Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1970, while working for Employer, Employee was injured. In 1989, Employee retired. In 2008, Employee applied for permanent total disability (PTD) compensation. The Industrial Commission of Ohio concluded that Employee was permanently and totally disabled without ruling on the credibility of the assertion that Employee retired because of his injury or determining whether his retirement was voluntary or involuntary. The court of appeals granted Employer a limited writ of mandamus that vacated the Commission's order and ordered the Commission to reconsider the matter. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that because a voluntary retirement from the work force prior to asserting PTD precludes the payment of compensation for that disability, the court of appeals was correct in ordering further consideration of whether Employee retired because of his injury and whether his retirement was voluntary. View "State ex rel. Cinergy Corp. v. Heber" on Justia Law

Appellant Cerena Mackey was employed by the Ohio Department of Education when she suffered an industrial injury. After she retired from the workforce, Mackey filed for permanent total disability (PTD) compensation. The Industrial Commission of Ohio granted compensation to Mackey. The Department moved for reconsideration, alleging that the hearing officer had made a clear mistake of law in failing to determine whether Mackey's retirement was voluntary or involuntary. The Commission granted the motion and, after a hearing, vacated the award, finding (1) Mackey's retirement was unrelated to her injuries and was hence voluntary, and (2) Mackey's voluntary retirement foreclosed PTD compensation. Mackey filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, which the court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in (1) reopening the issue of Mackey's PTD eligibility in order to consider the effect of her retirement upon it, and (2) finding that Mackey's retirement was voluntary. View "State ex rel. Mackey v. Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Appellees, members of the Barbee family, were involved in an automobile accident. Appellant, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, insured the automobile. The policy contained a provision that required an action for underinsured motorist coverage be brought against the insurer within three years of the date of the accident. After receiving a judgment against the tortfeasors and more than four years after the accident, the Barbees filed suit against Nationwide to recover the outstanding amounts on their judgments. Nationwide filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Barbees' claims were barred for failure to bring the claims within the three-year period required by the policy's limitation period. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a conflict between Nationwide's limitation provision and other provisions in the policy, which required that proceeds from any other available insurance be exhausted, rendered the limitation provision unenforceable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the three-year limitation provision was unambiguous and enforceable, and (2) the provision did not conflict with co-existing policy provisions because exhaustion of the tortfeasor's liability limits was not a precondition to filing suit by the insured against his insurer within the limitation period. View "Barbee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant Greg Bell requested that County Risk Sharing Authority (CORSA), a joint self-insurance pool whose members included the majority of Ohio's counties, provide him with certain CORSA records pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 149.43 and Ohio Rev. Code 149.431. David Brooks, the managing director of property and casualty insurance for CORSA, refused to provide copies of the records, asserting that they were not public records and that CORSA was a private corporation and not a public office subject to section 149.43. Bell filed for writs of mandamus to compel Brooks to provide copies of the requested CORSA records. The court of appeals denied the requested writs. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals insofar as it denied the writs relating to Bell's claim for CORSA's board meeting minutes on grounds that CORSA was not the functional equivalent of a public office for purposes of section 149.43, but (2) reversed to the extent that the court of appeals failed to consider Bell's records requests for CORSA's financial and compensation records as CORSA's status as a private, nonprofit corporation was not dispositive in regard to these claims. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Bell v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Thomas Tindira was a member of Ohio Police and Fire Pension Fund (OP&F) while working as a police officer with Lakewood Police Department. Before he resigned from the department, Tindira filed his application for disability benefits with OP&F, including in his list of disabling conditions PTSD, anxiety disorder, and major depression. The OP&F board of trustees determined that Tindira was disabled but denied his claim for disability benefits. The court of appeals denied Tindira a writ of mandamus to compel appellees, OP&F and its board of trustees, to vacate the board's denial of his claim and to award him disability benefits and attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ, holding that the pension fund and its board abused their discretion in denying disability benefits as Tindira had established his entitlement to the benefits. View "State ex rel. Tindira v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Travis Carpenter, a Clinton Township police officer, was involved in a motor vehicle accident outside his own jurisdiction while responding to a general dispatch call for assistance from an officer in another jurisdiction. The passenger in the vehicle that collided with Carpenter's vehicle filed a personal-injury suit naming as defendants, inter alia, Carpenter and Clinton Township. The trial court granted summary judgment to Carpenter and Clinton Township, concluding that they were entitled to immunity under Ohio Rev. Code 2744 because Carpenter was on an emergency call for purposes of the statute as he had a professional obligation to respond to the dispatch. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Carpenter could be considered to have been on an emergency call at the time of the accident for purposes of chapter 2744 when the evidence was insufficient to establish the existence of a mutual-aid agreement between the jurisdictions because application of the immunity statutes in this case did not depend on whether a mutual-aid agreement existed. View "Smith v. McBride" on Justia Law

Mike Gilb, who had been appointed to fulfill a second unexpired term on the Mason City Council, took out candidate petitions for the upcoming general election for city council. Relators, registered voters and city residents, sent Respondents, the county board of elections, a letter claiming that Gilb was ineligible pursuant to the term-limit provisions of the city charter. The board considered the letter at its regular meeting, determining that there was no action for it to take at the time. Subsequently, Relators filed an expedited election action, requesting a writ of prohibition to prevent Respondents from certifying Gilb as a candidate and a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents to sustain their protest. The Supreme Court (1) denied Relators' prohibition claim because they failed to establish their entitlement to the requested relief as (a) Respondents had not exercised or were not about to exercise quasi-judicial power, and (b) Relators did not establish that they lacked an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to challenge Gilb's candidacy; and (2) dismissed Relators' mandamus claim for lack of jurisdiction. View "State ex rel. Miller v. Warren County Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Employee splashed bleach in her left eye while working for Employer. While Employee lost little vision as a result of the accident, Employee experienced other complications, including light sensitivity and reduced depth perception. Employee subsequently underwent a corneal transplant. Employee sought scheduled-loss compensation under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57(B), alleging she had sustained a total loss of vision in her left eye due to the removal of her cornea. A staff hearing officer for Industrial Commission of Ohio agreed and awarded Employee a total loss of use. Employer filed a complaint in mandamus. The court of appeals issued a writ ordering the commission to vacate its order, concluding that the commission had abused its discretion in awarding compensation for a total loss of vision. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals pursuant to State ex rel. Baker v. Coast to Coast Manpower, L.L.C. View "State ex rel. Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Corey Hazel filed a writ of habeas corpus to compel his release from prison. With his petition, Hazel filed an affidavit of indigency and sought waiver of prepayment of the court's filing fees. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, holding that the petition was defective because Hazel failed to include in his affidavit of indigency a statement setting forth his balance in his inmate account for the preceding six months, as certified by the institutional cashier, in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2969.25(C). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding the court of appeals did not err in finding the petition defective because (1) the petition was in violation of section 2969.25(C), (2) as Hazel could have raised his claims in a previous habeas corpus case, res judicata barred Hazel from filing a successive habeas corpus petition, and (3) as Hazel's petition did not state a facially valid habeas corpus claim, the appellate court's dismissal without prior notice was proper. View "Hazel v. Knab" on Justia Law

After Employee was fired by Employer, Employee filed an action against Employer, claiming wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Employee argued that he was fired because he had expressed concerns about the safety of Employer's workplace to outside parties. Employer asserted it terminated Employee for insubordination. The trial court granted summary judgment to Employer, concluding that Employee failed to articulate a clear specific public policy that was jeopardized by his termination. The appellate court reversed, holding that there was a clear public policy favoring fire safety in the workplace and that retaliation against employees who raise concerns over fire safety violates public policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employee did not articulate a clear public policy applicable to his claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. View "Dohme v. Eurand Am., Inc." on Justia Law