Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Platinum Lodging, LLC, the former owner of the property at issue in this appeal, was a party throughout proceedings challenging a real property valuation for the tax year 2008. The Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) reduced the valuation. Platinum Lodging and the current property owners appealed to the common pleas court. The common pleas court remanded the matter to the BOR. On remand, the BOR dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the complainant lacked standing. The Columbus City Schools Board of Education and Platinum Lodging appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) dismissed the appeals on the grounds that, because the first appeal had been filed in the common pleas court, the BTA lacked jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the BOR’s dismissal order on remand. The Supreme Court reversed the BTA’s order or dismissal as to Platinum Lodging, holding that Platinum Lodging acted properly in filing its notice of appeal at the BTA instead of in the common pleas court. Remanded to the BOR with instructions that it determine the value of the property in accordance with the earlier remand order issued by the common pleas court. View "Columbus City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

The Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District (the “Sewer District”) filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it had the authority to implement a regional stormwater-management program and to impose fees to be charged to landowners within the Sewer District. The trial court declared that the Sewer District had authority under Ohio Rev. Code 6119 and its charter to enact a regional stormwater-management program. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Sewer District has authority to implement a regional stormwater-management program and to charge fees for that program. View "Northeast Ohio Reg’l Sewer Dist. v. Bath Twp." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the tax year 2008 valuation of an office-warehouse building in west Columbus. The Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) reduced the value assigned to the property from the $2,750,000 found by the auditor to the $1,520,000 advocated in an appraisal submitted by the property owner. The Columbus City Schools Board of Education (BOE) appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the BTA, holding (1) alleged defects in the wording of the BTA’s decision do not establish it to be unreasonable or unlawful; (2) the BTA is not required to issue formal findings of fact and conclusions of law; (3) alleged errors in the appraisal furnish no basis for reversal; and (4) the BOE failed to satisfy its burden under the rule announced in Bedford Bd. of Educ. v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision. View "Columbus City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellant purchased a two-family dwelling from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development for $5,000. The Cuyahoga County fiscal officer valued the property at $126,800 for tax year 2011. Appellant sought a reduction to $30,000. The County Board of Revision retained the fiscal officer’s valuation. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the BTA acted unreasonably when it found that the property’s 2011 sale price was not the best evidence of its tax year 2011 value. Remanded with instructions that the $5,000 sale price be used as the property’s value for tax year 2011. View "Schwartz v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Landowners filed a complaint with the Auglaize County Board of Revision (BOR) challenging the auditor’s valuation of their property. The BOR notified Landowners that a hearing would be held. Neither Landowners nor anyone on their behalf appeared at the hearing. The BOR dismissed the valuation complaint for failure to prosecute based on Landowners’ failure to attend the scheduled hearing. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed, concluding that the BOR had exceeded its discretionary authority in dismissing the complaint because the evidence presented raised the presumption that the sale furnished the criterion of value. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision, holding (1) BORs do not have the discretionary authority to dismiss a complaint based on the complainant’s failure to attend the scheduled meeting of the board; and (2) a BOR must make a determination of value whenever a complaint properly invokes its jurisdiction. Remanded. View "Ginter v. Auglaize County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

In 2009, Appellants acquired by way of a deed the surface rights to certain land in Harrison County. The deed did not convey to Appellants all of the mineral rights underlying their surface property. But after an oil and gas company inquired about leasing the mineral rights to the land, Appellants initiated procedures under the Dormant Mineral Act to have the mineral interests deemed abandoned and vested in them along with their surface ownership. Less than one month after Appellants published a notice of abandonment of the mineral interests underlying their property, John Croskey recorded a quitclaim deed for mineral interests underlying the property. The trial court determined that the Croskey affidavit preserved the mineral-rights holders’ interests for purposes of the Dormant Mineral Act and thus concluded that Appellants could not establish a claim for the abandonment of the oil and gas rights underlying their surface property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a mineral-interest holder’s claim to preserve filed pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5301.56(H)(1)(a) is sufficient to preclude the mineral interests from being deemed abandoned if filed within sixty days after notice of the surface owner’s intent to declare those interests abandoned. View "Dodd v. Croskey" on Justia Law

Appellant sought to develop a subdivision consisting of forty-four single-family homes on property zoned R-1 residential. Appellant applied to Granger Township Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) for variances for each of the forty-four proposed lots. The BZA denied the variance application. The county court of common pleas affirmed. Appellant filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that Granger’s zoning resolution establishing the R-1 zoning classification was unconstitutional and beyond Granger’s authority because Granger enacted the zoning resolution without enacting a separate comprehensive plan. The trial court denied Appellant’s claims, declaring that Granger had complied with Ohio Rev. Code 519.02’s requirement that a zoning resolution be adopted in accordance with a comprehensive plan. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a comprehensive plan pursuant to section 519.02 may be included within a township’s zoning resolution and need not be a separate and distinct document. View "Apple Group, Ltd. v. Granger Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals" on Justia Law

The City of Cincinnati owned several golf courses that were operated under a management contract by a private, for-profit contractor. Paul Macke, a private golf-course operator who owned taxable real property, challenged the ongoing exemption of the golf courses as public property used exclusively for a public purpose in complaints filed in 2009 and 2010. In each case, the tax commissioner granted the complaint and denied exemption. The City appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) consolidated the cases and reversed the tax commissioner’s denial of exemptions. The tax commissioner appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully by determining that the City did not forfeit its exemption under Ohio Rev. code 5709.08(A) when it hired a private management company to manage its golf courses. View "City of Cincinnati v. Testa" on Justia Law

In 2010, Bank filed a foreclosure action against Defendants for allegedly defaulting on a promissory note. The trial court granted Bank’s motion for summary judgment and issued a decree of foreclosure in Bank’s favor. Defendants appealed, asserting four assignments of error, none of which challenged the court’s conclusion that Bank had standing to bring the foreclosure suit. Rather than considering Defendants’ assignments of error, the court of appeals sua sponte considered the issue of standing and held that Bank lacked standing to bring this foreclosure action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bank had standing to file the foreclosure action against Defendants at the time that it filed the complaint in 2010. Remanded. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Horn" on Justia Law

A property owner appealed a valuation of its real property. After the Board of Tax Appeals issued its decision on August 29, 2013, the property owner appealed. The notice of appeal was filed on September 30, 2013, but the property owner failed to initiate service of the notice of appeal on the tax commissioner. On October 24, 2013, the property owner served the tax commissioner with the appeal. On November 4, 2013, the appeal was returned from mediation to the regular docket. That order specified that Appellant’s brief was due forty days from the date of the order. On November 12, 2013, the school board filed a motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the property owner failed to initiate service of the notice of appeal on the tax commissioner, a necessary party, within the thirty-day appeal period. View "Columbus City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law