Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Madison County Board of Commissioners filed an appropriation action against Greg and Marcia Bell. The common pleas court entered judgment in favor of the Board. The court of appeals affirmed. The Bells then filed a civil action against various Defendants, including the Board and the common pleas court judge. The common pleas court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. Greg Bell subsequently sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the circuit court judge that presided over the earlier action, a magistrate, and certain attorneys and entities, from proceeding in the case. The court of appeals denied Bell's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Bell could prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested writ of prohibition. View "State ex rel. Bell v. Court of Common Pleas (Pfeiffer)" on Justia Law

Stanley and Kathryn Wasserman requested a writ of mandamus to compel the city and its mayor to commence an appropriation action to determine whether a taking occurred when the city's actions when constructing a reservoir on the Wasserman's property constituted a taking and how much compensation, if any, was due to the Wassermans. The court of appeals granted the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in granting the a writ of mandamus to compel the city and its mayor to commence an appropriation proceeding when the court had not yet determined that the Wassermans' property had been taken by the city. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Wasserman v. Fremont" on Justia Law

Relators, owners of land located downstream from the western spillway of Grand Lake St. Marys, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, the Ohio Department of Natural Resources and its director, to initiate appropriation proceedings for the physical taking of their property resulting from flooding caused by a spillway constructed by Respondents and the state's lake-level-management practices. Respondents contended that Relators' claim was time-barred by Ohio Rev. Code 2305.09(E). The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) based on the Court’s precedent, Relators’ mandamus claim was not barred by the four-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.09(E) because Respondents’ ongoing control tolled the running of the limitations period; (2) relators in mandamus cases must prove their entitlement to the writ by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) Relators in this case established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents, by their actions, effected a taking of at least some of Relators' property. View "State ex rel. Doner v. Zody" on Justia Law

Ohio State University filed an application to exempt a two-story building to which it had title, predicating the exemption claim on Ohio Rev. Code 3345.17, which provides that state-university property is exempt for real property taxation if it is "used for the support of such university." The tax commissioner granted tax-exempt status, and the Board of Tax Appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the property, which generated rental income from a first-floor commercial tenant and second-floor residential tenants, qualified for exemption to the extent that the income generated by the property was devoted to university purposes. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of exemption, holding that income-producing property may not be exempted under section 3345.17 unless the activity conducted on the property bears an operational relationship to university activities. View "Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Testa " on Justia Law

In the civil case underlying this appeal, John Poss filed a motion for an order that Marilyn Morris transfer to him property that was the subject of a constructive trust. Before the court ruled on Poss's motion, Morris transferred the property to Skyway Investment Corporation. Poss then filed a motion to appoint a receiver to take possession of the property and to appoint a person to execute the conveyance of the property. The court of common pleas granted the motion. Skyway, which had been joined as a party defendant in the proceeding by the common pleas court, subsequently filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent Appellee, the county court of common pleas, from proceeding to place the property in receivership and a writ of mandamus to compel the court to vacate its orders concerning the property. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the common pleas court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to appoint a receiver and a person to effect the conveyance of the property in the underlying case; and (2) Skyway had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise its claims. View "State ex rel. Skyway Invest. Corp. v. Court of Common Pleas " on Justia Law

A family partnership purchased 749-acres for use as a farm. The entire farm enjoyed current-agricultural-use-valuation (CAUV) status until a seventy-acre parcel was transferred to Maralgate, LLC, after which the county auditor denied the CAUV application. Maralgate filed a complaint with the County Board of Revision, which also denied the application. The Board of Tax Appeals reversed and granted CAUV status. At issue on appeal was whether the parcel was under common ownership with the rest of the farm for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 5713.30(A)(1) because almost sixty percent of the parcel had trees that were not grown for commercial purposes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the parcel was under common ownership with the rest of the farm because the family partnership owned Maralgate; (2) the statute does not require that the trees in question be grown as a crop; and (3) a land survey showing how much of the parcel is devoted to different uses is required only if there is a commercial use of part of a parcel that is not an agricultural use, and, in this instance, those portions of the parcel not actively cultivated were not used for any commercial purpose. View "Maralgate, L.L.C. v. Greene County Bd. of Revision " on Justia Law

The owner of certain property improved with a hotel challenged a valuation of its property, seeking a reduction of true value. The School District filed a countercomplaint, seeking to retain the auditor's valuation. The County Board of Revision (BOR) assigned a reduced value to the property. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed and adopted the BOR's reduced valuation. The School Board appealed, contending that the BTA erred by according deference to the BOR's decision rather than relying on its own independent weighing of the evidence. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the BTA's decision, holding that the BTA unlawfully accorded a presumption of validity to the BOR's determination of value. Remanded so that the BTA could determine whether there was sufficient evidence to permit it to perform an independent valuation of the property. View "Vandalia-Butler City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, lakefront property owners and others, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and mandamus against the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR) and the State, seeking declarations that owners of property abutting Lake Erie hold title to the land between the high-water mark and the actual legal boundary of their properties as defined in their deeds or a writ of mandamus to compel ODNR to compel the State to compensate them for its alleged taking of the property. The trial court subsequently consolidated the action of other Plaintiffs claiming ownership of their land to the low-water mark of Lake Erie. The trial court concluded that the public-trust territory of Lake Erie was a moveable boundary consistent with the water's edge. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's holdings regarding the boundary of the public trust. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the territory of Lake Erie is held in public trust and extends to the natural shoreline, which is the line at which the water usually stands when free from disturbing causes; and (2) the boundary of the public trust does not change from moment to moment, and artificial fill cannot alter the boundary. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Merrill v. Dep't of Natural Res." on Justia Law

The Liberty Township board of trustees approved a zoning amendment that rezoned three parcels of township land. Subsequently, a group of petitioners filed a referendum petition seeking to submit the board's action approving the rezoning of the property to the electors of the township. Relators, the owner of the property at issue, the developer of the property, and the developer company's president, submitted a protest to the county board of elections against the referendum petition. The board certified the referendum petition and placed the rezoning issue on the general-election ballot and rejected Relators' protest grounds. Relators then filed this action for a writ of prohibition and a writ of mandamus to compel the board to sustain their protest. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition, holding that the board of elections abused its discretion by denying Relators' protest, certifying the referendum petition, and submitting the zoning amendment to the electorate because the petitioners did not timely file their referendum petition pursuant to statute. View "State ex rel. Edwards Land Co., Ltd. v. Delaware County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Insured submitted a claim to Insurer after his house was damaged by a storm. Insured returned the payment tendered to him by Insurer, deeming the amount insufficient to cover the damage to his home. Almost two years after the house was damaged, Insured filed suit against Insurer. Insurer argued the lawsuit was barred by a clause in the insurance contract that stated that any action must be started within one year after the date of loss or damage. The trial court granted Insurer's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed, concluding the policy language was ambiguous and that Insurer, by its actions, had waived its right to enforce the one-year limitation clause. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment, holding that Insurer could enforce the limitation-of-action clause contained in its contract because (1) the policy language was not ambiguous, and (2) Insurer did not waive its right to enforce the clause. View "Dominish v. Nationwide Ins. Co." on Justia Law