Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Findlay Market was a public market historically owned and operated by the City of Cincinnati until 2004, when the City and the Corporation for Findlay Market of Cincinnati entered into lease and management agreements under which the Corporation was to manage the market for the city. In this public-records mandamus case, Appellant sought unredacted copies of the lease agreements between the Corporation and merchants who subleased retail space at the market. Appellant received copies of the leases, but the term and rent provisions were redacted by the Corporation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant failed to establish his entitlement to relief in mandamus for the unredacted leases, as they were trade secrets and not public records. View "State ex rel. Luken v. Corp. for Findlay Market of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

Appellant, a medical doctor, performed surgery on Jeanette Johnson. Johnson's common bile duct was injured during the procedure. Johnson later returned to the hospital because of complications resulting from the bile duct injury. In an effort to console Johnson, Appellant said, "I take full responsibility for this. Everything will be okay." On July 26, 2007, Johnson and her husband filed an action against Appellant for negligent medical treatment and loss of consortium. Upon Appellant's motion, the trial court ruled that Appellant's statement of apology would be inadmissable at trial. The jury later returned a general verdict in favor of Appellant. At issue on appeal was whether Ohio Rev. Code 2317.43, which prevents the admission of certain statements made by healthcare providers, could be applied to Appellant's statement of apology even though the statement was made before the statute took effect. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in applying section 2317.43 retroactively to exclude Appellant's statement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 2317.43 applies to any cause of action filed after September 13, 2004; and (2) therefore, Appellant's statement was properly excluded. View "Estate of Johnson v. Randall Smith, Inc." on Justia Law

Relator, a trucking company, sought a writ of mandamus compelling Respondents, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) Registrar and the Department of Public Safety Director, to provide an unredacted, noncertified copy of the driving records of the trucking company's employee at cost. This case was consolidated with a direct appeal from the Tenth District Court of Appeals involving the same parties and the same issues but a different driving record. The BMV refused to provide the copies at cost but instead, following the BMV rule, required Relator to specify the basis for its entitlement to an unredacted copy and to pay a $5 fee for a certified copy. Relator claimed it should be able to receive an unredacted copy at cost under the Public Records Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth District in one case and denied the writ in the other case, holding (1) the BMV properly promulgated the rule at issue under its rule-making procedure; and (2) therefore, disclosure of the records was prohibited under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act and its counterpart in Ohio unless Relator could demonstrate a permissible use. View "State ex rel. Motor Carrier Serv., Inc. v. Rankin" on Justia Law

The State filed seven complaints against Appellee, a juvenile, alleging that he was delinquent for engaging in conduct that, if he had been an adult, would have constituted rape and gross sexual imposition. During pretrial proceedings, the State sought to introduce statements that two of the alleged victims made to a social worker with the police department. A magistrate concluded that the State was precluded from introducing at trial the out-of-court statements. The State did not move to set aside the magistrate's decision as was its right under the juvenile rules of procedure and failed to perfect an interlocutory appeal pursuant to the juvenile rules of procedure. The case proceeded to trial, where the court dismissed all counts after declining to allow out-of-court statements into evidence. The State appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State is not authorized to pursue a discretionary appeal when it fails to take an appeal as of right in accordance with the applicable rules of procedure. View "In re M.M." on Justia Law

Appellants filed an original action in mandamus in the court of appeals, arguing that they should be eligible for parole hearings at intervals set by the version of Ohio Adm. Code 5120:1-1-10(B), effective as of January 2, 1979, rather than the current version, which did not become effective until after they were incarcerated. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants had no right to parole or to be considered for parole on a particular date because application of the new parole guidelines to Appellants did not constitute a violation of any protected constitutional or statutory interest, and therefore, they had no clear legal right to relief. View "State ex rel. Richard v. Mohr" on Justia Law

Counsel for Defendants filed an affidavit with the clerk of the Supreme Court seeking to disqualify Judge Wyatt McKay from presiding over any further proceedings in the underlying case, alleging that the judge's rulings created the appearance of bias or prejudice against Defendants. The Supreme Court denied the affidavit of disqualification, holding (1) the extraordinary circumstances need to subject the judge to disqualification after having presided over lengthy proceedings in the case were not present here; (2) counsel pointed to no action on the part of Judge McKay that demonstrated bias, prejudice, or a disqualifying interest; and (3) counsel failed to overcome the presumptions that the judge followed the law and was not biased. View "In re Disqualification of McKay" on Justia Law

Plaintiff in the underlying complaint filed an affidavit seeking to disqualify Judge Thomas Pokorny from presiding over any further proceedings in her pending case. Plaintiff argued that the judge should be disqualified because (1) Plaintiff had moved to add Judge Pokorny as a defendant in a federal civil action she had filed, (2) the judge was conspiring to deny Plaintiff her right to defend herself and to conceal material facts, (3) the judge was biased against women and pro se litigants, and (4) the judge had scheduled a hearing on Defendant's motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigator. The Supreme Court denied the affidavit of disqualification, holding (1) naming the judge as a defendant in Plaintiff's federal case did not automatically lead to his disqualification in the underlying state court proceeding; (2) Plaintiff failed to substantiate her claims that the judge was conspiring against her or that the judge was biased against female and pro se litigants; and (3) the fact that the judge scheduled a hearing on Defendant's motion for summary judgment was not grounds for disqualification. View "In re Disqualification of Pokorny" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice and wrongful death action against Defendants. Counsel for Defendants filed affidavits with the clerk of the Supreme Court seeking to disqualify Judge Frank Forchione from presiding over further proceedings in the pending case, alleging that Judge Forchione was prejudiced in favor of Plaintiff because he granted Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendants' jury demand and because the judge lacked judicial objectivity. The Supreme Court denied the affidavits of disqualification, holding (1) rulings that are adverse to a party in a pending case are not grounds for disqualification; and (2) the record did not demonstrate the judge was partial to Plaintiff or that he had a bias against Defendants or their counsel. View "In re Disqualification of Forchione" on Justia Law

The two defendants in this case pled not guilty to drug related charges. On the first day of the nonjury felony trial, during the testimony of the first witness, the trial court became aware that the State had failed to disclose to Defendants some evidence related to the case. The discovery violation was unintentional. On motion by the defense, the trial court declared a mistrial and dismissed the charges with prejudice. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the failure of the trial court to explore whether a less severe sanction was appropriate was an abuse of discretion. Remanded. View "State v. Darmond" on Justia Law

Andrea Riffle, then in her third trimester of pregnancy, called the City of Akron Fire Department EMS, reporting serious vaginal bleeding. Department personnel responded to the call but did not assess the unborn child or transport Riffle to the hospital. Instead, they contacted a private ambulance service, which transported Riffle to the hospital. Riffle's baby survived for only three days. The Riffles sued the City and several of its medical-emergency personnel, alleging that each had negligently, recklessly, and wantonly caused the death of their daughter. The City moved for judgment on the pleadings, claiming immunity. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that Ohio Rev. Code 4765.49(B) provides for an exception to political-subdivision immunity when emergency medical services are provided in a manner constituting willful or wanton misconduct. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that wanton misconduct, pursuant to section 4765.49(B), is an exception to political-subdivision immunity, and the complaint therefore states a claim upon which relief may be granted. View "Riffle v. Physicians & Surgeons Ambulance Serv., Inc." on Justia Law