Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Lowe sought, by writ of procedendo, to compel Judge Callahan, to issue a ruling on his motion in arrest of judgment, alleging that he filed his motion on August 10, 2012, and that Judge Callahan has not ruled on it. The court of appeals dismissed the matter as moot because the judge had ruled on Lowe’s motion on August 22, 2012. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed. Lowe’s argument was not that the judge failed to rule on his motion but that she addressed the wrong issue in her ruling, an argument that should have been raised in an appeal of the ruling. View "Lowe v. Callahan" on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury convicted Appenzeller on18 felony counts. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 28 years in prison. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded for merging of certain offenses and resentencing. The trial court again imposed a sentence of an aggregate term of 28 years in prison. The appeals court affirmed. Appenzeller unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief based primarily on a claim that he was denied due process and equal protection when there was a break in the chain of custody of the trial transcript in his direct appeal. The alleged break occurred when Appenzeller’s own appellate attorney checked out the transcript to prepare his brief. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no violation of court rules or of constitutional rights. View "Appenzeller v. Miller" on Justia Law

Canton attorney Oberholtzer, admitted to the bar in 1989, was charged with client neglect in two family-law matters in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.15(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h). Oberholtzer was nonresponsive and failed to cooperate in the investigation of both matters. After a hearing, a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommended dismissing a charged trust-account violation, but otherwise found violations and recommended suspension from the practice of law for 12 months, with the entire suspension if Oberholtzer fully cooperates with a monitoring attorney, appointed by disciplinary counsel, for the entire period of suspension, and completes a three-hour continuing-legal-education course on law-office management. Neither party filed objections. The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the recommendation. View "Disciplinary Counsel v. Oberholtzer" on Justia Law

Taubman, admitted to the Ohio bar in 1976, admitted to professional misconduct for negligently withdrawing settlement proceeds held in a client guardianship account for his personal use in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) and 8.4(h). The parties stipulated that no aggravating factors existed and to the absence of a prior disciplinary record, a timely good-faith effort to rectify the misconduct, full and free disclosure to the board and a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and Taubman’s good character or reputation. The parties agreed that a stayed six-month suspension was the appropriate sanction; the board recommended adoption of the consent-to-discipline agreement. The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the agreement. View "Disciplinary Counsel v. Taubman" on Justia Law

Miller filed a mandamus action, alleging that he sent a public-records request to the Ohio State Highway Patrol on September 9, 2011, seeking records relating to traffic incidents involving a particular trooper. The agency provided some records, but Miller claims that it withheld video and audio recordings and reports concerning the traffic stop and arrest of a particular person on July 15 or 16, 2011. The agency asserted the investigatory-work-product exception to the Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43. The court found that Miller’s evidence had not been presented in a timely manner or in the required form, which mandates dismissal by local rule, but considered the evidence, which included a letter from the Highway Patrol establishing on its face that it refused to release certain documents requested by Miller. The court then dismissed for noncompliance with the rules. The Ohio Supreme Court remanded, holding that the Highway Patrol must support its contention that the withheld material falls under the “confidential law enforcement investigatory record” exception to the Public Records Act. View "Miller v. OH St. Hwy. Patrol" on Justia Law

In 2006, Dzelajlija was convicted of robbery, R.C. 2911.02. The court of appeals granted a new trial, finding that the trial court had admitted inadmissible and prejudicial evidence. In 2008, Dzelajlija was again found guilty and sentenced to concurrent seven-year terms. The appeals court reversed, finding that the indictment was defective for failing to state a culpable mental state for either offense. More than a year later, before a retrial, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Horner, which overruled precedent relevant to the indictment being defective. The trial court determined that the grounds for reversal no longer existed and reimposed the sentence. The appeals court agreed, but nevertheless reversed, finding Dzelajlija’s argument regarding the manifest weight of the evidence, earlier declared moot, had never been resolved. On reconsideration, the appeals court held that the trial court erred in considering the matter as pending under the original indictment and vacated the convictions and sentences. The Ohio Supreme Court reversed and remanded: the sentences could not be reimposed, because there was an outstanding issue of whether Dzelajlija’s convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence, but the convictions were vacated based on cases that have been repudiated. View "State v. Dzelajlija" on Justia Law

Terry Sigler was employed by the Lubrizol Corporation when he was injured. A staff hearing officer with the Industrial Commission awarded Sigler permanent-total-disability compensation. Lubrizol filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Commission granted. Following a hearing, the Commission vacated the award. Sigler filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus in the court of appeals, contending that the Commission had abused its discretion in issuing the reconsideration order because one of the two commissioners voting to overturn had not attended the hearing but had relied on an oral summary of the evidence from a Commission hearing officer who had attended the hearing and taken handwritten notes. The court of appeals issued the writ of mandamus requiring the Commission to vacate its order, concluding that the Commission's hearing did not comport with the due process standards set forth in State ex rel. Ormet Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and denied the writ, holding that Sigler failed to demonstrate that the Commission's voting procedures violated due process. View "State ex rel. Sigler v. Lubrizol Corp." on Justia Law

Appellant, a public utility (Utility), provided natural gas to intervening Appellee, an apartment complex. In 2008, Utility informed Appellee that it would disconnect gas service to the entire complex if Appellee did not bring all apartment units into compliance with the National Fire Protection Association's National Fuel Gas Code (NFG Code) within two months. Appellee subsequently filed a complaint against Utility with the Public Utilities Commission (Commission), alleging that Utility had unreasonably and unlawfully threatened to disconnect gas service to all units if Appellee refused to retrofit the ventilation system in each apartment to meet NFG Code requirements. The complaint requested that the Commission prohibit Utility from terminating service and requiring expensive remedial construction. The Commission found in favor of Appellee. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that none of Utility's six propositions of law had merit. View "Cameron Creek Apartments v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of eleven counts of rape and one count of attempted rape. During Defendant's trial, the acting administrative judge granted the State's motion to depose a witness on videotape. The ruling never made it onto the case docket, but the deposition was held, and the videotaped testimony was admitted into evidence. More than ten years after he was convicted, Defendant filed a motion to vacate the order granting testimony by deposition. The court of common pleas denied the motion. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the court of appeals requesting that the order be declared void. The court of appeals dismissed the writ, finding that the deposition testimony was proper and that Defendant had an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal after the trial court denied his motion to vacate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant had an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal, he could not establish the elements for a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Ervin v. Court of Common Pleas (Barker)" on Justia Law

Appellant was employed by Employer until December 2009. In 2009, Appellant authorized Employer to deposit $900 of her monthly earnings into a flexible-spending account for tax-free reimbursement of medical expenses. After Appellant was terminated from employment, she applied for unemployment compensation benefits. The Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services (ODJFS) denied benefits, ruling (1) Appellant was required to have earned an average weekly wage of at least $213 for twenty qualifying weeks to be eligible for unemployment compensation, (2) the amounts that went into Appellant' flexible-spending account were not remuneration for purposes of determining her unemployment compensation eligibility, and (3) with the exclusion of those amounts, Appellant's average weekly wage was only $125. The Unemployment Compensation Review Commission affirmed. The court of common pleas and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ODJFS's interpretation of the relevant statute was lawful and reasonable. View "Bernard v. Unemployment Comp. Review Comm'n" on Justia Law