Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Stanley and Kathryn Wasserman requested a writ of mandamus to compel the city and its mayor to commence an appropriation action to determine whether a taking occurred when the city's actions when constructing a reservoir on the Wasserman's property constituted a taking and how much compensation, if any, was due to the Wassermans. The court of appeals granted the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in granting the a writ of mandamus to compel the city and its mayor to commence an appropriation proceeding when the court had not yet determined that the Wassermans' property had been taken by the city. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Wasserman v. Fremont" on Justia Law

Terrance House filed complaints for writs of mandamus and procedendo to compel a court of common pleas judge to issue final, appealable orders on the judge's denial of Hough's motion for the judge to recuse herself and his motion to supplement his petition for postconviction relief. The court of appeals denied the claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Hough was not entitled to a final, appealable order on the judge's denial of his motion to recuse herself because the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review those decisions; and (2) the judge had no duty to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in denying Hough's motion to supplement his previously denied, untimely, successive petition for postconviction relief. View "State ex rel. Hough v. Saffold" on Justia Law

Frank Bilaver left his job with Fluid Line Products after Fluid Line denied him an extended leave of absence. Bilaver later applied for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, which the Industrial Commission of Ohio denied after finding that Bilaver's decision to leave Fluid Line constituted a voluntary abandonment of employment that barred compensation. The court of appeals upheld the Commission's decision. Bilaver appealed, arguing that his departure from Fluid Line was involuntary because he did not quit his job but was instead fired in a manner that did not comply with State ex rel. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Indus. Comm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm. controlled in this case, and (2) lacking evidence that Bilaver secured another job and was prevented from doing it by his industrial injury, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Bilaver v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

A jury found Jack Carlisle guilty of kidnapping and gross sexual imposition (GSI) and sentenced him to three years' imprisonment for kidnapping and one year of imprisonment for GSI, to be served concurrently. The trial court later vacated Carlisle's sentence due to change of circumstances, namely the cost of Carlisle's dialysis, and imposed a sentence of five years of community control. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court lacked authority to modify Carlisle's sentence because his convictions had been affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that the trial court in this case lacked the requisite authority to modify Carlisle's sentence, as absent statutory authority, a trial court is generally not empowered to modify a criminal sentence by reconsidering its own final judgment. Remanded. View "State v. Carlisle" on Justia Law

A three-judge panel convicted Lamont Hunter for the aggravated murder and rape of a three-year-old and child endangerment. The panel sentenced Hunter to death based on two death-penalty specifications: aggravated murder while committing or attempting to commit rape and aggravated murder of a child under the age of thirteen. The Supreme Court affirmed Hunter's convictions and sentence of death, holding (1) Hunter did not meet his burden of demonstrating that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that Hunter had previously abused the child; (3) the panel did not create a miscarriage of justice in convicting Hunter of all counts and specifications; (4) the panel did not err in denying multiple defense motions; (5) the panel did not err in sentencing Hunter to consecutive sentences for his noncapital offenses in violation of his constitutional rights; and (6) the aggravating factors clearly outweighed any mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, and the penalty imposed in this case was appropriate and proportionate when compared to death sentences approved for other rape-murders. View "State v. Hunter" on Justia Law

Employee was injured in an industrial accident in 1987. The last injury-related bill submitted to either self-insured Employer or its third-party administrator (collectively, Employer) was paid in 1997. In 2008, Employee asked Employer to authorize further treatment. Employer denied the request, relying on former Ohio Rev. Code 4123.52, under which claim inactivity in excess of ten years permanently closed a worker's compensation claim. In an effort to toll the statute, Employee revived an issue relating to a 1998 doctor's visit and requested a hearing on the payment of that outstanding bill. An Industrial Commission staff hearing officer ordered Employer to pay the outstanding bill. The court of appeals vacated the decision and directed the Commission to issue a new order denying payment of the bill. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission abused its discretion in ordering the bill to be paid because the visit related to a low-back condition that was not allowed in Employee's claim and there was no evidence establishing a potential connection between Employee's 1987 injury and his 1998 back symptoms. View "State ex rel. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

After Appellant Jermaine McKinney was convicted and sentenced in a criminal case, Appellant petitioned for writs of mandamus and procendendo to compel Appellee, a county court of common pleas judge, to issue a final, appealable order in his criminal case. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the judge's sentencing entry in the criminal case fully complied with Ohio. R. Crim. P. 32(C) by including the findings of the jury upon which Appellant's convictions were based, the sentence, the signature of the judge, and the clerk's time stamp; and (2) Appellant had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise the claim that the judge erred in his sentencing entry. View "State ex rel. McKinney v. McKay" on Justia Law

Appellant David Untied petitioned for a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge of the court of common pleas from proceeding with a hearing on an alleged violation of community control and a writ of mandamus to compel the court of common pleas clerk to date-stamp and time-stamp all documents filed with the court. The court of appeals held that Untied was not entitled to the requested extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the judge was authorized to conduct proceedings on the alleged community-control violations even though they were conducted after the expiration of the term of community control because the notice of violations was filed before Untied's community control expired; and (2) the documents filed with the court were all stamped with the date of filing in accordance with the pertinent provisions. View "State ex rel. Untied v. Ellwood" on Justia Law

Patient filed an action seeking recovery for injuries following a medical procedure Doctor performed on him allegedly without his informed consent. The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Doctor. The district court reversed. At issue on appeal was whether a claimant must present expert testimony on each element of the cause of action for failure to obtain informed consent to establish a prima facie case. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the verdict of the trial court, holding (1) expert medical testimony is required to establish both the material risks and dangers involved with a medical procedure and that an undisclosed risk or danger actually materialized and proximately caused injury to the patient; (2) if a patient fails to present medical expert testimony that it is more likely than not that an undisclosed risk of a surgical procedure actually materialized and proximately caused injury, then a trial court may properly grant a directed verdict; and (3) because there was no evidence to support each element of Patient's informed-consent claim in this case, the trial court properly directed a verdict. View "White v. Leimbach" on Justia Law

Appellant suffered an industrial injury and never returned to any type of employment. Appellant filed for permanent total disability compensation (PTD) six years later. The Industrial Commission of Ohio denied Appellant's application in an order that emphasized Appellant's refusal to participate in vocational rehabilitation. Appellant filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion in denying PTD. The court of appeals concluded that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in deciding to hold Appellant accountable for his failure to participate in vocational rehabilitation when there was no evidence that he would not benefit from such services. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that (1) contrary to Appellant's suggestion, illiterate persons are neither unemployable nor, once injured, inherently permanently and totally disabled; and (2) Appellant was medically capable of sustained remunerative employment, so his rehabilitation potential was germane to the analysis. View "State ex rel. Gonzales v. Morgan" on Justia Law