Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Relators, owners of land located downstream from the western spillway of Grand Lake St. Marys, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents, the Ohio Department of Natural Resources and its director, to initiate appropriation proceedings for the physical taking of their property resulting from flooding caused by a spillway constructed by Respondents and the state's lake-level-management practices. Respondents contended that Relators' claim was time-barred by Ohio Rev. Code 2305.09(E). The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding (1) based on the Court’s precedent, Relators’ mandamus claim was not barred by the four-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.09(E) because Respondents’ ongoing control tolled the running of the limitations period; (2) relators in mandamus cases must prove their entitlement to the writ by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) Relators in this case established by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents, by their actions, effected a taking of at least some of Relators' property. View "State ex rel. Doner v. Zody" on Justia Law

Employee suffered an industrial injury and received surgery on his right shoulder, after which Employee returned to work for self-insured Employer. Employee experienced renewed shoulder complaints four years later and asked Employer to add new shoulder conditions to Employee's workers' compensation claim and authorize surgery to correct them. Employer and the Industrial Commission denied Employee's request after finding that the proposed procedure was unrelated to the conditions allowed in Employee's workers' compensation claim. At issue on appeal was a doctor's report upon which the Commission based its decision. The court of appeals granted a limited writ in mandamus that ordered the Commission to reconsider the application after finding inconsistencies within the report. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that none of the alleged inconsistencies noted in the doctor's report affected the viability of the doctor's opinion that further surgery was not reasonably related to the allowed conditions, and therefore, the report was evidence supporting the Commission's decision. View "State ex rel. George v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Relator, Angela Dawson, requested a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent, a local school district, to provide her with access to (1) itemized invoices of law firms providing services to the district in matters pertaining to Dawson and her children, and (2) communications from the school district's insurance carrier identifying the district's legal representative and describing the liability and exposure of the district and insurance company related to a case filed against the district by Dawson on behalf of one of her children. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the requested records were exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act because the school district met its burden of establishing the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to the requested records. View "State ex rel. Dawson v. Bloom-Carroll Local Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Patrick Donohoe died from injuries sustained in a workplace accident. His widow, Catherine, filed an application for additional workers' compensation benefits, claiming that Patrick's accident resulted from his employer's violation of specific safety requirements (VSSRs) governing the construction industry. The Industrial Commission of Ohio denied her application. The court of appeals vacated the order and returned the cause to the Commission for further consideration. Both Catherine and the employer appealed. At issue on appeal was (1) whether the Commission staff hearing officer's order, which could be interpreted in different ways, was deficient; and (2) whether the Commission erred by denying Catherine's application because there were no eyewitnesses to the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an order that can engender two viable, yet irreconcilable, interpretations is too ambiguous to withstand scrutiny; (2) an order that is potentially based on an erroneous belief that a VSSR cannot issue in the absence of eyewitnesses is clearly an abuse of discretion; and (3) therefore, the court of appeals was correct in returning the cause to the Commission for clarification and consideration of all the evidence. View "State ex rel. Donohoe v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The State Employment Relations Board (SERB) appointed Kay Kingsley as an administrative law judge (ALJ), which was a classified position. Several years later, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 1, which changed the position of SERB ALJ from the classified service to the unclassified service. That same year, SERB terminated Kingsley's employment. Kingsley requested a writ of mandamus to declare H.B. 1 unconstitutional as applied to her and to order SERB to recognize her as a classified employee and to reinstate her to her former ALJ position. The court of appeals dismissed Kingsley's mandamus complaint, determining that Kingsley had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of an administrative appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kingsley did not set forth a viable claim for the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus as she had an adequate remedy by way of civil-service appeal to raise her claims. View "State ex rel. Kingsley v. State Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Ohio State University filed an application to exempt a two-story building to which it had title, predicating the exemption claim on Ohio Rev. Code 3345.17, which provides that state-university property is exempt for real property taxation if it is "used for the support of such university." The tax commissioner granted tax-exempt status, and the Board of Tax Appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the property, which generated rental income from a first-floor commercial tenant and second-floor residential tenants, qualified for exemption to the extent that the income generated by the property was devoted to university purposes. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of exemption, holding that income-producing property may not be exempted under section 3345.17 unless the activity conducted on the property bears an operational relationship to university activities. View "Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Testa " on Justia Law

In the civil case underlying this appeal, John Poss filed a motion for an order that Marilyn Morris transfer to him property that was the subject of a constructive trust. Before the court ruled on Poss's motion, Morris transferred the property to Skyway Investment Corporation. Poss then filed a motion to appoint a receiver to take possession of the property and to appoint a person to execute the conveyance of the property. The court of common pleas granted the motion. Skyway, which had been joined as a party defendant in the proceeding by the common pleas court, subsequently filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent Appellee, the county court of common pleas, from proceeding to place the property in receivership and a writ of mandamus to compel the court to vacate its orders concerning the property. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the common pleas court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to appoint a receiver and a person to effect the conveyance of the property in the underlying case; and (2) Skyway had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise its claims. View "State ex rel. Skyway Invest. Corp. v. Court of Common Pleas " on Justia Law

For several years, Appellant Paul Lane worked for the City. Later, the interim city manager terminated Lane's employment for disciplinary reasons. Lane subsequently submitted to the City's personnel director a request for a hearing from the City Personnel Appeals Board regarding his termination. Via letter, the City declined Lane's request. Lane filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellees, the City and Board, to conduct a hearing and issue a determination on the merits of his appeal, reinstate him to his position of employment, and award back pay and corresponding employment benefits. The court of appeals denied the writ, determining that Lane had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by administrative appeal from the Board's decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that in the absence of a final, appealable order by the Board on Lane's request for a hearing, he did not have an adequate remedy by way of administrative appeal to raise his claims. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Lane v. Pickerington" on Justia Law

Anthony Belton was charged with aggravated murder with death-penalty specifications and aggravated robbery with firearm specifications. Belton filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of Ohio Rev. Code 2929.03 and Ohio R. Crim. P. 11(C)(3), claiming these provisions were unconstitutional because they precluded him from entering a guilty plea without waiving his right to a jury trial during the sentencing phase of his capital case. The common pleas court denied the motion and upheld the provisions as constitutional. Belton later filed a motion for leave to file a delayed appeal from the common pleas court's order. The court of appeals granted the motion. The State subsequently filed an action for a writ of prohibition to prevent the court of appeals from proceeding in Belton's delayed appeal and to compel dismissal of the appeal. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the court of appeals patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the appeal when the order did not constitute a final, appealable order. View "State ex rel. Bates v. Court of Appeals " on Justia Law

A family partnership purchased 749-acres for use as a farm. The entire farm enjoyed current-agricultural-use-valuation (CAUV) status until a seventy-acre parcel was transferred to Maralgate, LLC, after which the county auditor denied the CAUV application. Maralgate filed a complaint with the County Board of Revision, which also denied the application. The Board of Tax Appeals reversed and granted CAUV status. At issue on appeal was whether the parcel was under common ownership with the rest of the farm for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 5713.30(A)(1) because almost sixty percent of the parcel had trees that were not grown for commercial purposes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the parcel was under common ownership with the rest of the farm because the family partnership owned Maralgate; (2) the statute does not require that the trees in question be grown as a crop; and (3) a land survey showing how much of the parcel is devoted to different uses is required only if there is a commercial use of part of a parcel that is not an agricultural use, and, in this instance, those portions of the parcel not actively cultivated were not used for any commercial purpose. View "Maralgate, L.L.C. v. Greene County Bd. of Revision " on Justia Law