Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus and/or procedendo seeking to compel Appellee, the county court of common pleas, to issue a sentencing opinion in his criminal case that complied with a statute requiring a court or panel of three judges to state in a separate opinion certain findings when imposing a sentence of life imprisonment in a capital case. The court of appeals denied relief because Appellant's complaint failed to comply with Loc. App. R. 45(B)(1)(a) and because Appellee already issued the sentencing order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant's document did not satisfy Rule 45(B)(1)(a), and the court of appeals was justified in denying relief on that ground alone; and (2) the court of appeals correctly reasoned that relief was unwarranted because mandamus and procedendo will not compel performance of a duty that has already been performed. View "State ex rel. Hopson v. Court of Common Pleas" on Justia Law

In 1990, Employee was working for Employer when she injured her left ankle. By 2009, Employee had multiple surgeries and was taking approximately fourteen medications. That same year, a Dr. Randolph concluded Employee required no further medical treatment for her 1990 industrial injury and other allowed conditions in her claim and that her current medications were no longer necessary. Employee subsequently filed a motion with the Industrial Commission for the loss of use of her left arm. Based on Dr. Randolph's addendum to his original report, a hearing officer denied Employee's motion for compensation for the loss of use of her arm. Employee filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, which the court of appeals denied, concluding that Dr. Randolph's second and third reports, issued as addenda to his original report, constituted some evidence upon which the Commission could rely to support its decision denying Appellant's claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the addenda of Dr. Randolph constituted some evidence to support the Commission's decision to deny Employee's request for compensation for the loss of use of her left arm, the Commission did not abuse its discretion, and the court of appeals properly denied the writ. View "State ex rel. Kish v. Kroger Co." on Justia Law

Defendant in the underlying action was a "mortgage servicer" that engaged in the business of serving residential mortgages of individuals. Plaintiff in the underlying proceeding contended that mortgage servicing is a "consumer transaction" as defined in the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (CSPA), Ohio Rev. Code 1345.01. Defendant countered that mortgage servicers perform services for financial institutions, not for borrowers, and therefore the transactions are commercial in nature and are not covered by the CSPA. The Supreme Court accepted certification of state-law questions from the federal district court concerning the proper interpretation of Ohio Rev. Code 1345.01(A) and (C). The Supreme Court held that the CSPA does not apply to the servicing of residential mortgage loans because mortgage servicing is not a consumer transaction under the CSPA, and an entity that services a residential mortgage loan is not a "supplier" that engages "in the business of effecting or soliciting consumer transactions" within the meaning of the CSPA. View "Anderson v. BarclayÂ's Capital Real Estate, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1990, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. The court of appeals and Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. In his first postconviction application, Defendant sought DNA testing of a cigarette butt. The trial court rejected the application because it found an earlier DNA test to be definitive. Defendant subsequently filed a second application for DNA testing of the cigarette butt based on newly discovered evidence he asserted identified other suspects in the murders. The trial court again rejected the application. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Ohio Rev. Code 2953.73(E)(1) is constitutional in conferring appellate jurisdiction upon the Court from a trial court's denial of postconviction DNA testing in a case in which the death penalty was imposed; and (2) before dismissing a subsequent application for postconviction DNA testing under Ohio Rev. Code 2953.72(A), a trial court must apply the definition of "definitive DNA test" set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2953.71(U) and the criteria of Ohio Rev. Code 2953.74. Remanded to consider whether prior definitive DNA testing, as defined in section 2953.71(U), precluded Defendant's second application. View "State v. Noling" on Justia Law

Relators in this case were instructors who were hired to instruct students in the Jefferson County's virtual learning academy (VLA), a cyber school for grades K-12. In 2008, the State Teachers Retirement Board of Ohio (STRS) determined that the VLA instructors were independent contractors instead of employees and refunded all contributions made by Jefferson County Educational Service Center Governing Board (Jefferson County ESC) on the VLA instructors' behalf. Relators sought writs of mandamus to compel the STRS to accept employer and employee contributions to its retirement fund and to compel the Jefferson County ESC to make employer contributions to the retirement system on their behalf. The court of appeals denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Relators failed to establish that the STRS abused its discretion in determining that they were not "teachers" within the meaning of Ohio Rev. Code 3307.01(B)(5) because the instructors were independent contractors, and not employees, of the Jefferson County ESC. View "State ex rel. Nese v. State Teachers Ret. Bd. of Ohio" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of several felonies and sentenced to an aggregate total of ten years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to terminate postrelease control. When no decision was made on that motion for several months, Defendant filed a complaint in the court of appeals for writs of mandamus and procedendo in an attempt to get the trial judge to rule on his motion to terminate postrelease control. The court of appeals dismissed Defendant's complaint for the writs on the basis that he had an adequate remedy by appeal to raise his postrelease claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a writ of procedendo was appropriate in this case because the trial judge failed to rule on an uncomplicated motion for over a year. View "State ex rel. Culgan v. Court of Common Pleas (Collier)" on Justia Law

At the end of his jury trial for attempted murder, Defendant requested an instruction on the lesser included offenses of assault and aggravated assault but opposed the state's request for an instruction on felonious assault. The trial court provided instructions on all lesser included offenses as requested by both parties. Defendant was found not guilty of attempted murder but guilty of felonious assault. The court of appeals reversed, holding that felonious assault is not a lesser included offense of attempted murder. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court correctly provided the jury with an instruction for felonious assault as a lesser included offense at the close of Defendant's trial, as a charge of attempted murder reasonably puts a defendant on notice that he may be convicted of felonious assault by causing physical harm. View "State v. Deanda" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of aggravated burglary, violating a protection order, and resisting arrest. Defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to establish that at the time of the altercation he knew there was a protection order in place because the order was not delivered before the offense occurred. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Defendant knew of the order, knew of the risk that his conduct would violate the order, and acted recklessly by disregarding that risk. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that to sustain a conviction for violating a protection order under Ohio Rev. Code 2919.27(A)(2), the State must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it served the defendant with the order before the alleged violation. Remanded. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured during the course and scope of his employment. Appellant filed a motion for temporary total disability compensation, which a hearing officer granted. The Industrial Commission later terminated temporary total disability compensation based on the report of doctor who stated that the allowed conditions in Appellant's workers' compensation claim had reached maximum medical improvement. Appellant filed a complaint in mandamus, alleging that the Commission acted contrary to law when it relied on the report of the doctor. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the doctor's report constituted some evidence upon which the Commission could rely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the doctor's report was sufficiently reliable to constitute some evidence to support the Commission's decision. View "State ex rel. Coleman v. Schwartz" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pled guilty to rape of a child under thirteen, gross sexual imposition on a child under thirteen, and two counts of pandering obscenity involving a minor. Appellant was sentenced to thirty-one years without the possibility of parole. After Appellant unsuccessfully filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 2006, Appellant filed a second habeas petition in 2012. The court of appeals dismissed the petition, holding that Appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law an that the petition was barred by res judicata. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in finding Appellant's petition barred by res judicata; but (2) the court of appeals acted properly when it concluded that Appellant had an adequate remedy at law, refused to reach the merits, and dismissed the petition for failure to state a claim for habeas relief. View "Billiter v. Banks" on Justia Law