Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mother obtained sole custody of Child in a judgment issued by the juvenile court in 2009. Mother subsequently moved to Arizona with Child and made Arizona their permanent home. In 2012, while Mother left Child temporarily with her mother, Child's paternal grandfather filed a motion for emergency temporary custody of Child, which the juvenile court granted. Mother filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition, contending that the Ohio court lacked jurisdiction because she and Child were residents of Arizona. The court of appeals dismissed the case after concluding that the juvenile court had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and that Mother had an adequate remedy by way of appeal if the juvenile court erred in its rulings. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ of prohibition, holding (1) if Mother could prove the allegations in her complaint, the juvenile court failed to follow the statute that creates its jurisdiction over Child; and (2) appeal was not an adequate remedy in this case because it was neither "complete," "beneficial," nor "speedy." Remanded. View "State ex rel. V.K.B. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Appellee, the administrator of the estate of Karen Parrish, filed wrongful-death and survival action arising from the allegedly negligent care and death of Parrish. The case proceeded to a jury. At the close of Appellee's opening statements, Appellants moved for directed verdict, asserting that Appellee had failed to meet the burden of establishing a case of medical malpractice against them because Appellee had failed to set forth in his opening statement a standard of care and causation. The trial court granted the motion for directed verdict and entered judgment in favor of Appellants. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court was required to consider both the opening statement and the complaint before determining whether a directed verdict was appropriate. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that a trial court is not required to consider allegations contained in the pleadings when ruling on a motion for directed verdict made on the opening statement of an opponent, but the trial court may consult the pleadings in liberally construing the opening statement in favor of the party against whom the motion is made. Remanded. View "Parrish v. Jones" on Justia Law

In an earlier litigation, Kleem retained Julian Vanni and Vanni & Associates (collectively, Vanni) to appraise certain real property in dispute between the parties. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Kleem and against Southwest Sports Center. Southwest subsequently filed suit against Kleem and Vanni. The case was assigned to Judge Richard McMonagle. Vanni sought a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge McMonagle from hearing the litigation, arguing that the judge lacked jurisdiction based on the jurisdictional-priority rule, claim preclusion, and witness immunity. The court of appeals dismissed the case, concluding that Judge McMonagle did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction and that Vanni had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge McMonagle did not patently lack jurisdiction and that Vanni had an adequate remedy by way of appeal. View "State ex rel. Vanni v. McMonagle" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of sexually-related crimes arising from incidents involving underage boys, including rape and gross sexual imposition. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that his confrontation rights were violated when he was not allowed to cross-examine Mark Losko with the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (BCI) because Losko was not called to testify at trial regarding the DNA profile he created for Defendant and the alleged victims. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court, concluding that because Losko's report contained only raw data and because Kristen Slaper, a BCI forensic analyst, testified and was cross-examined regarding her own report linking Defendant to the incriminating DNA evidence, Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights had not been violated. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when a defendant has stipulated to the admissibility and content of a nontestifying analyst's scientific report, the testimony of a witness who relied on that report does not violate the defendant's right to confrontation; and (2) because Defendant stipulated to Losko's report, he waived any later Confrontation Clause challenge to the use of the report by other witnesses. View "State v. Keck" on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working as a truck driver for Employer. Employee's claim was allowed for the injuries. The next year, Employee returned to work. Two days later, Employer terminated Employee for violating written work rules. A staff hearing officer later denied temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, determining that Employee's termination was a voluntary abandonment of employment that barred compensation for TTD. The court of appeals concluded that the Industrial Commission abused its discretion in determining that Employee was ineligible for TTD compensation based upon his termination from Employer and granted mandamus relief to Employee. The Supreme Court (1) reversed, holding that the Commission's order did not meet the standards of State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm'n because the court did not specifically state the evidence relied upon or explain the reason behind its decision that Employee had voluntarily abandoned his employment with Employer; and (2) returned the matter to the Commission to issue a new order stating the evidence relied upon and explaining its reasoning consistent with Noll. View "State ex rel. Cline v. Abke Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on a single, third-degree-felony count of failure to comply with a order or signal of a police officer in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2921.331(B) and (C)(5)(a)(ii). After a jury trial, the trial court convicted Defendant as charged and sentenced him to four years in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that, pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2945.75, the verdict form at trial was deficient. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the jury verdict supported only a misdemeanor conviction where the verdict failed to set forth the degree of the offense and failed to set forth the elements that elevated Defendant's crime from a misdemeanor to a felony. Remanded. View "State v. McDonald" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of aggravated arson and arson. The trial court sentenced Appellant to ten years imprisonment for aggravated arson and five years for arson, to be served consecutively. The trial court notified Appellant that a postrelease-control sanction would be imposed but failed to state the duration of the sanction and which conviction it was part of. After Appellant completed his prison term for aggravated arson and began serving his prison term for arson, the trial court imposed postrelease control related to Defendant's aggravated-arson offense. Appellant appealed the sentencing judgment, arguing that because he had served the prison sentence for his aggravated-arson offense, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose postrelease control related to that offense. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a trial court may resentence a defendant in order to correctly impose postrelease control if the defendant is still serving a prison term for any of the other offenses included in the same judgment entry of sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when Defendant completed his prison term for aggravated arson, the trial court lost the authority to impose a postrelease-control sanction for that offense. View "State v. Holdcroft" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of one count each of possession of heroin, trafficking in heroin, and conspiracy. After a series of motions seeking resentencing, Appellant filed a motion to vacate a nunc pro tunc order that had corrected an error in a sentencing entry, claiming that the order was void. Judge Jody Luebbers did not rule on the motion, arguing that she was divested of jurisdiction to entertain Appellant's subsequent filings once she had corrected the erroneous sentencing entry on remand. Appellant subsequently filed this action in procedendo, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court reversed and granted a writ of procedendo to compel Judge Luebbers to rule on Appellant's motions, holding that the judge had general jurisdiction in this case, and therefore, Appellant's action for the writ of procedendo had merit. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Luebbers" on Justia Law

Appellants requested a tax refund from the City of Worthington in connection with municipal income tax they paid on stock-option income earned from 2005 through 2007, as reported on Form 1040, Schedule C of their federal income tax return. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed the denial of Appellants' refund based on its view that Ohio Rev. Code 718.01 governed the case because the City's definition of net profits in former Worthington Codified Ordinance 1701.15, which defined net profit for purposes of the City's income tax for an individual taxpayer "as the individual's profit, other than amounts required to be reported on schedule C," contravened the statutory definition of net profits set forth in section 718.01(A)(7). The Supreme Court reversed and ordered the City to refund the municipal taxes paid by Appellants on Schedule C during the tax years at issue, holding that the decision of the BTA was unreasonable and unlawful because the General Assembly did not exercise its power to limit or restrict the municipal power of taxation through section 718.01, and therefore, the statutory provisions at issue did not preclude the refund. View "Gesler v. City of Worthington Income Tax Bd. of Appeals" on Justia Law

The Mount Vernon City School District Board of Education terminated Appellant for insubordination for refusing to remove religious displays in his classroom and injecting his personal religious beliefs into his pattern of instruction, all after being forbidden to do so. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence in the record supported Appellant's termination for insubordination in failing to comply with the district's orders to remove religious materials from his classroom. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts did not err in affirming the termination, as there was ample evidence of insubordination to justify the termination decision. View "Freshwater v. Mount Vernon City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law