Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue in this appeal was whether a judgment of a court purporting to grant an acquittal based on lack of venue is a "final verdict" as that term is defined in Ohio Rev. Code 2945.67(A), which authorizes the state to appeal certain trial court decisions either as a matter of right or by leave of court. In accordance with well-established caselaw, the court of appeals concluded in this case that the order purporting to acquit Defendant for failure to establish venue was a final verdict and could not be appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the failure to establish venue in a criminal felony trial is a basis for acquittal, and therefore, an acquittal order based on the failure to establish venue is a final verdict, and the state may not appeal from the order. View "State v. Hampton" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether an individual who is the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant forfeits all expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. Defendant in this case moved the trial court to suppress the cocaine found in his possession. The trial judge denied the motion base solely on the notion that an arrest warrant "cleanses" any error by police in seizing an individual later found to be subject to the warrant. The court of appeals reversed Defendant's conviction of possession of crack cocaine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the unlawfulness of an improper arrest or seizure cannot be purged by the fortuitous subsequent discovery of an arrest warrant. Remanded for a finding of whether there was a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the arresting officer's patdown of Defendant and whether the contraband seized could be justified. View "State v. Gardner" on Justia Law

Ohio's equine-activities-immunity statute, Ohio Rev. Code 2305.321, provides immunity from liability for harm sustained by an equine activity participant allegedly resulting from the inherent risk of equine activities. In this case the Supreme Court was asked to determine when an injured person is a "spectator" and therefore an "equine activity participant" whose claim for damages is barred by statute. Appellee assisted in the care and management of horses and was kicked in the head by a horse when she went to the aid of Appellant, who was unloading an untrained horse from its trailer. Appellant argued that he was immune from liability pursuant to section 2305.321. The trial court concluded that the statute barred Appellee's claim because (1) she was a spectator, i.e., she was present at the unloading of the horse and "noticed" that event, and (2) thus, Appellee was an "equine activity participant" when she was injured. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that one who purposely places herself in a location where equine activities are occurring and who sees such an activity is a "spectator" and hence an "equine activity participant" within the meaning of section 2305.321(A)(3)(g). Remanded. View "Smith v. Landfair" on Justia Law

This case involved a medical-malpractice claim filed well after the statute of repose set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2305.113(C). Timothy and Tracy Ruther sued a doctor and medical facility, claiming that the doctor had failed to properly assess, evaluate and respond to abnormal laboratory results including very high liver enzymes. The court of appeals held that section 2305.113(C), as applied to the facts of this case, violated the right-to-remedy clause of the Ohio Constitution, relying in part upon Hardy v. VerMeulen. The Supreme Court overruled Hardy and reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) Plaintiffs, whose cause of action for medical malpractice did not accrue until after the statute of repose had expired, were not deprived of a vested right; (2) Plaintiffs failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to their claim; and (3) therefore, the medical malpractice statute of repose found in section 2305.113(C) does not extinguish a vested right and thus does not violate the Ohio Constitution. View "Ruther v. Kaiser" on Justia Law

Appellee, a graduate of a foreign medical school, was required to be certified by the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (commission) before applying for medical residency in Ohio. Appellee thus applied to take a United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE) examination administered by the commission. Appellee took and failed Part I of the examination. Fifteen years later, Appellee sued the commission for breach of an express written contract, alleging that the commission had failed to administer part I of the USMLE in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in an informational pamphlet provided by the commission, and the breach caused him to fail the examination and suffer damages. The trial court granted the commission's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the documents attached to the complaint did not constitute an express written contract and that, even if a contract existed, the statute of limitations for oral contracts barred recovery. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the informational pamphlet was not a written contract, and thus, Appellee could prove no facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief, and the commission was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Rayess v. Educ. Comm'n for Foreign Med. Graduates" on Justia Law

Appellees filed a complaint for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of Ohio Rev. Code 4509.05(A) and asserting that the amended statute violated Ohio Const. art XII, 5a. The statute provided that the registrar of motor vehicles shall collect a certified abstract with respect to any person's motor vehicle accidents and record of convictions for violation of motor vehicle laws. In addition, the statute directed the registrar to collect for each abstract a five dollar fee. The trial court agreed and granted injunctive relief and declaratory judgment, concluding that sixty percent of the five dollar fee collected under section 4509.0 as amended was money relating to registration, operation, or use of vehicles on public highways in Ohio, but such funds were not being 'expended' consistent with the specific purposes enumerated in Article XII, Section 5a. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the money derived from certified abstracts was related to the process of certification, not to the registration, operation, or use of vehicles on public highways. View "Ohio Trucking Ass'n v. Charles" on Justia Law

Respondent was a candidate for judge of the fifth district court of appeals of Ohio for the six-year term beginning February 11, 2013. Respondent won in the primary election but lost in the general election. A five-member judicial commission appointed by the Supreme Court concluded that the record before a hearing panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline supported the panel's finding that Respondent violated several provisions of Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct during her campaign by using campaign flyers depicting Respondent wearing a judicial robe. The Supreme Court agreed with the commission that the finding of professional misconduct was supported by the record and affirmed the sanctions imposed by the commission of a $1000 fine and $2500 in attorney fees. View "In re Moll" on Justia Law

Electric distribution utilities that opt to provide service under an electric security plan must undergo an annual earnings review. If their plan resulted in "significantly excessive earnings" compared to similar companies, the utility must return the excess to its customers pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4928.143(F). In the case below, the Public Utilities Commission found that Columbus Southern Power's 2009 earnings were significantly excessive by over $42 million. There were three appeals from the order. Columbus Southern Power asserted that section 4928.143(F) was unconstitutionally vague, and the Ohio Energy Group and the Office of the Ohio Consumers' Counsel (collectively, OEG) and Industrial Energy Users-Ohio (IEU) raised different arguments that the commission erred in applying the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the commission's order, holding (1) the statute was not unconstitutionally vague, and (2) neither OEG nor IEU showed that the commission unreasonably interpreted or applied section 4928.143(F). View "In re Columbus S. Power Co." on Justia Law

Employee worked in the aisle of a warehouse where he sustained injuries when a co-worker operating a sideloader struck him. Employee sued Employer, asserting the company had deliberately intended to injure him by directing him to work in the aisle with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to occur. The trial court granted Employer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Employee failed to show Employer intended to injure him. The court of appeals reversed, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact that Employer objectively believed the injury to Employee was substantially certain to occur. At issue on appeal was the recently enacted statute, Ohio Rev. Code 2745.01(A), which specifies that an employer is not liable for an intentional tort unless the employee proves the employer had the intent to injure or believed the injury was "substantially certain" to occur. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred by ignoring the statutory definition of "substantially certain" and holding Employer could be held liable for Employee's injuries if "objectively believed" the injury was substantially certain to occur; and (2) no evidence existed that Employer deliberately intended to injure Employee by directing him to work in the warehouse aisle. View "Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellee was convicted of one count of rape and one count of kidnapping. The court of appeals vacated both convictions, holding that the State failed to present sufficient evidence showing Appellee knew or had reason to know that the alleged victim's ability to consent was substantially impaired. Upon his release, Appellee filed an action for declaratory judgment seeking compensation from the State for wrongful imprisonment. The trial court granted Appellee's motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellee was innocent of the charges upon which he was convicted, or that no crime was committed by Appellee, or both. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) one who claims to be a "wrongfully imprisoned individual" under Ohio Rev. Code 2743.48 must prove all of the factors in section 2743.48(A) by a preponderance of the evidence before seeking compensation from the State for wrongful imprisonment; and (2) a trial court adjudicating proof of innocence pursuant to section 2743.48(A)(5) may not find that a claimant has been wrongfully imprisoned based solely on an appellee court judgment vacating a felony conviction due to insufficient evidence and discharging the prisoner without a remand for a new trial. Remanded. View "Doss v. State" on Justia Law