. Delaware County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law