Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was the proper valuation for the tax year 2010 of an undeveloped tract made up of three noncontiguous parcels that was purchased in 2007 for the development of ranch condominiums. The county auditor originally valued the entire tract using the 2007 sale price, with a portion of that price allocated to each of the individual parcels. The Delaware County Board of Revision ordered reductions based on a deputy auditor’s report that was not made part of the record until the case was appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) retained the reduced valuations. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision, holding that the evidence in the record negates the validity of the 2007 sale price but does not clearly establish an alternative valuation for the property. Remanded with instructions that the BTA perform an independent valuation of the property based on the existing record and any additional evidence that may be heard or received. View "Olentangy Local Schools Board of Education v. Delaware County Board of Revision" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a declaratory-judgment action against Defendant, seeking to quiet title to a mineral interest. At issue between the parties was whether the 1989 version of the Dormant Mineral Act or the 2006 version of the Act applied in this case. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the 1989 version of the Act applied, and therefore, Defendant, the owner of the severed mineral estate, did not preserve his rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) pursuant to Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, the 2006 version of the Act applied in this case; and (2) based on Dodd v. Croskey, Defendant preserved his mineral rights. View "Walker v. Shondrick-Nau" on Justia Law

Nile and Katheryn Batman claimed to hold an interest in minerals underlying the properties owned by Wayne Lipperman and the estate of James Albanese (“Albanese”). Albanese and Lipperman filed separate actions seeking to quiet title to their respective properties, claiming that the severed mineral interests held by the Batmans had been abandoned. Albanese and Lipperman also sought to cancel any oil and gas leases executed in relation to the Batmans’ interests in their properties. The trial court granted summary judgment against Albanese and Lipperman. The court of appeals affirmed in both cases. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Ohio Dormant Mineral Act (ODMA) applies in these cases; and (2) because neither Albanese nor Lipperman complied with the notice and affidavit requirements in the ODMA, the mineral interests are preserved in favor of their holder, the Batmans. View "Albanese v. Batman" on Justia Law

Appellant, a property owner, applied to exempt real property used as a public community school for tax year 2010. The tax commissioner denied the exemption to the property that Appellant leased to the community school. Appellant appealed, arguing that because it was wholly owned by a 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation whose members include the community school to whom the property is leased, the property should qualify for exemption under the public-schoolhouse exemption and an exemption for exclusive charitable use. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the denial of an exemption, concluding that the record showed a “view to profit” on the part of the lessor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record contained sufficient support for the BTA’s view-to-profit finding. View "250 Shoup Mill, LLC v. Testa" on Justia Law

Bank filed this foreclosure action against Debtors. Debtors counterclaimed, alleging that Bank did not own the promissory note or the mortgage at the time it commenced the foreclosure action. The trial court granted summary judgment for Bank, finding that Bank was the holder of the note and the assignee of the mortgage prior to the commencement of the action. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) only the current holder of both the note and the mortgage has standing to file a foreclosure action, and (2) genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Bank owned the note at the time it commenced the foreclosure action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when debt on a promissory note secured by a mortgage has been discharged by a bankruptcy court, the holder of the mortgage has standing to foreclose on the property and to collect the deficiency on the note from the foreclosure sale of the property; and (2) no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding any of the elements of Bank’s foreclosure action. View "Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Holden" on Justia Law

The Franklin County auditor valued a two-story office building at $2,205,000. The property owner filed a complaint seeking a reduction. Before the Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) the owner presented an appraisal valuing the property at $1,000,000. The BOR adopted the lower value. The Dublin City Schools Board of Education (BOE) appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the BOR’s valuation. BOE appealed, arguing that the appraisal did not constitute probative evidence of value, and therefore, the BTA should not have adopted that value for the real property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that in light of the plain applicability of the Bedford rule, the BTA did not err in its decision. View "Dublin City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

In 2009, Spire Institute (Spire), a nonprofit corporation, entered into an agreement to lease land from Roni Lee, LLC, a for-profit company. By 2012, Spire had constructed Olympic-grade athletic facilities and related improvements on about a quarter of the property. In 2010, Spire sought a real-estate-tax exemption for the entire property under the charitable-use exemption. The tax commissioner denied exemption, finding that Roni Lee used the property for land development and commercial leasing and that Spire was not “engaged in charitable activity in any substantial way.” The commissioner also denied exemption of he undeveloped property under the prospective-use doctrine. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the denial of exemption. The Supreme Court affirmed the BTA’s decision, holding that Spire failed to establish that any portion of the subject property qualified for a charitable-use exemption. View "Geneva Area Recreational, Educ. & Athletic Trust v. Testa" on Justia Law

The property owners of three undeveloped residential lots in the Westerville City School District filed complaints with the Franklin County Board of Revision (BOR) seeking reductions in the county auditor’s valuations of all three parcels for tax year 2011. The BOR adopted the the opinion of the owners’ appraiser and granted the requested reductions. The Westerville City School District Board of Education appealed. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) adopted the valuations of the school board’s appraiser, which were higher than the valuations arrived at by both the owner’s appraiser and the auditor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA did not act unlawfully or unreasonably by finding that the school board met its burden of proof at the BTA hearing and did not violate Ohio Const. art. XII, 2, which requires that property “be taxed by uniform rule according to value.” View "Westerville City Schs. Bd. of Educ. v. Franklin County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Team Rentals, LLC, the owner of a two-story office building in Summit County, sought a reduction of the value assigned to its property for tax year 2012. The Summit County Board of Revision (BOR) reduced the value based explicitly on a bank appraisal presented by Team Rentals. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) reversed the BOR’s valuation and reinstated the higher valuation originally assessed by the county auditor, concluding that the BOR’s determination to reduce the value record was unsupported by competent and probative evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the BTA, holding (1) the BTA misapprehended the competency of the evidence and ignored case law barring the use of the auditor’s original valuation as “default value” under the circumstances presented in this case; and (2) a legal error in the BOR’s determination prevented affirmance of the BOR’s determination. Remanded for an independent determination of value based upon all the evidence in the record. View "Copley-Fairlawn City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a class action complaint alleging that Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) failed timely to record in the appropriate county recorder’s office the satisfaction of her residential mortgage within ninety days after payoff, as required by Ohio Rev. Code 5301.36(B). After the class was certified, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) issued a cease-and-desist order (consent order) to Fannie Mae. Fannie Mae moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the FHFA consent order did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the consent order did not preclude the trial court from exercising jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. 4635(b), the federal statute governing judicial review of FHFA orders; but (2) 12 U.S.C. 4617(j)(4) barred the trial court from ordering Fannie Mae to pay damages under section 5301.36(C) while Fannie Mae is under FHFA’s conservatorship. View "Radatz v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n" on Justia Law