Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In an earlier litigation, Kleem retained Julian Vanni and Vanni & Associates (collectively, Vanni) to appraise certain real property in dispute between the parties. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Kleem and against Southwest Sports Center. Southwest subsequently filed suit against Kleem and Vanni. The case was assigned to Judge Richard McMonagle. Vanni sought a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge McMonagle from hearing the litigation, arguing that the judge lacked jurisdiction based on the jurisdictional-priority rule, claim preclusion, and witness immunity. The court of appeals dismissed the case, concluding that Judge McMonagle did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction and that Vanni had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge McMonagle did not patently lack jurisdiction and that Vanni had an adequate remedy by way of appeal. View "State ex rel. Vanni v. McMonagle" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased a 33,000-square-foot residential lot in 1974 that was adjacent to another lot owned by Plaintiffs upon which they had built their residence. In 2004, the village of Ottowa Hills denied Plaintiffs' request for a variance seeking to have the vacant lot declared a "buildable" lot because the zoning code at that time included a requirement that no structure could be built on a lot smaller than 35,000 square feet. This new size restriction was enacted in 1978. At the time Plaintiffs purchased the lot, the minimum buildable lot size was 15,000 square feet. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully appealed the village's decision to the Ottawa Hills Zoning Commission. The trial court upheld the Commission's decision, concluding that there was no regulatory taking. The court of appeals reversed. On remand, the trial court determined that a taking had not occurred because Plaintiffs had not taken any affirmative steps to build a house on the lot. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the analysis that is applicable to determining whether a variance should have been granted in this case, the appropriate result would have been to grant the variance. Remanded. View "Boice v. Village of Ottawa Hills" on Justia Law

This appeal involved two separate actions that were consolidated. In the first action, a married couple raised allegations of fraud and other claims against Residential Finance Corporation (RFC), which had brokered two refinancings of the couple's residential mortgage. The first action was consolidated with a foreclosure case filed later against the couple. Appellant and RFC were named as third-party defendants in the foreclosure case. After consolidation, the case was bifurcated on the basis of subject matter for trial purposes and was scheduled to go to trial only on the refinancing issues. Judge Robert Nichols denominated Appellant as a codefendant in that trial. Appellant field an action for a writ of prohibition to prevent Nichols from requiring him to be a defendant in the trial. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant could not establish the elements for a writ of prohibition, as Appellant had an adequate remedy at law and Nichols did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over Appellant. View "State ex rel. Shumaker v. Nichols" on Justia Law

A trust filed a valuation complaint seeking a reduction of a county auditor's valuation of a self-storage facility for the tax year 2008. The Groveport Madison Local Schools Board of Education (BOE) filed a countercomplaint requesting retention of the auditor's valuation. After a hearing, the County Board of Revision (BOR) ordered a reduction of the property value as requested by the trust. After the BOE appealed, the property was sold at a sheriff's sale. On appeal, the Board of Tax Appeals remanded with instructions that the BOR dismiss the valuation complaint for lack of jurisdiction because the complaint misidentified the owner of the property. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because there is no statutory requirement that a valuation complaint accurately identify the legal owner of the subject property, identification of the owner is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Remanded. View "Groveport Madison Local Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

East Bank Condominiums II, LLC began construction of a condominium complex in 2006. By the time the county auditor assessed the value of the condominium units in 2008, twenty-one units remained unsold and unfinished. The auditor determined the aggregate true value of the twenty-one units was $8,139,300. East Bank challenged the valuation. The county board of revision established the 2008 valuation in accordance with the property owner's evidence and concluded that the total fair market value of the twenty-one units was $3,100,000. The board of tax appeals (BTA) reversed the board of revision's adjustments and reinstated the auditor's valuation of the twenty-one units. The Supreme Court reversed and adopted the valuation of $3,100,000, holding that the BTA did not properly utilize the auditor's valuation of the twenty-one units when the only evidence in the record negated the auditor's determination. View "Dublin City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

After Countrywide Home Loans Servicing filed a complaint in foreclosure against Appellants, the trial court granted default judgment in favor of Countrywide, and the property was sold at a sheriff's sale. Countrywide subsequently filed a notice of voluntary dismissal and then refiled its complaint in foreclosure. The trial court granted the order of foreclosure, rejecting Appellants' claim that the action was precluded by res judicata. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that until the order confirming the sheriff's sale is entered, the plaintiff may terminate the case without prejudice by filing a notice of voluntary dismissal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a judgment of foreclosure cannot be dissolved by the filing of a notice of voluntary dismissal after a trial court has entered judgment on the underlying note. Remanded. View "Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Nichpor" on Justia Law

Defendant in the underlying action was a "mortgage servicer" that engaged in the business of serving residential mortgages of individuals. Plaintiff in the underlying proceeding contended that mortgage servicing is a "consumer transaction" as defined in the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (CSPA), Ohio Rev. Code 1345.01. Defendant countered that mortgage servicers perform services for financial institutions, not for borrowers, and therefore the transactions are commercial in nature and are not covered by the CSPA. The Supreme Court accepted certification of state-law questions from the federal district court concerning the proper interpretation of Ohio Rev. Code 1345.01(A) and (C). The Supreme Court held that the CSPA does not apply to the servicing of residential mortgage loans because mortgage servicing is not a consumer transaction under the CSPA, and an entity that services a residential mortgage loan is not a "supplier" that engages "in the business of effecting or soliciting consumer transactions" within the meaning of the CSPA. View "Anderson v. BarclayÂ's Capital Real Estate, Inc." on Justia Law

K&D Enterprises, through its manager, Mid-America, contracted to purchase an apartment complex. Prior to the closing, K&D Enterprises created a new company, Euclid-Richmond Gardens, and assigned its rights under the purchase agreement to that new company. Euclid-Richmond Gardens hired K&D Group, Inc., a property-management company, to manage the apartment. K&D Group hired former employees of Mid-America and assumed the operations of the complex. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation later conducted an audit and determined K&D Group was the successor in interest to the business operations of Mid-America, a determination that authorized the Bureau to base K&D Group's experience rating, in part, on Mid-America's past experience, which included a large workers' compensation claim. After K&D Group's administrative appeal was denied, K&D Group unsuccessfully filed a mandamus action in the court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and issued the writ of mandamus, holding that K&D Group was not a successor in interest for purposes of workers' compensation law, and thus, the Bureau abused its discretion when it transferred part of Mid-America's experience rating to K&D Group. View "State ex rel. K&D Group, Inc. v. Buehrer" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the 2007 tax-year valuation of six properties owned by Appellant. Appellant filed six valuation complaints regarding the properties. The county board of revision (BOR) retained the auditor's valuation for five parcels and ordered a reduction for one. On appeal, the board of tax appeals (BTA) concluded (1) in the case of the one parcel, the complaint's failure to state an actual dollar amount of value reduction was a jurisdictional defect, and thus the case was remanded to the BOR for dismissal; and (2) with respect to the other five parcels, the evidence offered by Appellant was insufficient to find a value different from that determined by the BOR. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the BTA properly ordered dismissal of Appellant's appeal of the case of the one parcel; and (2) the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in adopting the BOR's valuation with respect to the other parcels. View "Shinkle v. Ashtabula County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Cincinnati Community Kollel, an educational institution for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 4709.121(A)(2), sought exemptions for three residential apartment buildings based on the claim that the properties were being used in furtherance of its educational purposes. The statute provides that real property belonging to an educational institution is exempt from taxation if it is made available under the direction of the institution for use in furtherance of or incidental to its educational purposes and not with a view to profit. The tax commissioner denied the exemptions, and the board of tax appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the BTA applied the wrong legal standard and failed to cite reliable and probative evidence to support its decision. Remanded to the BTA to review the evidence submitted in this case and determine whether the subject property was used in furtherance of the kollel's educational purposes. View "Cincinnati Cmty. Kollel v. Levin" on Justia Law