Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this appeal of a real-property-valuation case, the city school district board of education challenged a decision of the board of tax appeals (BTA) that affirmed the county board of revision's (BOR) adoption of a sale price as the value of the property at issue for tax year 2007. The school board argued in part that the BOR lacked jurisdiction because the valuation complaint had been signed and submitted by the property owner's spouse, who was not a lawyer. The Supreme Court affirmed the BTA's decision, holding (1) the filing of a valuation complaint by the owner's spouse validly invokes the BOR's jurisdiction; and (2) the record furnished a sufficient basis to support the BTA's finding. View "Columbus City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

When a complaint has been filed that contests the county auditor's valuation of a particular parcel, as it was in this case, and when that complaint asks for a value increase or reduction of $17,500 or more, Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(B) requires that the auditor give notice of the complaint within thirty days of the last day for filing valuation complaints. At issue in this appeal was whether that notification is a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction by the board of revision, and if so, whether the thirty-day deadline itself is jurisdictional. The Supreme Court held (1) under section 5715.19(B), the notification itself is jurisdictional, but the thirty-day requirement is not; and (2) thus, the original failure of the auditor in this case to give notice was cured when the notice was later given after remand by the court of common pleas. Because the court of appeals held the contrary, the Court reversed its decision. View "2200 Carnegie, LLC v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

This was an original action by Relators, property owners, for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, the Department of Natural Resources and its director, to initiate appropriation proceedings for the physical taking of their property resulting from flooding caused by a spillway constructed by Respondents and the state's lake-level-management practices. On December 1, 2011, the court granted a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents to commence appropriation proceedings to determine the amount of their taking of the property. Following failed settlement negotiations, the State filed appropriation cases for the property of two of the relators. All of the relators with the exception of the two then filed a motion for an order for Respondents to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of the court's December 1, 2011 writ. The Supreme Court held that Relators established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents were in contempt of the court's December 1, 2011 writ and ordered Respondents to file appropriation cases for Respondents' parcels. View "State ex rel. Doner v. Zehringer" on Justia Law

Youngstown Belt Railway Company entered into a purchase agreement with Total Waste Logistics of Girard for the purchase of Mosier Yard, which the railway owned. The sale was never consummated, and later the city of Girard commenced an appropriation action to appropriate a portion of Mosier Yard. The trial court held that the city's appropriation proceedings were preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA). On remand, the trial court held that it would be inappropriate to consider the railway's potential sale to Total Waste in the preemption analysis but determined that the railway's use of a portion of the appropriated land for storage caused the city's action to be preempted by the ICCTA. The appellate court affirmed, although on different grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the city's proposed eminent-domain action against the undeveloped portion of the railway's property, which did not contain any tracks or rights-of-way and did not have any concrete projected use that would constitute rail transportation by a rail carrier, was not preempted under the ICCTA. View "Girard v. Youngstown Belt Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation commenced this foreclosure action before it obtained an assignment of the promissory note and mortgage securing the Plaintiffs' loan. Plaintiffs maintained that Federal Home Loan lacked standing to sue. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Federal Home Loan and entered a decree of foreclosure. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Federal Home Loan had remedied its lack of standing when it obtained an assignment from the real party in interest. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the cause, holding (1) standing is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court, and therefore it is determined as of the filing of the complaint; and (2) thus, receiving an assignment of a promissory note and mortgage from the real party in interest subsequent to the filing of an action but prior to the entry of judgment does not cure a lack of standing to file a foreclosure action. View "Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Schwartzwald" on Justia Law

This case involved the interplay between a municipality's expedited type-2 annexation of real property located within a township pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 709.023 and the municipality's tax-increment finding (TIF) created pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5709.40 to encourage development of that property. The Supreme Court held that although a township continues to receive tax revenue on property that a municipality annexes through an expedited type-2 process under section 709.023, the municipality may adopt a TIF plan under 5709.40 that temporarily exempts from city and township property taxes a portion of the improvements made to the annexed property to encourage the annexed property's economic development. In so doing, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Sugarcreek Twp. v. City of Centerville" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a county sheriff can meet the constitutional obligation of providing notice of a sheriff's sale to a plaintiff by letter directing the plaintiff's attorney to monitor a website for a listing of the date, time, and location of sale. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in denying plaintiff's motion to set aside the sheriff's sale. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that constructive notice by publication to a party with a property interest in a foreclosure proceeding via a sheriff's office website is insufficient to constitute due process when that party's address is known or easily ascertainable. Remanded. View "PHH Mtge. Corp. v. Prater" on Justia Law

LTC Properties, Inc., which owned a congregate care assisted-living facility in Licking County, contested the tax-year 2007 valuation of its property as found by the auditor, as retained by the Licking County Board of Revision, and as affirmed by the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). On the merits, LTC contended (1) the auditor overvalued its property by predicating his cost-based valuation on the cost schedule for nursing homes and private hospitals rather than on the cost schedule for apartment buildings with twenty to thirty-nine rental units; and (2) the BTA erred by denying LTC's request for a continuance of the evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA's decision to affirm the County's use of the nursing home / private hospital cost schedule as a starting point in performing a cost valuation of LTC's assisted-living facility was neither unreasonable nor unlawful; and (2) the BTA did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance. View "LTC Props., Inc. v. Licking County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellants here were property owners who alleged that a foreign municipality rezoned land that lay in the municipality but that was adjacent to their property in another municipality for the benefit of private enterprise rather than public health. The complaint sought both a declaratory judgment, alleging violations of due process and equal protection, and a writ of mandamus, alleging a regulatory taking for which Appellants were entitled to compensation. The trial court concluded (1) Appellants had standing to bring a declaratory-judgment action, but Appellants' constitutional claims failed; and (2) Appellants' takings claim failed. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the property owners lacked standing to bring their claims without distinguishing between the declaratory judgment and mandamus claims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) consistent with the Court's holding in Clifton v. Blanchester, Appellants did not have standing to assert a mandamus claim for appropriation of land outside the territorial limits of municipality; but (2) Appellants did have standing to bring a declaratory-judgment action to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinances. View "Moore v. Middletown" on Justia Law

Real property owners (Owners) sued Appellant, the county engineer, complaining that their property had been flooded for several years and the water caused damage to their property. Owners alleged that the draining system was improperly designed, constructed, or installed and pleaded that the court require Appellant to upgrade the system to prevent future flooding. The trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the county engineer was immune from litigation under Ohio Rev. Code 2744, which addresses political-subdivision liability for torts. Owners appealed, arguing that the design, planning, or construction of a sewer system is a proprietary function, which is an exception to political subdivision immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because upgrading a storm-sewer system involves construction and design, such upgrading is a governmental, not a proprietary, function. View "Coleman v. Portage County Eng'r" on Justia Law