Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this appeal was whether a juvenile has a statutory right to counsel during a police interrogation conducted before a complaint is filed or an appearance is made in juvenile court. The juvenile in this case was adjudicated delinquent of aggravated robbery with a three-year firearm specification. The juvenile appealed, arguing that the police sergeant violated Ohio Rev. Code 2151.352 in obtaining a written statement before giving the juvenile an opportunity to obtain counsel. The appellate court rejected the juvenile's claim, concluding that a juvenile proceeding does not commence until the filing of a complaint, and because no complaint had been filed against the juvenile at the time he was interrogated and gave the written statement, section 2151.352 did not apply. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) pursuant to section 2151.352, a child is statutorily entitled to representation by legal counsel upon the filing of a complaint in juvenile court or upon initial appearance in the juvenile court; and (2) thus, the right of a juvenile to counsel pursuant to section 2151.352 attaches when the jurisdiction of a juvenile court is properly invoked. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law

This was an expedited election action in which Relator, the city of Brecksville, sought writs of mandamus and prohibition to prevents Respondents, the secretary of state and Cuyahoga County board of elections, from certifying an initiative petition and submitting the initiative to electors at the November 6, 2012 general election. The petition was filed in respect to Citizens United v. Fed Election Comm. and was titled, "Initiative in support of movement to amend the U.S. Constitution to establish that corporations are not people and money is not speech" and proposed certain ordinances to city electors for their proposal. The Supreme Court (1) dismissed the purported mandamus claim for lack of jurisdiction, as the city's request actually sought a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction; and (2) denied the writ of prohibition, holding that the ordinances proposed by the initiative constituted proper legislative action. View "State ex rel. Brecksville v. Husted" on Justia Law

This was an original action in mandamus by relator, JobsOhio, asking the Supreme Court to (1) find that legislation authorizing the creation of JobsOhio to promote economic development in the state and to assume responsibility for the merchandising and sale of alcohol in the state was constitutional, and (2) compel respondent, the Ohio Department of Commerce director, to execute an agreement to transfer the state's liquor business to JobsOhio. The Supreme Court dismissed the cause because it did not properly invoke the original jurisdiction of the court, as it essentially sought either a declaratory judgment or an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of the statute rather than presenting a justiciable controversy. View "State ex rel. JobsOhio v. Goodman" on Justia Law

A juvenile court issued temporary visitation orders in a pending case for custody under Ohio Rev. Code 2151.23(A)(2) between a parent and nonparent. When the parent violated the orders, the trial court found the parent in contempt. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the juvenile court lacked authority to order visitation in a section 2151.23(A)(2) custody case, and thus, the underlying temporary order was invalid, and the parent could not be in contempt of an invalid order. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's orders, holding that in exercising its jurisdiction under section 2151.23(A)(2), a juvenile court may issue temporary visitation orders that are in the best interest of the minor child during the litigation. View "Rowell v. Smith" on Justia Law

Bay Mechanical & Electrical Corporation, a specialty mechanical contractor, challenged a sales-tax assessment issued by the tax commissioner with respect to Bay's purchase of allegedly taxable employment services. During the audit period, Bay purchased the services from two entities. Bay treated the personnel supplied by the entities as "permanent-assignment" employees, and therefore regarded the attendant employment services as exempt pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5739.01(JJ)(3). The commissioner denied the exemption on the ground that the evidence offered by Bay was insufficient to prove entitlement to the exemption. The board of tax appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully when it upheld the tax commissioner's sales-tax assessment against Bay because the contracts and testimony offered by Bay did not satisfy the one-year and permanent-assignment criteria of section 5739.01(JJ)(3). View "Bay Mech. & Elec. Corp. v. Testa" on Justia Law

The issue in this appeal was whether a plea agreement between the Summit County prosecuting attorney and Appellant bound the Portage County prosecuting attorney regarding his prosecution of Appellant for crimes that Appellant committed wholly in Portage County. The trial court overruled Defendant's motion to enforce the plea agreement, finding that Defendant failed to prove that the Portage County prosecuting attorney, who was not a party to the agreement, authorized anyone in Summit County to negotiate or contract on his behalf. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a county prosecuting attorney does not have authority to enter into a plea agreement on behalf of the state for crimes committed wholly outside the county in which the prosecuting attorney has been elected; and (2) because the Portage County prosecuting attorney had not granted the Summit County prosecuting attorney authority to bind him as to the prosecuting of Defendant for crimes committed in Portage County, the plea agreement between the Summit County prosecuting attorney and Defendant did not preclude the Portage County prosecuting attorney from prosecuting Defendant for crimes that he committed wholly in Portage County or from asking for consecutive sentences. View "State v. Billingsley" on Justia Law

This was an expedited election case in which Relators, taxpayers and committee members representing the petitioners supporting the issue, requested a writ of mandamus to compel Respondent, the county board of elections, to submit a levy-decrease question to the electorate at the November 6, 2012 general election. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the board of elections neither abused its discretion nor clearly disregarded Ohio Rev. Code 5705.261 and 5705.192 by removing Relators' levy-decrease initiative from the November 6 ballot where the voter-approved levy did not increase the rate of the preexisting voter-approved levies. View "State ex rel. Taxpayers for Westerville Sch. v. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

This was a public-records mandamus action in which Relator, an attorney representing defendants in criminal cases, sought certain records from Respondents, the county prosecutor's office and the county prosecuting attorney. The Supreme Court granted the writ for a few of the requested records but denied the writ for the remaining requested records, holding (1) Relator, for the most part, did not establish his entitlement to the requested relief in mandamus for most of his requests; but (2) Relator established his entitlement to a writ of mandamus to compel Respondents to provide copies of those portions of the requested calendars of the prosecuting attorney and two assistant prosecuting attorneys that were work-related entries for the period of November 2008 to July 2010, as these portions of the requested calendars were records for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 149.011(G) and 149.43 and Relator had not previously been provided with the requested records. View "State ex rel. McCaffrey v. Mahoning County ProsecutorÂs Office" on Justia Law

This was an expedited election case for writs of mandamus and prohibition to find Akron Ordinance No. 271-2012 to be invalid and to order Respondents, the Summit County board of elections and the secretary of state of Ohio, to reconvene forthwith and adopt ballot language that properly described the proposed charter amendment for the November 6, 2012 general election. The Supreme Court denied the writs, holding that Relator did not establish his entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief, as (1) the proposed charter amendment did not violate the Akron Charter; and (2) the board of elections and secretary of state did not abuse their discretion or clearly disregard applicable law by rejecting Relator's argument concerning the approved ballot language, and the ballot language for the proposed charter amendment approved by the board of elections and secretary of state properly described the amendment. View "State ex rel. Kilby v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Employee was suspended from his position with City and, therefore, was not working when City discharged him. Employee subsequently filed an action against City for retaliatory discharge under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.90. Employee alleged he did not learn he had been discharged until almost six weeks after the date City claimed the discharge occurred. The trial court ruled the allegation was not relevant to, and did not delay the commencement of, the ninety-day period following the discharge for the employer to receive written notice of Employee's claim that his discharge had been retaliatory under section 4123.90. The court, therefore, found Employee's ninety-day notice letter untimely. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in general, "discharge" in section 4123.90 means the date the employer issued the notice of employment termination, not the date of the employee's receipt of that notice or the date of the employee's discovery of a section 4123.90 cause of action; but (2) the facts of this case may require an exception to the general rule. Remanded. View "Lawrence v. Youngstown" on Justia Law