Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were skiing and Defendant was snowboarding at the same resort when Defendant and one of Plaintiffs collided, injuring Plaintiff. Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendant and his parents, alleging that Defendant had acted negligently, carelessly, recklessly, willfully, and wantonly in causing the collision. The trial court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court to determined whether Defendant had violated any duties under Ohio Rev. Code 4169.08 or 4169.09 and if he did, whether negligence per se applied. The court also held that a genuine issue of material fact existed whether Defendant was reckless. The Supreme Court affirmed, albeit on somewhat different grounds, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact, but only as to whether Defendant's actions were more than negligent, that is, whether his actions were reckless or intentional under the common law. View "Horvath v. Ish" on Justia Law

Appellee was working as an apprentice lineman for Appellant, an electrical-utility construction contractor, when he came into contact with an energized line and received an electric shock, which caused severe burns. Appellee filed this action against Appellant, alleging workplace intentional tort in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2745.01 and common law. He alleged that Appellant knew with substantial certainty that he would be injured when working alone in an elevated lift bucket near energized high-voltage power lines without the use of protective rubber gloves and sleeves. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) protective rubber gloves and sleeves are personal items that an employee controls and do not constitute "an equipment safety guard" for purposes of section 2745.01(C), and an employee's failure to use them, or an employer's failure to require an employee to use them, does not constitute the deliberate removal by an employer of an equipment safety guard; and (2) consequently, Appellee failed to establish a rebuttable presumption of intent pursuant to section 2745.01(C), and Appellant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Hewitt v. L.E. Myers Co." on Justia Law

The City of Reynoldsburg was a municipal corporation governed by a charter. Intervening appellee, Columbus Southern Power Company (CSP), was a public utility and provided electric power to the City and its residents. At issue in this case was whether the City or CSP bore the cost to relocate overhead power lines underground. Specifically, the City sought a ruling that its right-of-way ordinance requiring all overhead power lines to be relocated underground at the sole cost of the public utility took precedence over CSP's commission-approved tariff, which provided that municipalities shall pay the costs whenever they required CSP to relocate overhead electrical distribution lines underground, in this particular aspect. The City filed a complaint with the Public Utilities Commission, contending that its ordinance superseded CSP's tariff and that the tariff was unjust, unreasonable, and unlawful. The commission found in favor of CSP. The Supreme Court affirmed the commission's orders, holding that the commission correctly found that the City was required to pay CSP's entire costs for relocating the power lines underground. View "In re Complaint of Reynoldsburg " on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to resolve a certified conflict between the fifth and second district courts of appeals on whether res judicata bars a criminal defendant from arguing that his plea is void due to an earlier postrelease-control sentencing error when the defendant has entered a plea of guilty to escape. The Supreme Court held that if a trial court improperly sentences a defendant to a term of postrelease control and the defendant subsequently pleads guilty to violating the terms of that postrelease control, the defendant is not barred by principles of res judicata from collaterally attacking his conviction as void. In so holding, the Court reversed the judgment of the fifth district court of appeals, which affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea to escape on the theory that he had never been legally placed on postrelease control. View "State v. Billiter" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with one count of domestic violence. The domestic-violence charge was enhanced to a third-degree felony under the statute applicable to third-time offenders. A jury found Appellant guilty. The court of appeals affirmed Appellant's domestic-violence conviction but as a fourth-degree rather than a third-degree felony because the state had not presented evidence of at least two prior domestic-violence convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) while Ohio Rev. Code 2945.75(B)(1) permits the state to prove a prior conviction by submitting a judgment entry of the conviction, the statute does not restrict the manner of proof to that method alone; (2) when the state chooses to prove a prior conviction by using a judgment entry, that entry must comply with Ohio R. Crim. P. 32(C); (3) the appellate court in this case was correct in holding that the state proved only one, not two, prior convictions, and therefore the offense may be elevated only to a fourth-degree felony; but (4) the court of appeals was incorrect in holding that compliance with Rule 32(C) was not a prerequisite to proving a prior offense for purposes of increasing a subsequent charge. View "State v. Gwen" on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of aggravated murder and tampering with the evidence. The trial court, however, granted Appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal on the aggravated-burglary count. The Supreme Court accepted Appellant's appeal to review two questions of law: (1) does a person have standing to object under the fourth Amendment to the retention of a DNA profile by the state and its use in a subsequent criminal investigation when the profile was lawfully created during a previous criminal investigation, but the person was acquitted of the crime; and (2) does the state have the authority to retain a DNA profile that was created during a criminal investigation and use that profile in a subsequent investigation, when the person was acquitted of any crime following the first investigation? The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a person does not have standing to object to the retention of his or her DNA profile or the profile's use in a subsequent criminal investigation; and (2) the state is authorized to retain the DNA profile and to use it in a subsequent investigation even though the profile was obtained from a sample taken during the investigation of the crime of which the person was acquitted. View "State v. Emerson" on Justia Law

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation commenced this foreclosure action before it obtained an assignment of the promissory note and mortgage securing the Plaintiffs' loan. Plaintiffs maintained that Federal Home Loan lacked standing to sue. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Federal Home Loan and entered a decree of foreclosure. The appellate court affirmed, holding that Federal Home Loan had remedied its lack of standing when it obtained an assignment from the real party in interest. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the cause, holding (1) standing is required to invoke the jurisdiction of the common pleas court, and therefore it is determined as of the filing of the complaint; and (2) thus, receiving an assignment of a promissory note and mortgage from the real party in interest subsequent to the filing of an action but prior to the entry of judgment does not cure a lack of standing to file a foreclosure action. View "Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Schwartzwald" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court found juvenile appellant J.V. delinquent and guilty of felonious assault, aggravated robbery, and the attendant firearm and serious-youthful-offender specifications. The court imposed a blended sentence of at least two years of incarceration at the Ohio Department of Youth Services and a stayed adult sentence of three years. Near the end of his sentence, J.V. was involved in a fight that led the trial court to invoke the stayed adult sentence. The court of appeals affirmed the invocation of the stayed adult sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the invocation of the adult prison sentence was constitutional; but (2) a juvenile court does not have the authority to impose criminal punishment, including post-release control, after the delinquent child turns twenty-one, and because the juvenile court imposed the adult sentence and added postrelease control after J.V. turned twenty-one, the court acted outside of its jurisdiction. View "In re J.V." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether an indigent parent whose sentence for civil contempt at a previous hearing for failure to pay child support was suspended on condition that he comply with his child-support obligations for a year, has a right to appointed counsel at a subsequent hearing on a motion to impose the suspended sentence due to noncompliance with the conditions. The court of appeals (1) concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not apply at the hearing, as it was civil in nature, and (2) declined to create a categorical rule that indigent parties previously represented by counsel at a contempt hearing have a due process right to appointed counsel at later purge hearings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because a purge hearing does not amount to a new contempt proceeding, a hearing to determine whether a contemnor has purged himself of civil contempt is a civil proceeding; and (2) the Due Process Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions do not guarantee an indigent parent the right to appointed counsel at a civil-contempt purge hearing. View "Liming v. Damos" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a judgment granting a writ of mandamus to compel Appellees, the county board of commissioners and the county board of elections, to hold a special election before January 1, 2013 to elect a judge for the newly created county municipal court for a one-year term in 2013. The court of appeals granted the writ to compel the special election. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment of the court of appeals with regard to granting the special election and instead held that Appellants established their entitlement to a writ of mandamus to compel Appellees to conduct the November 6, 2012 election for the two part-time judgeships for the county court; (2) granted a writ of mandamus to compel the board of elections to accept the filed petitions and conduct the November 6, 2012 election for the judges of the county court; and (3) affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals insofar as the court held that the pertinent legislation was unconstitutional insofar as it appointed judges of the county court to the newly created county municipal court for 2013. View "State ex rel. Whitehead v. Sandusky County Bd. of Comm'rs" on Justia Law