Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Ohio Supreme Court
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Employee was involuntarily separated from his employment due to disability. Employee's treating physician later certified that Employee was able to return to work, and Employee was subsequently reinstated to the payroll by Employer. Employee appealed the reinstatement order to the extent that the order did not award him back pay or credit his vacation leave from the date his treating physician certified that he could return to work to the day before he was returned to the payroll. The State Personnel Board of Review dismissed Employee's administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Employee then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel Employer to remit back pay or restore vacation-leave credit. The court of appeals dismissed Employee's complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither Ohio Rev. Code 124.32 nor Ohio Adm. Code 123:1-30-04 required that Employer remit back pay or credit the vacation leave Employee used between the date Employee's treating physician certified that he could return to work to the day before he was returned to the payroll. View "State ex rel. Baroni v. Colletti" on Justia Law

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Appellant Raleigh Striker filed a pro se complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, the clerk and the city of Shelby, to make certain records available for inspection and copying under the Ohio Public Records Act. The court of appeals denied Striker's request. Respondents subsequently filed a motion for sanctions against Striker, claiming that Striker had engaged in frivolous conduct in the public-relations mandamus case. The court of appeals awarded the clerk $3,503 in attorney fees as sanctions pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2323.51 for responding to Striker's frivolous assertions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in awarding the clerk attorney fees for Striker's frivolous conduct because (1) the court properly determined that Striker had engaged in frivolous conduct that would authorize an award of reasonable attorney fees against him pursuant to section 2323.51, and (2) the reasonable fees incurred as a result of Striker's frivolous assertions were $3,503. View "State ex rel. Striker v. Cline" on Justia Law

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The superintendent of insurance, in her capacity as the liquidator of an insolvent insurer, filed an action in the county court of common pleas against an independent accounting firm that provided auditing services to the insurer, alleging negligence and that the firm had received preferential or fraudulent payments. The accounting firm moved to dismiss the complaint or to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause that was contained in an engagement letter signed by the insurer and accounting firm. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that because the liquidator had not signed the arbitration agreement, there was a presumption against arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed but in part for different reasons, holding that the liquidator was not bound by the insurer's agreement when the liquidator's claims did not arise from the contract that contained the arbitration provision. View "Taylor v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P." on Justia Law

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Appellant Carlos Galloway filed requests for writs of mandamus and procedendo to compel Appellees, the county court of common pleas and its judge, to issue judgments in Appellant's criminal cases that complied with Ohio R. Crim. P. 32(C) and constituted final, appealable orders. The court of appeals denied Appellant's request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sentencing entries in Appellant's criminal cases fully complied with rule 32(C); (2) insofar as Appellant's claimed that one of his sentencing entries did not properly reflect the jury's verdict, he raised mere error and had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise the issue; and (3) any error regarding the imposition of court costs could be challenged by appeal. View "State ex rel. Galloway v. Lucas County Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law

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Attorney submitted attorney-fee applications to the attorney general, requesting $1,563 in attorney fees for representing Client in connection with Client's application for crime-victim reparations. The attorney general granted an award of $1,020 to Attorney. A court of claims panel of commissioners affirmed the award. The attorney general appealed, challenging the jurisdiction of the court of claims. A judge of the court of claims affirmed, concluding that the court of claims had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the attorney general's award of attorney fees. The tenth district court of appeals issued writs of mandamus and prohibition (1) compelling the court of claims to vacate its decision and dismiss the appeal, and (2) prohibiting the court of claims from hearing similar appeals from decisions of the attorney general on attorney-fee applications in the future. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of claims lacked jurisdiction to consider appeals from decisions of the attorney general granting or denying payment of attorney fees for seeking reparations on behalf of a victim of crime. View "State ex rel. DeWine v. Court of Claims of Ohio " on Justia Law

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Relators, Ohioans for Fair Districts and its members, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent, Secretary of State Jon Husted, to treat Sections 1 and 2 of H.B. 319, which established new congressional districts for the state based on the 2010 decennial census, as subject to referendum, to accept the submission of Relators' referendum-petition summary, and to discharge the duties of Husted's office as provided by Ohio Const. art. II and Ohio Rev. Code 3519.01. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) the writ was consistent with precedent and the plain language of Ohio Const. art. II, and (2) unless a valid referendum petition was timely filed with the secretary of state, H.B. 319 would become effective ninety days from the date the bill was filed by the governor in the office of the secretary of state. View "State ex rel. Ohioans for Fair Dists. v. Husted" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of various crimes. The judgment entry of conviction did not set out whether the conviction was based upon a guilty or no-contest plea or upon a bench trial or jury trial. The cause was remanded for resentencing for other reasons. On remand, the judgment entry contained the same error. The trial court then sua sponte filed a nunc pro tunc judgment entry supplementing the wording of the original resentencing judgment entry. The appellate court sua sponte dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding no new or substantial right was affected by correction of the sentencing judgment. Appellant subsequently obtained a certification of a conflict of the decision in this case with that of State v. Lampkin. At issue on appeal was whether a nunc pro tunc judgment entry that is issued solely to correct a clerical omission in a prior final judgment entry constitutes a new final order from which a new appeal may be taken. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no new right of appeal is created by such an entry, and therefore, the entry in this case was not a final order from which an appeal could be taken. View "State v. Lester" on Justia Law

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The owner of certain property improved with a hotel challenged a valuation of its property, seeking a reduction of true value. The School District filed a countercomplaint, seeking to retain the auditor's valuation. The County Board of Revision (BOR) assigned a reduced value to the property. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed and adopted the BOR's reduced valuation. The School Board appealed, contending that the BTA erred by according deference to the BOR's decision rather than relying on its own independent weighing of the evidence. The Supreme Court agreed and vacated the BTA's decision, holding that the BTA unlawfully accorded a presumption of validity to the BOR's determination of value. Remanded so that the BTA could determine whether there was sufficient evidence to permit it to perform an independent valuation of the property. View "Vandalia-Butler City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

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Appellee was injured by a falling tree located near, but outside, an easement maintained by Utility Company. Utility Company had hired Service Contractor to inspect trees along its power lines and to remedy any situation in which trees or vegetation might affect the lines. Appellee filed suit against Appellants, Utility Company and Service Contractor, alleging that they were liable for Appellee's injuries based upon their failure to inspect, maintain, and remove the tree or to warn the landowner and the public of the danger raised by the tree. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants, concluding that they owed no duty to Appellee and that Appellee was not a third-party beneficiary under the Appellants' contract. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the contract was ambiguous regarding whether Appellee had enforceable rights as an intended third-party beneficiary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) for an injured party to qualify as an intended third-party beneficiary under a written contract, the contract must indicate an intention to benefit that third party; and (2) because the contract between Appellants did not indicate an intent to benefit Appellee, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Appellants. View "Huff v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

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A jury convicted Roland Davis of aggravated murder, murder, kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery. Davis was sentenced to death. The trial court dismissed Davis's petition for postconviction relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. Davis then filed a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act on a motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding (1) a trial court has jurisdiction over a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence when the specific issue has not been decided on direct appeal; and (2) an appellate court has jurisdiction, in a case in which a death penalty has been imposed, to consider the trial court's denial a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law