Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Ohio Supreme Court
State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Craig
Reporters for the Cincinnati Enquirer requested that the Cincinnati police department provide the newspaper with certain records related to a shootout at a local bar, including the names of the two police officers shot, their personnel files, and an unredacted copy of the incident report of the shootout. The Cincinnati police chief denied the requests insofar as the newspaper sought names and identifying information regarding the officers involved in the shootout. The Enquirer subsequently filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel the police chief to make the requested records available for inspection and copying and seeking attorney fees. The court of appeals denied the writ and the request for attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not in denying the writ and request for attorney fees, as the requested identifying information of the police officers wounded in the shooting was exempted from disclosure under the Public Records Act by the constitutional right of privacy. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Craig" on Justia Law
State v. Lloyd
Appellant Wesley Lloyd was convicted in Texas of aggravated sexual assault. Lloyd subsequently moved to Ohio. Lloyd was later convicted of several charges relating to his failure to register as a sex offender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the offense for which Appellant was convicted in Texas was a sexually oriented offense under Ohio law because it is substantially equivalent to rape, a listed Ohio offense, and therefore, Appellant's offense triggered a duty to register in Ohio; but (2) because the State failed to prove that at the time Appellant moved to Ohio, he was under a duty to register in Texas as a result of his conviction for aggravated sexual assault, Appellant's convictions must be vacated.
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AT&T Commc’ns of Ohio, Inc. v. Lynch
Appellee, AT&T Communications of Ohio, applied to the City of Cleveland for an income-tax refund for 1999 through 2002. Appellant, the City's income-tax administrator, denied AT&T's appeal in all respects, (1) dismissing AT&T's application for the refund for 1999 after finding that the statute of limitations on the request for a refund had expired, and (2) determining that any refund AT&T was claiming for 2000 through 2002 was offset in part by its other tax obligations. The board of income tax review reversed in part, determining that AT&T should receive the entire refund requested for the tax years 2000 through 2002. AT&T appealed. The court of common pleas reversed and entered judgment in favor of the administrator regarding AT&T's refund for 2000 through 2002. The court of appeals reversed the common pleas court's judgment, concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the administrator's assignments of error because the administrator did not file a notice of appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the administrator failed to perfect a separate appeal in the court of common pleas, the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction to consider the administrator's assignments of error. View "AT&T Commc'ns of Ohio, Inc. v. Lynch" on Justia Law
State v. Harris
This appeal involved two criminal cases against Mario Harris. In Harris I, Harris pleaded guilty to two offenses with forfeiture specifications. After the trial court imposed a sentence, Harris filed a motion for resentencing, which the court denied. The appellate court held that the trial court's denial of Harris's motion was not a final, appealable order because the sentencing court had failed to include the terms of forfeiture in the judgment of conviction. In Harris II, Harris pled guilty to an offense with an automobile-forfeiture specification. The trial court imposed a prison sentence and ordered the forfeiture. The court denied Harris's subsequent motion for resentencing. The appellate court held that the sentence was void because the trial court had failed to include a mandatory driver's license suspension as part of Harris's sentence. The Supreme Court consdoliated the cases and held (1) a journal entry of conviction need not include a related forfeiture in order to be a final appealable order; and (2) when a trial court fails to impose a mandatory driver's license suspension as part of an offender's sentence, that part of the sentence is void, and resentencing is limited to the imposition of the statutorily mandated term.
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State ex rel. Souffrance v. Doe
Appellant, inmate Sidney Souffrance, petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, the records custodian for the Life Skills Center of Cincinnati, a community school, to provide access to the attendance records, addresses, and telephone numbers of all students who were in a certain classroom during two specific months and to records indicating which computer terminal a specific student had used during one of those months. The court of appeals held that the disclosure of the requested records was barred by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the record request related to persons who were no longer students, because the persons were students when the records were created and originally maintained, the records were subject to the nondisclosure provisions of FERPA. View "State ex rel. Souffrance v. Doe" on Justia Law
HealthSouth Corp. v. Testa
This personal-property-tax case came to the Supreme Court for the second time on appeal from the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). For tax year 2002, HealthSouth Corporation claimed that as a result of massive accounting fraud, it reported fictitious personal-property assets at its facilities in various Ohio taxing districts. HealthSouth subsequently filed an application for final assessment for 2002 in order to obtain from the tax commissioner a new assessment that would reduce the taxable value in various taxing districts by removing fictitious assets. The BTA reversed the commissioner's refusal to grant a reassessment, and the Supreme Court remanded with instructions for the BTA to complete its fact-finding. On remand, the BTA found that HealthSouth established that the denial of its refund request was improper and remanded to the commissioner for a determination of a reduced tax assessment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in its determination. View "HealthSouth Corp. v. Testa" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Teamsters Local Union v. Bd. of Comm’rs
County Commissioners passed a resolution establishing an early retirement incentive plan (ERIP). The resolution made the plan available to all employees of Commissioners except for the sanitary engineering division. A few days before passage of the resolution, some employees of the division filed a grievance regarding eligibility for the retirement plan. None of them were members of Union, a bargaining unit of employees who worked for the sanitary engineering division, but at least four Union members attended the hearing. The county administrator determined that the division employees were not permitted to participate in the retirement plan. Union filed a taxpayer action against Commissioners, on behalf of all union-member division employees, seeking a declaration that the ERIP was in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 145.297. The trial court agreed and held for Union. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Union lacked standing to bring a taxpayer action against Commissioners, and to the extent that Union had standing in its own right, Union failed to exhaust its administrative remedies; and (2) therefore, the issue of whether Commissioners' ERIP was in violation of section 145.297 was moot. View "State ex rel. Teamsters Local Union v. Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law
State v. Davis
Appellee Tracy Davis was indicted under Ohio Rev. Code 2921.04(B) for witness intimidation based on a threat he made to his ex-wife after police began investigating the underlying crime but before any charges had been filed. Section 2921.04(B) prohibits the intimidation of a person who observes a crime after the initiation of proceedings flowing from the criminal act in a court of justice. The trial court convicted Davis for witness intimidation. The court of appeals reversed, finding that no "action or proceeding" existed at the time of the threat, and therefore, the victim of the threat was not a witness under section 2921.04(B). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly determined that insufficient evidence existed to convict Davis for witness intimidation based on his threat to his ex-wife because a police investigation of a crime, without more, is not a proceeding in a court of justice and does not invoke the protection of section 2921.04(B) for a person who observes the crime. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Ruscilli Constr. Co. v. Indus. Comm’n
David Barno, a temporary worker on a construction project, alleged that he was injured as a result of Ruscilli Construction Company's violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR) pertaining to floor openings on construction sites. After a workers' compensation claim was allowed, Barno filed an application for additional compensation with Industrial Commission of Ohio, alleging a violation of Ohio Admin. Code 4123:1-3-04(D). A Commission staff hearing officer (SHO) found that Ruscilli had violated section 4123:1-3-04(D)(1). The court of appeals vacated the SHO's order and remanded the cause to the Commission, finding that the order misinterpreted the applicable safety requirement and that it was based on significant mistakes of fact. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the SHO's order contained at least four major errors involving both law and fact, and therefore, the order was premised in findings that lacked evidentiary support. View "State ex rel. Ruscilli Constr. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n " on Justia Law
In re Application of Duke Energy Ohio, Inc.
Duke Energy Ohio, Inc. sought to recover over $30 million for the costs of restoring its system following the destruction caused by Hurricane Ike. The Public Utilities Commission allowed Duke to recover roughly half that amount, finding that several of Duke's requests lacked adequate supporting evidence. Duke appealed, raising five propositions of law, all variations on the theme that the Commission's order lacked record support. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission's finding reducing the amount that Duke could recover because it found substantial problems with the supporting evidence was confirmed by the record; and (2) each of Duke's arguments lacked merit.
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