Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In July 2015, the Delaware Joint Vocational School District Board of Education passed a resolution to submit a renewal levy to voters at the general election. On November 20, 2015, the Delaware County Board of Elections purported to certify the election result. The county auditor then delivered the abstract of tax rates to the tax commissioner to apply the reduction factors and calculate the tax rate for the school district. When the county auditor discovered that the Board of Elections had not certified the results of the levy using Form 5-U, however, the tax commissioner excluded the levy on the list of tax rates certified for collection to the county auditors in counties with territory in the school district, and the levy was not included on the property tax bills sent to property owners for the first half of tax year 2016. The school board brought this action in mandamus to compel the tax commissioner to apply the reduction factors and calculate the tax rates for the levy. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that because no proper certification of the multicounty election was presented to the tax commissioner demonstrating that the tax was authorized to be levied, the commissioner did not have a clear legal duty to apply reduction factors and calculate tax rates for this levy. View "State ex rel. Delaware Joint Vocational School District Board of Education v. Testa" on Justia Law

The T. Ryan Legg Irrevocable Trust appealed a tax on the trust’s 2006 income. The tax commissioner moved to dismiss, arguing that the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the trust had not shown that the trustee had authorized the filing of the notice of appeal and the petition for reassessment. The BTA denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated the BTA’s decision in part, holding (1) the tax commissioner failed to prove that the trust’s counsel lacked authority to file the tax appeals; (2) the trust’s capital gain was subject to Ohio income tax on an apportioned basis, but the trust had a legal basis for seeking a reduced Ohio allocation; and (3) the tax assessment did not violate due process or equal protection rights. Remanded to the tax commission for a determination of the proper Ohio allocation. View "T. Ryan Legg Irrevocable Trust v. Testa" on Justia Law

Ernest and Louann Giddens resided in Missouri but paid Ohio income tax as owners of shares in a corporation that did some of its business in Ohio. In 2008, that corporation was an S corporation, and therefore, its income passed through for tax purposes. The tax commissioner reduced the amount of the “nonresident tax credit” that relates to a distribution from the corporation. The Giddenses had allocated the distribution outside Ohio, arguing that it constituted a dividend that was “nonbusiness income” allocable to Missouri. The tax commissioner determined that the distribution should be treated as “business income” and concluded that a portion of it was taxable by Ohio based on the proportion of the corporation’s business in Ohio. The Board of Tax Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Giddenses properly treated the income as nonbusiness - rather than business - income. View "Giddens v. Testa" on Justia Law

Betty Lunn, the owner of a single-family residence, challenged the Lorain County auditor’s valuation of the property for tax year 2012. Lunn appealed, arguing that her 2011 purchase of the home was a recent arm’s-length sale that established a lower true value. The Board of Revision (BOR) retained the auditor’s valuation, concluding that the auditor had provided insufficient evidence of the sale. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed and valued the property according to the sale price. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully when it found that Lunn satisfied her initial burden to show a recent arm’s-length sale under former Ohio Rev. Code 4713.03; but (2) Lunn’s purchase was a “forced sale” under section 5713.04, and therefore, Lunn failed to overcome the presumption that the sale of the property post-foreclosure was not indicative of the property’s true value. View "Lunn v. Lorain County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

Cynthia Musto owned property that the Lorain County auditor valued at $547,260 for the tax year 2012. Musto filed a complaint requesting a reduction in value to $405,000. The Board of Revision (BOR) retained the county auditor’s valuation of Musto’s property. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the BTA’s decision, holding (1) the BTA did not err by denying Musto’s motion to continue the BTA hearing; (2) the BTA reasonably and lawfully retained the auditor’s valuation because Musto did not present clear evidence negating it; and (3) the BTA did not err by denying Musto’s motion to disqualify counsel for the auditor and the BOR. View "Musto v. Lorain County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

Mason Companies, Inc., a company based in Wisconsin, appealed from the imposition of Ohio’s commercial-activity tax (CAT) on revenue it earned from its sales of goods through orders received via telephone, mail, and the Internet. Mason challenged the imposition of the CAT assessments based on its being operated outside Ohio, employing no personnel in Ohio, and maintaining no facilities in Ohio. The Supreme Court upheld the CAT assessments against Mason, holding that, after applying the holding in Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, the lack of Mason’s physical presence within Ohio was not a necessary condition for imposing the obligations of the CAT law given that the $500,000 sales-receipts threshold adequately assured that Mason’s nexus with Ohio was substantial. View "Mason Cos., Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

In this companion case to Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, the Supreme Court considered Newegg, Inc.’s appeal from the imposition of Ohio’s commercial-activity tax (CAT) on revenue it earned from sales of computer-related products that it shipped into the state of Ohio. Newegg contested its CAT assessments based on its being operated outside Ohio, employing no personnel in Ohio, and maintaining no facilities in Ohio. In Crutchfield, the Supreme Court held that, under the Commerce Clause, the physical presence of an interstate business within Ohio is not a necessary condition for imposing the obligations of the CAT law given that the $500,000 sales receipts threshold adequately assures that the taxpayer’s nexus with Ohio is substantial. After applying Crutchfield’s holding in this case, the Supreme Court upheld the CAT assessments against Newegg. View "Newegg, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

The tax commissioner issued commercial-activity tax (CAT) assessments against the Crutchfield Corporation on revenue it earned from sales of electronic products that it shipped from the state of Ohio. Crutchfield, whose business in Ohio consisted solely of shipping goods from outside the state to its consumers in Ohio using the United States Postal Service or common-carrier delivery services, challenged the issuance of CAT assessments against it, arguing that Ohio may not impose a tax on the gross receipts associated with its sales to Ohio consumers because Crutchfield lacks a “substantial nexus” with Ohio. Citing case law interpreting this substantial-nexus requirement, Crutchfield argued that its nexus to Ohio was not sufficiently substantial because it lacked a “physical presence” in Ohio. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the assessments issued by the tax commissioner. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the BTA and upheld the CAT assessments against Crutchfield, holding (1) the physical presence requirement recognized by the United States Supreme Court for purposes of use-tax collection does not extend to business-privileges taxes such as the CAT; and (2) the statutory threshold of $500,000 of Ohio sales constitutes a sufficient guarantee of the substantiality of an Ohio nexus for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause. View "Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa" on Justia Law

New York Frozen Foods, Inc. filed its Bedford Heights income-tax returns on a separate-entity basis for tax years 2005 through 2007. In 2010, Frozen Foods and its affiliates filed consolidated amended returns for the same tax years and claimed a refund of taxes it had previously paid based on its separate returns. Regional Income Tax Agency, acting in its capacity as the city’s tax administrator, denied the refund. The Bedford Heights Income tax Board of Review affirmed the denial of refunds. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed, agreeing that the amended returns were improper. Frozen Foods appealed. Bedford Heights cross-appealed, arguing that the BTA erred by failing to deny the refund on an alternative ground. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision to deny Frozen Foods’ claim for a refund on the alternate ground that the city ordinance barred a change from a separate return to a consolidated return when filing an amended return because the change constituted a “change in method of accounting” prohibited by the ordinance. View "New York Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Bedford Heights Income Tax Board of Review" on Justia Law

Albany Commons Ltd., the owner of a 240-unit apartment complex, filed a complaint for tax year 2005 seeking a reduction from the auditor’s valuation of $13,600,000 to $9,720,000. At a hearing before the Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR), Albany Commons presented an appraisal by James Horner, a certified appraiser, that proposed a property valuation of $9,338,000. The BOR adopted Horner’s valuation. The Columbus City Schools Board of Education (BOE) appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopted Horner’s appraisal valuation without adjustment and without discussion of other issues raised by the BOE. BOE again appealed, arguing that the absence of market data from the appraisal report and other flaws in the appraisal rendered the appraisal defective and unreliable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BOE did not establish an abuse of discretion in the BTA’s decision to credit Horner’s testimony and report. View "Columbus City Schools Board of Education v. Franklin County Board of Revision" on Justia Law