Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An individual attending a senior swimming class at a municipal recreation center suffered serious injuries after tripping over the legs of a newly installed bench in the women’s locker room. She died 12 days later. Her estate sued the recreation center and the city that owned and operated it, alleging negligence and wrongful death based on the center’s decision to place a bench with extended legs in a confined space, which allegedly created a hazardous condition.The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment in favor of the city and recreation center, finding that they were entitled to political-subdivision immunity under Ohio law and that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the claim of a physical defect. The plaintiff appealed, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the bench constituted a physical defect under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), which could remove immunity, and held that immunity was not definitively restored under R.C. 2744.03(A).The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that a political subdivision’s decision to place a particular model of bench in a locker room does not amount to a physical defect within the meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(4). The court clarified that a “physical defect” refers to a tangible imperfection that impairs the function of an object, and no evidence was presented that the bench was broken, malfunctioning, or otherwise physically flawed. Therefore, the exception to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) does not apply. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the appellate court and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of the city and recreation center. View "Steigerwald v. Berea" on Justia Law

After a prolonged labor, a mother delivered her son at a hospital, with the child experiencing respiratory distress requiring intubation shortly after birth. The mother alleged that the child’s injuries resulted from medical malpractice by the hospital and two physicians involved in her care during labor and delivery. One physician initially managed her labor, then transferred care to another physician, and later resumed care the following morning, at which point he ordered an emergency cesarean section after being notified of fetal distress.During the litigation, the mother’s medical expert provided a report stating that all involved providers, including both physicians and the nursing staff, deviated from the standard of care by not advocating for a cesarean section on the evening prior to delivery, a time when the physician in question was not present. The physician moved for summary judgment, arguing that the expert's report did not implicate him in the alleged malpractice. In response, the mother submitted an affidavit from the same expert, which incorporated the prior report but added a new opinion that the physician breached the standard of care by not performing a cesarean within thirty minutes of receiving reports of fetal distress on the morning of delivery. The physician moved to strike this affidavit, arguing it contradicted the prior expert report and was submitted only to create an issue of fact.The Stark County Court of Common Pleas granted the motion to strike the affidavit and entered summary judgment for the physician. The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the affidavit’s new opinion was contradictory and could be disregarded under the sham-affidavit rule.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment. It held that when an expert incorporates an earlier report into a sworn affidavit, the court may consider both documents together for summary judgment purposes. If the affidavit contradicts the report without sufficient explanation, the trial court acts within its discretion to strike it under the sham-affidavit rule. View "Moore v. Mercy Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

A minor child was injured when a dog bit him at a playground within a manufactured-home community. The dog belonged to a resident, and at the time of the incident, the resident’s son had tied the dog by its leash to a swing set. The child suffered serious injuries requiring extensive stitches. The owner of the manufactured-home community permitted residents to keep dogs in their homes and allowed leashed dogs in common areas, subject to community rules requiring control over pets.Following the incident, the child, through his mother and legal guardian, filed suit against both the dog’s owner and the owner of the manufactured-home community, alleging that the community owner was a “harborer” of the dog under Ohio law and thus strictly liable for the injuries. The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment to the community owner, finding it was not a harborer. The Second District Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the community owner was a harborer and could be strictly liable under R.C. 955.28(B), and ordered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that, to be a “harborer” under R.C. 955.28(B), one must shelter, protect, or exercise control over the dog. The court determined that the owner of the manufactured-home community, by merely allowing residents to keep dogs and permitting leashed dogs in common areas, did not shelter, protect, or exercise control over the dog that caused the injury. Thus, the community owner was not a harborer and was not strictly liable. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate court’s judgment and reinstated the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment to the community owner. View "L.H. v. Sun Secured Financing, L.L.C." on Justia Law

William Johnson drowned while swimming at a recreation center pool owned and operated by the City of Cleveland. At the time, the lifeguard on duty, Nieemah Hameed, was seated in a folding chair on the pool deck rather than in an available elevated lifeguard chair, citing discomfort as her reason for not using the elevated chair. After Johnson failed to resurface while swimming, Hameed and another lifeguard attempted resuscitation, but Johnson died. The cause of death was determined to be drowning due to a seizure.The executor of Johnson’s estate filed a wrongful death and survivorship action against the city and the lifeguard. The city asserted political subdivision immunity under Ohio law and argued Johnson had signed a waiver of liability. The plaintiff countered that an exception to immunity applied under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), claiming the use of a folding chair instead of the elevated lifeguard chair constituted a “physical defect” on the pool grounds. The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas denied Cleveland’s motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue of material fact. The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on its own precedent that the use of a low chair could create a material factual dispute as to whether a physical defect existed.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the choice to use a folding chair rather than an elevated lifeguard chair does not amount to a “physical defect” under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4). The court found no evidence of a tangible imperfection in the lifeguard chair or pool area that would remove the city’s immunity. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals and ordered the trial court to enter summary judgment in favor of the City of Cleveland. View "Hoskins v. Cleveland" on Justia Law

A patient alleged that she suffered a neck fracture after falling from her hospital bed while medicated and unattended at a hospital. She filed a complaint against the hospital within the one-year statute of limitations for medical claims, also naming ten John Doe defendants described as unknown medical providers involved in her care. The hospital was served and answered the complaint, but the plaintiff did not obtain summonses or attempt service on the John Doe defendants. Several months later, with the hospital’s consent, she amended her complaint to replace the John Doe defendants with specific individuals and entities, including two doctors and a medical group.The newly named defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims against them were time-barred because they were not named before the statute of limitations expired and the plaintiff had not complied with Ohio Civil Rule 15(D), which governs the naming and service of unknown defendants. The Richland County Court of Common Pleas granted the motion, holding that the statutory 180-day extension for joining additional defendants in medical-claim actions did not apply to defendants who were “obvious” at the outset and that the plaintiff was required to comply with Civil Rule 15(D). The Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the statutory extension applied to any additional defendants not named in the original complaint, regardless of whether their existence was contemplated at filing.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s decision. It held that a plaintiff is not required to comply with Civil Rule 15(D) to name additional defendants in an amended complaint under R.C. 2323.451(D)(1), and that the 180-day extension under R.C. 2323.451(D)(2) is not limited to newly discovered defendants. Because the plaintiff properly amended her complaint to join the additional defendants, the extension applied and her action was timely commenced. View "Lewis v. MedCentral Health Sys." on Justia Law

The case concerns a lawsuit brought by the executor of an estate against a city, alleging that the city’s negligence in failing to address a hazardous tree led to a fatal accident. The estate claimed that the city owned the tree and had ignored repeated warnings about its dangerous condition, resulting in the decedent’s severe injury and subsequent death after a tree fell on him while he was riding a motorcycle on a city street.After the complaint was filed, the city submitted an answer denying the allegations and raising several defenses, including a general assertion that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. However, the city did not specifically assert political-subdivision immunity as a defense. The case experienced delays due to a judge’s recusal and the COVID-19 pandemic. As the case progressed, the estate pursued discovery and moved for partial summary judgment. The city failed to timely respond to discovery and only raised the political-subdivision immunity defense for the first time in an untimely motion for summary judgment, after the deadlines for dispositive motions had passed. The trial court struck the city’s motion and later denied the city’s request for leave to amend its answer to add the immunity defense, finding the delay unjustified and prejudicial.The Seventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the city’s general assertion of failure to state a claim did not preserve the specific defense of political-subdivision immunity, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend the answer. The Supreme Court of Ohio agreed, holding that a party does not preserve the defense of political-subdivision immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744 by merely asserting failure to state a claim, and that unjustified and prejudicial inaction supported the denial of leave to amend the answer. The judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "Durig v. Youngstown" on Justia Law

A group of city and county governments, Indian tribes, and other entities filed actions against opioid manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies, alleging they misled medical professionals and the public, leading to widespread addiction. Two Ohio counties, Trumbull and Lake, claimed that national pharmaceutical chains, including Walgreens, CVS, and Walmart, contributed to the opioid epidemic by filling prescriptions without proper controls. They filed a common-law absolute public-nuisance claim seeking equitable relief.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied the pharmacies' motion to dismiss, which argued that the Ohio Product Liability Act (OPLA) abrogated the public-nuisance claims. The court based its decision on a prior ruling in a related case, concluding that the OPLA did not abrogate public-nuisance claims seeking non-compensatory damages. After a jury verdict in favor of the counties, the pharmacies' motion for judgment as a matter of law was also denied. The pharmacies appealed, and the Sixth Circuit certified a question to the Supreme Court of Ohio regarding the OPLA's scope.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the OPLA abrogates all common-law public-nuisance claims arising from the sale of a product, including those seeking equitable relief. The court determined that the statutory definition of "product liability claim" includes public-nuisance claims related to the design, manufacture, supply, marketing, distribution, promotion, advertising, labeling, or sale of a product. The court rejected the argument that the OPLA only abrogates claims seeking compensatory damages or involving defective products. The court concluded that the counties' claims, based on the pharmacies' dispensing of opioids, fall within the scope of the OPLA and are therefore abrogated. View "In re Natl. Prescription Opiate Litigation" on Justia Law

A medical-malpractice action was filed by Kalvyn Stull and his family against Summa Health System and associated parties, alleging that improper medical treatment following a car accident caused severe brain damage to Kalvyn. During discovery, the plaintiffs requested the residency file of Dr. Mazen Elashi, a resident physician involved in the treatment. Summa Health System claimed the file was protected by the peer-review privilege under Ohio law, supported by an affidavit from Dr. Erika Laipply, which stated that the file was used exclusively for peer-review purposes.The trial court in Summit County held that Summa had not sufficiently demonstrated that the peer-review privilege applied, as the affidavit contained ambiguities and lacked specific details. The court granted the motion to compel the production of the residency file. Summa appealed, and the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the affidavit was insufficient to establish the privilege due to its ambiguities and incomplete information.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the presence of factual ambiguities in affidavit testimony does not alone determine whether the peer-review privilege applies. The court emphasized that the trial court has the authority to conduct further inquiry, including in camera review, to resolve the factual disputes and determine the applicability of the privilege. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for an in camera review of the residency file and any other necessary factual inquiry to resolve the legal question of whether the file is privileged. View "Stull v. Summa Health System" on Justia Law

In this case, Claudia Kennedy, as the executor of Donald R. Gerres's estate, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Western Reserve Senior Care and Dr. Sataya Acharya, among others, alleging that substandard medical care led to Gerres's death in October 2013. Kennedy initially filed the lawsuit in September 2014, voluntarily dismissed it in January 2019, and refiled it within a year.The trial court denied the healthcare providers' motion for judgment on the pleadings, which argued that the four-year statute of repose for medical claims barred Kennedy's refiled action. However, after the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Durrani, which held that the saving statute does not preserve claims refiled after the statute of repose expires, the healthcare providers sought summary judgment. The trial court denied this motion but later granted a directed verdict in favor of the healthcare providers after Kennedy's opening statements.Kennedy appealed to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, arguing that R.C. 2305.15(A) tolled the statute of repose because Dr. Acharya had moved out of Ohio. The Eleventh District affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that applying the tolling statute to Dr. Acharya, who left Ohio for legitimate business purposes, violated the dormant Commerce Clause.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that R.C. 2305.15(A) does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause as applied to a physician who moved out of Ohio to practice medicine in another state. The court found that the tolling statute serves a legitimate local purpose and does not impose a burden on interstate commerce that is clearly excessive in relation to its benefits. The judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Kennedy v. W. Res. Senior Care" on Justia Law

The case involves a medical negligence claim brought by Janet Hild, the administrator of Scott Boldman's estate, against several medical professionals and entities, including Samaritan Health Partners and Good Samaritan Hospital. Boldman, who had multiple health issues, underwent an emergency appendectomy at Good Samaritan Hospital. Post-surgery, he became combative and removed his breathing tube, after which he soon died. Hild claimed that the anesthesia was improperly handled, causing Boldman's aggressive behavior and subsequent death. The hospital argued that Boldman self-extubated and suffered a cardiac arrest unrelated to the anesthesia.The case proceeded to a jury trial in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. The jury found that Sandra Ward, the Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist, was negligent in her care of Boldman. However, only the six jurors who found negligence were allowed to vote on whether Ward's negligence proximately caused Boldman's death. They concluded it did not. Hild filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that all jurors should have been allowed to vote on proximate cause. The trial court denied the motion.The Second District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision in part, holding that the trial court erred by not allowing all jurors to vote on proximate cause, and remanded the case for a new trial on specific issues. The hospital appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio.The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the same-juror rule applies in all negligence cases where the jury answers sequential interrogatories that separate the elements of negligence. This means the same three-fourths of jurors must concur on all elements for a valid verdict. The court reversed the Second District's decision to the extent it ordered a new trial and reinstated the jury's verdict in favor of the hospital. View "Hild v. Samaritan Health Partner" on Justia Law