Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was subject to an increased personal-property tax assessment. The tax commissioner subsequently issued final-assessment certificates, which included instructions for appealing the assessment. Instead of instructing Appellant to appeal directly to the board of tax appeals, which is the correct procedure for appealing a final assessment, the commissioner instructed Appellant to petition for reassessment with the tax commissioner. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for reassessment. Instead of conducting a substantive review of the petition, the commissioner dismissed the petition because Appellant did not appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA). The BTA affirmed the dismissal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the BTA erred in determining that Appellant had committed a fatal procedural error when it followed the appeal instructions given by the tax commissioner. Remanded with instructions to issue a final determination that addresses the assessment on the merits. View "Crown Commc'n, Inc. v. Testa" on Justia Law

Danielle Laurence sued Stephen Stillwagon and Ace Doran seeking damages for personal injuries she suffered in an automobile accident. In discovery, Laurence produced her medical records. Laurence subsequently dismissed her case. Meanwhile, Todd Leopold and his wife sued Stillwagon, Ace Doran, and Laurence, seeking recovery for injuries sustained in the same accident and asserting that Laurence's negligence caused the accident. Laurence moved for a protective order seeking to preclude counsel from using the medical records she produced in her lawsuit. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed, determining that Laurence waived her physician-patient privilege with respect to the accident by filing a claim of personal injury against Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that pursuant to the statute establishing the physician-patient privilege, at least two separate provisions applied and specified that the statements made by Laurence to her physician were no longer privileged. View "Leopold v. Ace Doran Hauling & Rigging Co." on Justia Law

Appellee, who worked for the City of North Ridgeville, was assaulted and raped by a co-worker while at work. Appellee filed this action against the City for, among other causes of action, intentional, willful, and wanton disregard for the safety of others in selecting and controlling the co-worker, which was an employer intentional tort. The trial court denied the City's motion for summary judgment on Appellee's employer-intentional-tort claim. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that because an intentional tort may arise out of the employment relationship between a political subdivision and its employee, the City did not establish that it was entitled to immunity as a matter of law on that claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a civil action by an employee of a political subdivision alleging an intentional tort against her employer may fall within the Ohio Rev. Code 2744.09(B) exception to political-subdivision immunity; and (2) the City did not establish that it was entitled to political-subdivision immunity on Appellee's employer-intentional-tort claim as a matter of law. View "Vacha v. City of N. Ridgeville" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to fifth-degree-felony theft of property valued at $500 or more but less than $5,000 for misappropriating intellectual property from his employer (Employer). As part of his sentence, the trial court ordered Defendant to pay restitution to Employer in the amount of $63,121, representing the costs of a company investigation and an accounting. The court of appeals affirmed the order of restitution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a trial court has discretion to base the amount of restitution in an appropriate case on the amount it orders on a recommendation of the victim, the offender, a presentence investigation report, and other information, but the amount ordered cannot be greater than the amount of economic loss suffered as a direct and proximate result of the commission of the offense; (2) a hearing on restitution is required only if the offender, victim, or survivor disputes the amount of restitution ordered; and (3) the trial court lacked authority in this case to order $63,121 in restitution. Remanded. View "State v. Lalain" on Justia Law

Ten valuation complaints were filed by a salaried employee on behalf of a corporate entity as the property owner. In each case, the county board of revision (BOR) ordered a decrease in value. The school board argued before the board of tax appeals (BTA) that the original complaints should be dismissed because a salaried employee of the corporation who was not himself a lawyer but purported to act on behalf of the corporate owner signed the complaints. The school board acknowledged that Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(A)(1) explicitly authorizes salaried corporate employees to file on behalf of the corporate owner but argued that the statute cannot be given effect because that kind of filing constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. The BTA granted the school board's motion and ordered that the appeals be remanded to the BOR to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the complaints properly invoked the jurisdiction of the BOR where the legislature acted within its authority in amending section 5715.19(A)(1) to permit a salaried employee of a corporation who is not a lawyer to file a complaint on behalf of the corporation. Remanded. View "Marysville Exempted Village Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Union County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

In 2005, a limited liability company and its owners (plaintiffs), on behalf of other similarly situated telephone customers, filed a complaint seeking to certify a class action lawsuit against United Telephone Company of Ohio (UTO), which provided Plaintiffs with telephone service. Plaintiffs claimed that their phone bills from UTO contained unauthorized charges from third parties. The trial court ultimately denied Plaintiffs' amended motion for class certification. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the order of the trial court, holding (1) a trial court must conduct a rigorous analysis to ensure the prerequisites of Ohio R. Civ. P. 23, under which plaintiffs must establish seven prerequisites in order to certify a class action, are satisfied; and (2) even though the trial court's consideration of the merits in this case was improper, its order denying certification of the class was correct because Plaintiffs' proposed amended class did not satisfy the prerequisites of Rule 23. View "Stammco, LLC v. United Tel. Co. of Ohio" on Justia Law

In 2006, Taxpayers acquired a two-story building pursuant to a contract by which they acquired a business on the first floor of the building. Thus, the asset purchase included personal property consisting of restaurant equipment and a covenant not to compete, as well as the realty. In 2007, the auditor used the entire aggregate price, $325,000, as the property value even though in 2006 the auditor had determined the value to be only $116,700. The county board of revision (BOR) reduced the value to $175,000. The board of tax appeals reinstated the $325,000 aggregate price as the value of the property. The Supreme Court ordered the value be modified to $160,000, a figure supported by the mortgage loan secured by the real property, holding that the adoption of the full sale price was unreasonable and unlawful. View "Sapina v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant, a police officer, was convicted of abduction and intimidation, each with an accompanying firearm specification. On appeal, the court of appeals partially reversed and remanded for a new trial on the abduction charges, holding that the trial court's instructions to the jury on the offense of abduction were fatally deficient. The court also reversed the gun specifications. At issue on appeal were the following issues: (1) whether police officers are exempt from prosecution for the offense of intimidation when accused of abusing their power to intimidate; and (2) what instructions a trial court must give to the jury on the definition of the "privilege" exception to the offense of abduction where the defendant is a police officer accused of abusing his privilege to arrest and detain. The Supreme Court partially reversed, holding that the court of appeals (1) correctly upheld Defendant's intimidation conviction; but (2) incorrectly held that the definition of "privilege" provided by the trial court constituted plain error. View "State v. Steele" on Justia Law

In 1979, Appellant pled guilty to felonies and was sentenced to four to twenty-five years. In 1980, Appellant was paroled. In 1982, Appellant pled guilty to several more felonies and was sentenced to five to twenty-five more years. Appellant filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the sentences imposed on him after he violated parole were to be served concurrently with his original 1979 sentence. The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee, warden of the Grafton Correctional Institution, concluding that former Ohio Rev. Code 2929.41(B)(3) required the sentences to be served consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute at the time required that Appellant's sentences be served consecutively, and even if it did not, the judgment entries did not support Appellant's arguments. View "State ex rel. Thompson v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Appellant was employed as a laborer by County Saw & Knife. Appellant successfully sought workers' compensation after he developed respiratory problems from his exposure to metal dust. One year later, Appellant applied for an additional award, alleging that Country Saw violated specific safety requirements (VSSRs). The Industrial Commission denied Appellant's application, concluding that County Saw had not violated the VSSRs. The court of appeals denied Appellant's request for a writ of mandamus that would require the Commission to vacate its order denying Appellant's application. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not present sufficient evidence to establish that he was entitled to an award for a VSSR in addition to his extant workers' compensation benefits. View "State ex rel. Scott v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law