Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This was an original action challenging the decennial apportionment of districts in the General Assembly. At issue was whether the 2011 apportionment plan adopted by the apportionment board (Respondents) complied with Ohio Const. art. XI, 7 and 11. The Supreme Court denied Relators' request for declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that Relators failed to adduce sufficient, credible proof to rebut the presumed constitutionality accorded the 2011 apportionment plan by establishing that the plan was unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, Relators were not entitled to a declaration that the 2011 apportionment plan was unconstitutional or a prohibitory injunction to prevent elections from being conducted in accordance with that plan. View "Wilson v. Kasich" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to determined whether Ohio Const. art. XII, 5a permits the use of motor vehicle and gas tax (MVGT) funds to pay those costs of a county's joint self-insurance pool attributable to covering the risk of liability and loss resulting from the operations of a county engineer's highway department. The Supreme Court concluded that Ohio Const. art. XII, 5a authorizes the use of MVGT funds to pay a county's cost of participating in a joint self-insurance pool attributable to covering the risk of liability and loss resulting from the operations of a county engineer's highway department. In so holding, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded. View "Stockberger v. Henry" on Justia Law

This workers' compensation case came before the Supreme Court on an appeal of right from the court of appeals' judgment granting Claimant a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission to vacate its August 6, 2009 order. Appellants, Industrial Commission and Claimant's employer, sought to reinstate the August 6 order, which vacated a previously allowed claim for temporary total disability compensation on the grounds that a later statement by Claimant's examining physician had repudiated that same physician's earlier certifications that the disabling injury had not yet reached maximum medical improvement. On appeal, Claimant argued that the Commission lacked adequate grounds to exercise continuing jurisdiction, which it needed in order to invalidate the earlier order. The court of appeals granted mandamus relief, finding that the subsequent repudiating opinion of Claimant's examining physician could not be relied upon by the Commission to support the exercise of continuing jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission abused its discretion in exercising continuing jurisdiction over this case. View "State ex rel. Knapp v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to resolve a conflict between the Third and Tenth District Courts of Appeals. The issue was whether after a claimant's right to participate in the workers' compensation fund has been established, a trial court abuses its discretion under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512(F) when it awards the claimant his or her costs related to the conditions for which the trier of fact determined the claimant was ineligible to participate in the fund. The Court held (1) when a claimant's right to participate in the workers' compensation fund is established on appeal, section 4123.512(F) requires the trial court to award the claimant his or her costs; (2) under section 4123.512, a trial court is not required to apportion costs based on the outcome of a particular claim and/or condition; and (3) accordingly, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by awarding costs under section 4123.512(F) when it reimburses a claimant for costs incurred on appeal without regard to the outcome of a particular claim and/or condition. View "Holmes v. Crawford Machine, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, the former mayor of the city of Vermilion, appealed from a judgment denying her request for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, the city, to provide copies of certain itemized billing statements for attorney services rendered to the city. Because she thought the annual legal fees expended by the new administration would far exceed the fees incurred during her administration, Appellant made the records requests to permit public scrutiny of the city's expenditure of funds for legal services. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the portion of the court of appeals granting summary judgment in favor of the city and denying Appellant's claim for a writ of mandamus, as the city did not establish that the entirety of the requested statements were exempt from disclosure under the Public Records Act; and (2) affirmed the portion of the judgment denying Appellant's request for an award of statutory damages and attorney fees. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Anderson v. City of Vermilion" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether Appellant, Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services (ODJFS), properly denied applications for federal wage subsidies filed by Appellees, three former employees of American Standard who later were reemployed at a lower wage before they reached the age of fifty. The Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission denied Appellees' eligibility for the subsidies. The court of common pleas reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that because ODJFS offered a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous language in the federal statute that established the wage subsidies, ODJFS did not improperly deny the applications. View "Lang v. Dir., Ohio Dep't of Job & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Appellant (Bank) loaned money to Appellee (LLC). LLC later filed a putative class action, alleging that Bank had breached its contract by charging interest in excess of the rate stated in the promissory note. LLC claimed Bank was charging more interest than was agreed to by LLC as expressed in the note by charging a rate calculated by a 365/360 method rather than an annual rate. Bank contended the note fixed the interest rate according to the 365/360 method. The trial court granted summary judgment to Bank. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to which interest rate was imposed by the note. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment, holding that the clause in the promissory note imposing the interest rate was not ambiguous, and fixed the interest rate according to the 365/360 method. View "JNT Props., LLC v. KeyBank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

Youngstown Belt Railway Company entered into a purchase agreement with Total Waste Logistics of Girard for the purchase of Mosier Yard, which the railway owned. The sale was never consummated, and later the city of Girard commenced an appropriation action to appropriate a portion of Mosier Yard. The trial court held that the city's appropriation proceedings were preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA). On remand, the trial court held that it would be inappropriate to consider the railway's potential sale to Total Waste in the preemption analysis but determined that the railway's use of a portion of the appropriated land for storage caused the city's action to be preempted by the ICCTA. The appellate court affirmed, although on different grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the city's proposed eminent-domain action against the undeveloped portion of the railway's property, which did not contain any tracks or rights-of-way and did not have any concrete projected use that would constitute rail transportation by a rail carrier, was not preempted under the ICCTA. View "Girard v. Youngstown Belt Ry. Co." on Justia Law

This appeal involved three rulings in a medical-malpractice trial. Appellee suffered a stroke during brain surgery performed at Appellant, the Cleveland Clinic. Appellee sued the clinic, claiming its surgeon had struck a ventricle, thus causing the stroke. A verdict was entered for the clinic. The court of appeals found the trial court abused its discretion in (1) allowing the clinic to use demonstrative evidence recreating the surgery that was provided to Appellee's counsel ten minutes before the expert using it testified; (2) ordering counsel for Branch not to argue an inference that because the best piece of evidence was not saved, it must have been adverse to the clinic; and (3) instructing the jury that evidence of alternative medical approaches was not evidence of negligence. the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the jury verdict for the clinic, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in any of the rulings at issue. View "Branch v. Cleveland Clinic Found." on Justia Law

The question before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the city of Cuyahoga Falls was immune from liability, pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2744, in an action brought by a minor and his parents after the minor was injured at an indoor swimming pool maintained by the city. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city on the ground that indoor swimming pools do not fall under section 2744.02(B)(4), which sets forth an exception to immunity for injury caused by negligence of a political subdivision's employee within or on the grounds of a building used in connection with a governmental function. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the pool was in a building used in connection with the performance of a governmental function, and therefore, the exception to political-subdivision tort immunity applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the city was not immune from liability because the exception to immunity contained in Ohio Rev. Code 2744.02(B)(4) was applicable. View "M.H. v. City of Cuyahoga Falls" on Justia Law