Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Ohio Supreme Court
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Appellant had been employed as a nurse with Progressive Parma Care, LLC since 1995. During her tenure at Parma Care, Appellant was disciplined on several occasions. On April 10, 2008, Appellant was injured at work. On April 16, 2008, the director of nursing terminated Appellant for cause. On April 21, 2008, a physician certified that Appellant was temporarily and totally disabled from all employment beginning on the date of her injury. The Industrial Commission denied Appellant’s request for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, concluding that Appellant’s discharge from employment for violating written workplace rules had been a voluntary abandonment, making Appellant ineligible for benefits, and that the medical evidence did not support Appellant’s claim that she had been temporarily and totally disabled at the time of her termination. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion when it denied her request for TTD compensation. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant compensation for TTD. View "State ex rel. Robinson v. Indus. Comm'n " on Justia Law

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In 2003, Appellant was tried on charges of aggravated burglary and rape. A mistrial was declared due to a hung jury. After a retrial in 2005, Appellant was convicted by a jury of both charges. Appellant’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. Appellant subsequently asked the court of appeals to issue a writ ordering immediate release or a new trial, alleging that the retrial was jurisdictionally unauthorized because, in 2003, the trial court had discharged the jury without satisfying the requirement of Ohio Rev. Code 2945.36 that the reasons for the discharge be entered on the journal. However, Appellant failed to raise this objection before his second trial. The court of appeals’ dismissed Appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant waived his mistrial argument, and moreover, Appellant had other adequate legal remedies at law. View "State ex rel. Bevins v. Cooper" on Justia Law

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Appellant purchased property in 2004 for $7.4 million. For the tax-year 2006, the County auditor set the value at $8 million. Appellant filed a complaint with the County Board of Revision (BOR) seeking a decrease in value to $5 million, an amount close to the sale price of the property in 2003. After a hearing, the BOR reduced the property value from $8 million to the 2004 sale price of $7.4 million. Appellant appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). The BTA upheld the $7.4 million sale price as the best evidence of value. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA’s decision to adopt the $7.4 million sale price from 2004 as the property’s value for the tax-year 2006 was not unreasonable or unlawful. View "HIN, LLC v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

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In 2003, Appellant was arrested and charged with the murder of Amber Zurcher. The trial court granted a mistrial on Appellant’s first trial. Several trials followed, and after a fifth trial, another mistrial was declared. When the trial court set a sixth trial date, Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the prosecution was barred by the Double Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The trial court denied the motion. The State moved to dismiss Appellant’s appeal, arguing that the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to dismiss was not a final, appealable order. The court of appeals concluded that, in this situation where there had been multiple mistrials, the order was a final, appealable order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an order denying a motion to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds is a final, appealable order. Remanded. View "State v. Anderson" on Justia Law

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Appellant was injured while working for Employer. Appellant’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for a dislocated left shoulder and a torn left rotator cuff, among other injuries. Appellant later requested compensation for the scheduled loss of use of his left upper extremity. The Industrial Commission denied Appellant’s request for benefits by relying on the report of Dr. D. Ann. Middaugh as evidence that Appellant had retained some use of his left arm. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Commission’s finding as an abuse of discretion. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that Dr. Middaugh’s report was some evidence upon which the Commission could rely to deny scheduled loss compensation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was entitled to an award for the scheduled loss of his left arm because (1) Dr. Middaugh’s findings were not consistent with her ultimate conclusion, and consequently, Dr. Middaugh’s report could not be some evidence supporting the Commission’s decision to deny an award for loss of use; and (2) the only other report submitted for consideration with Appellant’s loss-of-uses award stated that, for all practical purposes, Appellant had lost the function of his left arm. View "State ex rel. Wyrick v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio" on Justia Law

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Appellant made a public-records request to the City of South Euclid. After the City failed to respond to the request for nearly six months, Appellant filed a claim for a writ of mandamus. The writ claim became moot when all the requested records were produced during the pendency of the mandamus action. Appellant claimed the she was entitled to statutory damages and attorney fees given that (1) the city delayed two months in providing any response to the request, and (2) the original production of documents was incomplete. The court of appeals denied both statutory damages and attorney fees, concluding that Appellant “failed to establish any viable public benefit.” The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeal’s denial of statutory damages, holding that in authorizing an award of such damages, Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(C)(1) does not condition that award on applying the public-benefit test; and (2) affirmed the denial of attorney fees but on other grounds, holding that the plain language of section 149.43(C)(2)(b) prohibited an award of attorney fees in this case. Remanded. View "State ex rel. DiFranco v. City of S. Euclid" on Justia Law

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Appellant made a public-records request to the City of South Euclid in care of the clerk of the city council. The clerk stated that he would forward the requested information, but because of an internal breakdown in communication, the City did not fulfill the request for nearly six months. Appellant filed a claim for a writ of mandamus, after which the oversight was discovered. The City subsequently provided the records responsive to Appellant’s request. Appellant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, contending that although the mandamus action was mooted by the production of records, she was entitled to a mandatory award of attorney fees. The court of appeals denied the motion for fees, concluding that Appellant had “failed to establish any viable public benefit.” The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) in considering the question of mandatory attorney fees, the court of appeals should have followed Ohio Rev. Code 149.43(C)(2)(b) rather than looking to public benefit; and (2) because the court did not have to render a judgment ordering the City to produce the records within a reasonable time, Appellant was ineligible for mandatory attorney fees under section 149.43(C)(2)(b). View "State ex rel. DiFranco v. City of S. Euclid" on Justia Law

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George Smith suffered an injury while working for Ohio State University. The Industrial Commission of Ohio allowed Smith’s claim for bilateral inguinal hernia. Tragically, Smith suffered brain damage resulting from postoperative complications from surgery to repair the hernia, leaving him in a persistent vegetative state. A doctor later concluded that Smith had bilateral vision and hearing loss caused by the loss of brain function. Smith sought additional scheduled awards for the loss of vision and hearing. However, no test could be performed to determine whether Smith suffered an actual loss of sight or hearing, and the medical evidence showed that Smith was unable to process sights and sounds because of damage to his brain, not because of any injury to his eyes or ears. The Industrial Commission denied Smith’s request for additional compensation based on the lack of any objective testing showing vision or hearing loss. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s denial of Smith’s claim, holding that the evidence supported a finding that Smith suffered from a loss of brain-stem function, a loss that has not been included in the schedule for compensation set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57. View "State ex rel. Smith v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

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Defendant stole $550 worth of merchandise from a department store. At that time, Ohio Rev. Code 2913.02 classified that theft offense as a felony. Prior to sentencing, however, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 86, which made theft of property valued at less than $1,000 a misdemeanor. Thereafter, the trial court convicted Defendant of a misdemeanor. The appellate court reversed, holding that nothing in H.B. 86 provided that Defendant was entitled to benefit from the decrease in classification of the theft offense and should have been convicted of a felony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that trial court properly convicted and sentenced Defendant for a misdemeanor conviction, as the Legislature intended to afford the benefit of a decreased theft offense classification to offenders like Defendant. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

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After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, among other offenses. Judge Patricia Oney sentenced Appellant was sentenced to seven years’ incarceration. Appellant filed a petition in mandamus and prohibition in the court of appeals against Judge Oney regarding the legality of his sentence. The court of appeals granted Judge Oney’s motion to dismiss the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Appellant had brought an earlier mandamus case raising the same sentencing issues, which was previously dismissed by the court of appeals, Appellant’s mandamus claim was precluded by res judicata and was properly dismissed; and (2) because Appellant had an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal and Judge Oney had subject-matter jurisdiction to try Appellant and to sentence him, the court of appeals properly dismissed the prohibition claim. View "State ex rel. Harsh v. Oney" on Justia Law