Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2003, Defendant pleaded guilty to aggravation with a firearm specification. The State and Defendant later agreed that Defendant could withdraw his guilty plea and instead plead guilty to aggravated robbery without a firearm specification and to one count of an attempt to have weapons while under a disability. The new agreement decreased Defendant’s sentence by six months. In 2009, Defendant pled guilty to attempted felonious assault. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a term of imprisonment, to run consecutively to the sentence from the 2003 case. Defendant subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his 2007 plea and resentencing were void and he was therefore entitled to immediate release. The appellate court denied the writ, concluding that Defendant had already unsuccessfully pursued an adequate legal remedy to challenge his 2007 conviction and could not use habeas corpus to try again. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant’s claim was barred by res judicata. View "Smith v. Buchanan" on Justia Law

The Public Utilities Commission ("PUCO") approved of the first electric security plan of American Electric Power operating companies (collectively, “AEP”). The Supreme Court held that the Commission committed reversible error on three issues, including (1) approving the recovery of carrying costs associated with environmental investments without proper statutory authority, and (2) authorizing the provider-of-last-resort (“POLR”) charge without sufficient evidence. On remand, the Commission determined that the environmental-investment carrying costs were lawful but determined that the AEP had not presented evidence of its actual POLR costs and directed the company to deduct that charge from its tariff schedules. Following rehearing, the Office of Consumers’ Counsel (OCC) and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) filed an appeal raising several challenges to the Commission’s remand orders. The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Commission, holding that OCC and IEU did not carry their burden of showing reversible error in the Commission’s remand orders. View "In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty a violation of Ohio’s RICO statute and a predicate offense of trafficking in marijuana. The trial court imposed a six-year sentence for the RICO offense and an eight-year sentence for the trafficking offense, to be served consecutively. On appeal, Appellant asserted that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive prison sentences violated the prohibition against double jeopardy. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant’s separate sentences. Appellant appealed, arguing that the appellate court was required to apply the standard set forth in State v. Johnson in deciding whether the imposition of multiple convictions and sentences for a RICO offense and one or more of its predicate felonies violated the Allied Offenses statute and his rights under the double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that State v. Johnson is not applicable to a RICO violation and that a RICO offense does not merge with its predicate offenses for purposes of sentencing. View "State v. Miranda" on Justia Law

In September 1991, Appellant was convicted in federal court of criminal offenses and sentenced to federal prison. Meanwhile, in January 1991, the Crawford County Sheriff’s Department served a warrant on Appellant for his arrest after his indictment in Crawford County. Appellant was arraigned in Crawford County then returned to federal custody. In April 1992, Appellant was returned to Crawford County, tried in a jury trial, and convicted of criminal offenses. On appeal, Appellant argued that his speedy-trial rights were violated under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD). The court of appeals affirmed on appeal and dismissed Appellant’s subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ denial of a writ of habeas corpus, holding (1) because Appellant was not returned to federal custody after April 1992 until his state court trial had been held, no violation of the IAD occurred; and (2) the court of appeal’s determination on appeal that no violation of the IAD occurred was res judicata as to Appellant’s claims in this case. View "State ex rel. Dye v. Bradshaw" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was visiting a friend, who was a tenant at an apartment building owned by Defendant, when Plaintiff suffered an injury while descending the common area stairs. Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging that Defendant had negligently failed to maintain adequate lighting on the premises. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant, holding (1) since Plaintiff was not a tenant but a business invitee, Defendant only owed her a duty of ordinary care; and (2) the open-and-obvious doctrine applied in this case to negate the duty of ordinary care. The court of appeals reversed, holding that tenants’ guests are entitled to the protections of Ohio Rev. Code 5321.04, that a landlord’s violation of section 5321.04 constitutes negligence per se, and that the open-and-obvious-danger doctrine does not apply when the landlord is negligent per se. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a landlord owes the statutory duty under section 5321.04 to keep all common areas of the premises in a safe condition to a tenant’s guest properly on the premises; and (2) a breach of that duty constitutes negligence per se and obviates the open-and-obvious-danger doctrine. View "Mann v. Northgate Investors, LLC" on Justia Law

After a car accident involving David Fraley and Timothy Oeding, Oeding’s insurer (“Auto-Owners”) placed an investigative hold on Fraley’s truck for several months. Fraley filed a negligence action against Oeding’s estate, Oeding’s employer (“J&R”), and Auto-Owners, alleging, among other things, that Auto-Owners’ investigatory hold caused Fraley intangible economic loss due to the loss of use of the truck. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding (1) the court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Oeding and J&R solely because their insurer did business in Ohio, and (2) Fraley was not entitled to maintain a direct action against Auto-Owners because he had not obtained a judgment against Auto-Owners’ insureds. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in its determination that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Oeding and J&R because Auto-Owners’ investigatory hold and its communication with Fraley brought Auto-Owners, and by extension J&R and Oeding, within Ohio’s long-arm statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an Ohio court may not impute an insurance company’s conduct to its nonresident insured for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction over the insured. View "Fraley v. Estate of Oeding" on Justia Law

The Village of Richfield petitioned in municipal court to unseal certain criminal records, claiming that the records were improperly sealed under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.52. Judge Kathryn Michael, the presiding judge of the municipal court, denied the motion to unseal the records. Richfield subsequently made a written request to the clerk of courts for the official criminal case records, claiming that because the records had not been properly sealed, they were public under Ohio Rev. Code 149.43. The request was denied. Richfield then filed this action in mandamus, asserting that the records were sealed unlawfully. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) Richfield improperly requested the court records under section 149.43 rather than Sup. Ct. R. 44 through 47, which control access to court records; and (2) even if Richfield had properly requested the records, Richfield had an adequate remedy at law of the denial of its motion to unseal the records, and therefore, Richfield could not satisfy the requirements of a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Richfield v. Laria" on Justia Law

In 2005, Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to serve twenty-five years to life. In 2012, the common pleas court judge overruled Appellant’s motion in arrest of judgment. In 2013, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of procedendo in the court of appeals, seeking to compel the common pleas court judge to rule on his motion in arrest of judgment. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. Appellant appealed, arguing that the judge erred in denying his motion so it was incumbent upon the court of appeals to compel her to reconsider her decision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy to correct any alleged error in the judge’s decision through a direct appeal. View "State ex rel. Roberts v. Marsh" on Justia Law

Cheryl and John Gallenstein, Kentucky residents, purchased a boat in Indiana. The couple docked their boat in Indiana but chose Cincinnati as the hailing port. In 2003, the Division of Watercraft of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources issued a registration certificate to Cheryl. in 2005, the Ohio tax commissioner assessed a use tax, imposed a penalty, and assessed pre-assessment interest, determining that Cheryl’s use of the boat in Ohio, combined with her declaration of Cincinnati as the boat’s hailing port and her registration of the boat in Ohio created a nexus between the boat and Ohio and that she did not qualify for the transient use exception. The Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the BTA acted unreasonably and unlawfully in affirming the commissioner’s use tax, penalty, and pre-assessment interest because Cheryl qualified for the transient use exception contained in Ohio Rev. Code 5741.02(C)(4). View "Gallenstein v. Testa" on Justia Law

In 2008, the county auditor assigned a value of approximately $5 million to certain property located in the Mason City School District. The former owner of the property subsequently filed a valuation complaint seeking a reduction from the auditor’s valuation. The Warren County Board of Revision (BOR) reduced the value. The Mason City School District Board of Education appealed. After a hearing, the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) raised the value of the property, concluding that the 2006 sale price of $5,350,000 was the value of the property as of 2008. After the BTA hearing and before the BTA issued its decision, Squire Hill Properties II, LLC acquired the property. Squire Hill appealed. The Supreme Court vacated the BTA’s decision, holding (1) under the circumstances, the BTA was not required to give Squire Hill notice of the BTR hearing; but (2) the BTA erred by not properly considering the finding of the BOR that the 2006 sale was not recent in regard to the tax-lien date. Remanded. View "Mason City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Warren County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law