Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Cincinnati for Pension Reform (CPR) qualified an initiative to amend the Cincinnati City Charter for the November 5, 2013 ballot. Because CPR objected to the ballot language adopted by the Hamilton County Board of Elections to describe the proposed amendment, it sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to adopt new ballot language and to compel the Secretary of State to approve the new language. The Supreme Court granted the requested writ in part and denied it in part, holding (1) the Board abused its discretion by adopting ballot language that omitted two key provisions of the proposed charter amendment; but (2) CPR did not establish entitlement to a writ against the Secretary of State. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati for Pension Reform v. Hamilton County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a complaint and amended complaint against the Ohio Edison Company, a public utility, alleging that Ohio Edison had unlawfully removed the electric meter from his property and disconnected his electric service. The Public Utilities Commission found that Ohio Edison was justified in removing the meter and terminating electric service where (1) Appellant had never made an application for new service under Ohio Edison's tariff and therefore was not a customer of Ohio Edison, and (2) Ohio Edison properly removed the electric meter without prior notice because the meter had been tampered with and was a safety hazard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to demonstrate that the Commission erred in finding that (1) Appellant was not a customer of Ohio Edison at the property in question; and (2) Ohio Edison had lawfully disconnected electric service to the property. View "Smith v. Ohio Edison Co." on Justia Law

In 2003, Kyle Smith's parents sued Dr. Gary Huber and Qualified Emergency Specialists, Inc. for malpractice after Kyle sustained serious and permanent injuries from an epidural hematoma that Hubert failed to diagnose. Prior to trial, Plaintiffs voluntarily filed a notice of dismissal. Plaintiffs refiled the action in 2008 and eventually added Kyle as a party. The trial court awarded damages and prejudgment interest. In calculating prejudgment interest, the court applied the version of Ohio Rev. Code 1343.03(C) that existed at the time the complaint was filed, concluding that subsequent amendments to the statute applied prospectively only. The court of appeals affirmed the award of prejudgment interest but reversed the trial court's decision to suspend the accrual of prejudgment interest from the date of the voluntary dismissal to the refiling of the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 1343.03(C) applies to tort actions filed after June 2, 2004, regardless of when the cause of action accrued; and (2) because the refiled complaint was filed after the legislation had gone into effect, the amended version of the statute applied in this case. View "Longbottom v. Mercy Hosp. Clermont" on Justia Law

Appellee was charged with a traffic offense, possession of drugs of abuse, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The drug charges were later dismissed. After Appellee applied to seal the records pertaining to the drug charges, the trial court ordered the records of the dismissed drug charges sealed, concluding that the conviction in the traffic case did not prevent sealing of records in the criminal case involving the drug offenses. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether records of a dismissed charge may be sealed if the offense arises from or is in connection with the same act that led to a conviction on an unsealable charge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a trial court is precluded from sealing the record of a dismissed charge if the dismissed charge arises as the result of or in connection with the same act that supports a conviction that is exempt from sealing. Remanded. View "State v. Pariag" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with violating Ohio Rev. Code 4301.69(A), which prohibits the sale of beer to an underage person. At Defendant's trial, the State had difficulty proving what Defendant sold to an informant was beer as defined by statute. The court then took judicial notice that Bud Light was, in fact, beer. Defendant was convicted as charged. The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a fact - the alcohol content by volume of Bud Light - that was not something that was "generally known." The Supreme Court reversed and vacated Defendant's conviction, holding that because there was no evidence admitted on the statutory element of the alcohol content of the substance sold by Defendant to the informant, there was insufficient evidence for a conviction, and double jeopardy barred a retrial. View "State v. Kareski" on Justia Law

Dean Sziraki was seriously injured in the course of his employment and spent the next sixteen years as a quadriplegic. After Sziraki died in 2007, his estate filed a claim for death benefits. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation (Bureau) awarded compensation, but the benefits did not include accrued compensation for scheduled-loss benefits pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57(B) for the loss of use of Sziraki's arms and legs. The Industrial Commission awarded compensation for the total loss of use of Sziraki's four extremities for 850 weeks. The Commission, however, limited the amount payable to period of two years, the amount Sziraki would have been entitled to had he filed for compensation on the date of his death, due to the two-year limit on retroactive payment under section 4123.57(B). The court of appeals denied the estate's writ of mandamus requesting an order that the Commission award the full 850 weeks. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it limited payment of the benefits to the two years preceding Sziraki's death; and (2) the court of appeals correctly concluded the Bureau had no duty to award the benefits during Sziraki's lifetime in the absence of an application. View "State ex rel. Estate of Sziraki v. Adm'r, Bureau of Workers'Â Comp." on Justia Law

On May 6, 2013, one day before the primary, Coughlin filed a nominating petition as a candidate the office of clerk of courts for the Stow Municipal Court in the November general election. Coughlin is a qualified elector and satisfies the statutory requirements to run for the Stow Municipal Court clerkship. On July 11, 2013, an elector, Nelsch, filed a protest, challenging Coughlin’s ability to run as either a nonpartisan or independent candidate by setting out Coughlin’s long history of association with the Republican Party. Coughlin responded in writing and at the board’s July 15, 2013 protest hearing. Coughlin argued that he was running as a nonpartisan candidate, not an independent candidate, and that the requirement of disaffiliation applies only to independent candidates. The board voted unanimously to sustain the protest and deny Coughlin’s petition. The Ohio Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus, holding that there is no statutory provision extending the disaffiliation requirement to candidates for nonpartisan office. View "Coughlin v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

On January 31, 2013, Yeager submitted a declaration of candidacy to the Richland County Board of Elections, to seek the Republican Party nomination to represent the 5th Ward in the Mansfield City Council. His petitions contained sufficient valid signatures. Yeager was the only person to file a declaration of candidacy. R.C. 3513.02 provides that if in an odd-numbered year, the number of declared candidates seeking a particular party’s nomination does not exceed the number of candidates that party is entitled to nominate, then no primary will be held, and election officials shall certify the declared candidate(s) for inclusion on the general-election ballot. The board of elections certified Yeager’s candidacy for the general-election ballot without a primary, at its March 14, 2013 meeting. On April 2, 2013, the board determined that Yeager was not a qualified elector in the 5th Ward and did not reside at 462 Lily Street, the address listed on his voter-registration form. On July 9, the board officially voted to remove Yeager’s name from the November ballot. The Ohio Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus, holding that the board, which had not received a written protest or held a hearing, acted untimely and in disregard of clearly-established law. View "Yeager v. Richland Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Harper, a known drug dealer, was robbed and murdered in his Sandusky residence. Police learned that immediately before his murder, Harper was to have participated in a drug deal. Cellphone records led them to Gipson, who was in custody in Canton, Michigan for his alleged involvement in another crime. Steckel, a Canton police officer, later testified that during a driving tour of the neighborhood, Gipson identified Ricks, who he knew as “Peanut,” as the other man involved in the murder. The judge instructed the jury that the hearsay testimony was not for the truth of the matter asserted, but to describe the investigation. Neither Gipson nor Ricks testified. Ricks was convicted. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed, holding that admission of the alleged accomplice’s statements through an investigating officer’s testimony violated Ricks’s (the defendant’s) right to confront the witnesses against him under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the Ohio Constitution. Gipson’s out-of-court statements connected Ricks to Gipson and to the crime. The danger of unfair prejudice was amplified by further testimony that Gipson was upset and scared by seeing Ricks, which encouraged the jury to misuse the content of the out-of-court statement for its truth. View "State v. Ricks" on Justia Law

Snyder, admitted to the bar in 1996, allegedly committed 18 violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including charging excessive and nonrefundable fees. Snyder operated SPLS, a foreclosure-defense firm with “of counsel” relationships with out-of-state attorneys. Snyder shared office space with PIC, a business that provided paralegal and support services for Snyder, including interacting with clients on the phone, compiling information, and contacting lenders regarding mitigation options. PIC contracted with a marketing firm that attracted potential clients by sending solicitation letters to homeowners who were behind in mortgage payments. Snyder would enter into an agreement with the client that provided for a flat fee that was deemed earned in full upon the opening of the file. The cost of representation ranged from $1,595 to $2,295; $200 to $500 would be sent to the attorney outside of Ohio who was listed as “of counsel.” Snyder retained $300 for each client, with the balance going to PIC for its services. A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline concluded that three violations had been proven and recommended dismissal of the others. The board adopted the panel’s findings and recommendation of a public reprimand. No objections were filed. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed. View "Geauga Cnty. Bar Ass'n v. Snyder" on Justia Law