Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was a sex offender, originally classified under Megan's Law, who violated former Ohio Rev. Code 2950.99 by failing to give proper notice of an address change. At issue in this case was whether current section 2950.99 or former section 2950.99 governed the penalty for Appellant. The appellate court (1) reversed the sentence imposed by the trial court, and (2) applied the penalty provision in place when Defendant was classified rather than the penalty provision in place immediately before Megan's Law was replaced by the Adam Walsh Act (AWA), holding that current section 2950.99 does not apply to sex offenders originally classified under Megan's Law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that for a defendant whose sex-offender classification was determined under Megan's Law, the penalty for a violation of the reporting requirements of former section 2950.05 that occurs after Megan's Law was supplanted by the AWA is the penalty set forth in the version of section 2950.99 in place just before the effective date of the AWA. View "State v. Howard" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Appellant’s failure to provide notice of a change of residence address. Appellant was a sex offender, originally classified under Megan's Law, who was indicted for violating the address-notification requirements of the Adam Walsh Act (AWA) before State v. Bodyke was decided. Bodyke made the requirements of the AWA inapplicable to offenders such as Appellant. In addition, Appellant was charged with tampering with records because he filed an address-verification form with false information. The form was filed with a sheriff under the mistaken belief that it was required. Appellant pleaded guilty to the charges. The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that the charges against Appellant were based upon violations of the AWA, which, pursuant to Bodyke, did not apply to Appellant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Bodyke does not require the vacation of convictions where the conduct at issue was a violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2950.05 both as it exists under the AWA and as it existed under Megan's law; and (2) regardless of whether a person has a duty to file an address-verification form, filing a form containing false information with the intent to defraud can be a violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2913.42. View "State v. Brunning" on Justia Law

The Shelly Company, an Ohio corporation engaged in the business of surfacing roads, owned several subsidiaries, including appellants Shelly Materials, Inc. and Allied Corporation (collectively, Shelly). The hot-mix asphalt facilities were regulated by the Ohio EPA pursuant to air-pollution-control permits issued to Shelly. In July 2007, the State filed suit against Shelly, alleging that the companies had violated state law and Ohio's federally approved plan for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of air-quality standards as required by the federal Clean Air Act. The court found for the state on some, but not all, claims for relief, and issued a civil penalty. At issue on appeal was the proper method of calculating the civil penalty to be levied against the industrial facility with the terms of its air-pollution-control permit. The appellate court concluded that according to the terms of the permit, the penalty was to be calculated from the initial date of noncompliance until the facility demonstrated that it no longer violated the permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court reached the proper conclusion in this matter. View "State ex rel. Ohio Attorney Gen. v. Shelly Holding Co." on Justia Law

Ohio Rev. Code 2152.83(A)(1) requires that a juvenile court issue on order classifying the child as a juvenile-offender registrant at the time of the child's release from the custody of a secure facility. When he was eighteen years old, Appellant, a native of Haiti, was adjudicated to be a delinquent child and ordered to be committed to the Ohio Department of Youth Services (DYS). After Appellant was released from DYS, he was held in jail until hearings could be conducted to determine his citizenship. When Appellant was released from jail and after he turned twenty-one, he filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition to prevent the juvenile court from proceeding to classify him as a juvenile-offender registrant. Appellant claimed the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to proceed because he was over twenty-one years old and because the court failed to hold a classification hearing within a reasonable time of his release from DYS. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that he juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to classify Appellant, who was no longer a "child" under the applicable statute. View "State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch" on Justia Law

On October 10, 2011 the board of revision issued a decision ordering reductions in the valuation of property owed by a county club. The local school district board of education (school board) attempted to appeal that decision to the board of tax appeals (BTA) by sending the appropriate notices by certified mail on October 14, 2011. That same day, the country club physically presented its notices of appeal to the common pleas court and the BOR. The school board argued that it had filed its appeal first because it placed its notices in the mail earlier on October 14 than the country club had filed its appeals at the courthouse and the BOR. The BTA ruled that the country club had filed its appeal first, determining that the time of the mailing was immaterial and that the probative force of the school board evidence of the time of mailing was questionable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully in determining that the school board had not proven the time when its notice of appeal was mailed, it properly held that the country club's filing in the common pleas court had priority for jurisdictional purposes. View "Oak Hills Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Hamilton County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Appellee committed an act on September 1, 2007 that, if committed by an adult, would constitute rape. On May 19, 2010, the juvenile court classified Appellee as a Tier III sex offender under S.B. 10. Appellee appealed, asserting that he should not be classified as a Tier III sex offender under S.B. 10 because he committed his offense before the effective date of the applicable part of that statute. The First District Court of Appeals agreed and reversed. Noting, however, that its analysis was in conflict with the analysis of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, the First District certified a question of law to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered by stating that S.B. 10's classification, registration, and community-notification provisions may not be constitutionally applied to a sex offender who committed his sex offense between the July 1, 2007 repeal of Megan's Law and the January 1, 2008 effective date of S.B. 10's aforementioned provisions. View "In re Bruce S." on Justia Law

After an unmarried couple ended their relationship, they reached an agreement on issues pertaining the parental rights and responsibilities regarding their child. A hearing was held on the only remaining issue that the couple could not agree upon: what the child's surname should be. The magistrate ordered that the child's surname be changed from the mother's last name to his father's last name. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the decision to change the child's surname was not supported by sufficient evidence as a matter of law, as the trial court did not confine its consideration to the best interest of the child and improperly founded its decision on gender-based conventions and stereotypes. Remanded for entry of final judgment in favor of the mother. View "D.W. v. T.L." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against the city and two of its firefighters. The action arose out of the death of Plaintiff's husband and grandson, who died when a city fire engine operated and commanded by the defendant firefighters collided with Plaintiff's husband's vehicle. The trial court court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding (1) the city had a full defense to liability pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2744.02(B)(1)(b) because the operation of the fire truck did not constitute willful or wanton misconduct; and (2) the firefighters were entitled to immunity pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2744.03(A)(6)(b) because Plaintiff presented no evidence that the firefighters had acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. The court of appeals reversed, holding that reasonable minds court find that the firefighers' actions in this case were reckless and that the willful or wanton misconduct referred to in section 2744.02(B)(1)(b) was the functional equivalent of recklessness. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding that the willful or wanton misconduct and recklessness degrees of care have different meanings, involve different degrees of culpability, and are not interchangeable. After the Court's clarification of the terms, the matter was remanded. View "Anderson v. Massillon" on Justia Law

A jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated murder and aggravated robbery. After Appellant's convictions and sentence were affirmed, Appellant filed a pro se motion to order the preservation and listing of evidence pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2933.82. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) because section 2933.82 became effective in 2010, and Appellant was convicted in 1997, the statute would have to be applied retrospectively if it were to apply at all in this case; (2) because the statute did not contain an express, clear provision for retroactive application, it did not apply retrospectively; and (3) Appellant could not benefit from retrospective application of the statute. At issue on appeal was whether the obligation to preserve and catalog criminal-offense-related biological evidence imposed upon certain government entities by section 2933.82 applies to evidence in the possession of those entities at the time of the statute's effective date. The Supreme Court held that section 2933.82 is not retroactive, but it does apply to biological evidence in the possession of governmental evidence-retention entities at the time of its effective date. Remanded. View "State v. Roberts" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated murder, one count of murder, and two counts of rape. Defendant was sentenced to death for the aggravated murder and to twenty years in prison for the two rape convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the trial court properly excused two prospective jurors for cause who were not unequivocally opposed to the death penalty; (2) the trial court did not commit reversible error in the majority of its evidentiary rulings; (3) the erroneous admission of testimony relaying out-of-court statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the remaining evidence establishing Defendant's guilt; (4) the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during the penalty phase; (5) Ohio's death-penalty was constitutional; and (6) Defendant's death sentence was appropriate and proportional. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law