Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging that he suffered from spinal injuries as a result of Defendants’ medical malpractice. During discovery, Plaintiff requested a recorded surveillance video that Defendants had created of him. Defendants refused to turn over the video, claiming that it was attorney work product that they intended to use only as impeachment evidence. The court of common pleas ordered Defendants to produce the tape. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding that the discovery order was final and appealable. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that Defendants failed to establish that the trial court’s discovery order was a final, appealable order, and therefore, neither this Court nor the court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the interlocutory order. View "Smith v. Chen" on Justia Law

This case arose from the death of Seth Cromer at the pediatric intensive-care unit of Children’s Hospital Medical Center. Seth’s mother and father, individually and as administrator, brought this medical-negligence action against the hospital, alleging that Seth’s death was caused by the negligence of multiple hospital employees. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the hospital. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by including an instruction on foreseeability when it instructed the jury on the hospital’s standard of care. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) foreseeability of harm is generally relevant to the determination of the scope of a physician’s duty in a medical-malpractice action, and therefore, giving a foreseeability instruction in such an action is not manifestly incorrect; (2) where the parties in this case did not dispute that the physician understood that the chosen course of treatment carried some risk of harm, the instruction regarding foreseeability was not necessary; and (3) the unneeded jury instruction on foreseeability did not prejudice Plaintiffs’ substantial rights, and therefore, reversal was not justified. View "Cromer v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Akron" on Justia Law

A colorectal surgeon and a surgical resident at a hospital (collectively, Defendants), performed abdominal surgery on Plaintiff in 2007. In 2009, Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice claim against Defendants, alleging that Defendants’ negligence caused her femoral-nerve damage. The jury entered verdicts for Defendants. Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that the verdicts could not be reconciled with the evidence. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court properly overruled Plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts; but (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on remote cause. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erroneously found prejudicial error in the remote-cause jury instruction. Remanded.View "Hayward v. Summa Health Sys./Akron City Hosp." on Justia Law

Appellee, the administrator of the estate of Karen Parrish, filed wrongful-death and survival action arising from the allegedly negligent care and death of Parrish. The case proceeded to a jury. At the close of Appellee's opening statements, Appellants moved for directed verdict, asserting that Appellee had failed to meet the burden of establishing a case of medical malpractice against them because Appellee had failed to set forth in his opening statement a standard of care and causation. The trial court granted the motion for directed verdict and entered judgment in favor of Appellants. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court was required to consider both the opening statement and the complaint before determining whether a directed verdict was appropriate. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that a trial court is not required to consider allegations contained in the pleadings when ruling on a motion for directed verdict made on the opening statement of an opponent, but the trial court may consult the pleadings in liberally construing the opening statement in favor of the party against whom the motion is made. Remanded. View "Parrish v. Jones" on Justia Law

As a result of a surgery to remove a cyst at the lowest part of his spinal cord, Plaintiff permanently lost bladder, bowel, and sexual function. Plaintiff and his wife filed this action against Defendant, a neurosurgeon who diagnosed the cyst but who did not participate in the surgery. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment against Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred by admitting, over objection, as an exhibit an illustration from a learned treatise; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to submit to the jury a properly drafted interrogatory offered by Defendant; (3) the trial court erred by prohibiting Defendant from presenting evidence of "write-offs" to contest Plaintiffs' medical bills without a foundation of expert testimony on the reasonable value of the medical services rendered; and (4) the court's errors, taken together, deprived Defendant of a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "Moretz v. Muakkassa" on Justia Law

In 2003, Kyle Smith's parents sued Dr. Gary Huber and Qualified Emergency Specialists, Inc. for malpractice after Kyle sustained serious and permanent injuries from an epidural hematoma that Hubert failed to diagnose. Prior to trial, Plaintiffs voluntarily filed a notice of dismissal. Plaintiffs refiled the action in 2008 and eventually added Kyle as a party. The trial court awarded damages and prejudgment interest. In calculating prejudgment interest, the court applied the version of Ohio Rev. Code 1343.03(C) that existed at the time the complaint was filed, concluding that subsequent amendments to the statute applied prospectively only. The court of appeals affirmed the award of prejudgment interest but reversed the trial court's decision to suspend the accrual of prejudgment interest from the date of the voluntary dismissal to the refiling of the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 1343.03(C) applies to tort actions filed after June 2, 2004, regardless of when the cause of action accrued; and (2) because the refiled complaint was filed after the legislation had gone into effect, the amended version of the statute applied in this case. View "Longbottom v. Mercy Hosp. Clermont" on Justia Law

Appellant, a medical doctor, performed surgery on Jeanette Johnson. Johnson's common bile duct was injured during the procedure. Johnson later returned to the hospital because of complications resulting from the bile duct injury. In an effort to console Johnson, Appellant said, "I take full responsibility for this. Everything will be okay." On July 26, 2007, Johnson and her husband filed an action against Appellant for negligent medical treatment and loss of consortium. Upon Appellant's motion, the trial court ruled that Appellant's statement of apology would be inadmissable at trial. The jury later returned a general verdict in favor of Appellant. At issue on appeal was whether Ohio Rev. Code 2317.43, which prevents the admission of certain statements made by healthcare providers, could be applied to Appellant's statement of apology even though the statement was made before the statute took effect. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in applying section 2317.43 retroactively to exclude Appellant's statement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 2317.43 applies to any cause of action filed after September 13, 2004; and (2) therefore, Appellant's statement was properly excluded. View "Estate of Johnson v. Randall Smith, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice and wrongful death action against Defendants. Counsel for Defendants filed affidavits with the clerk of the Supreme Court seeking to disqualify Judge Frank Forchione from presiding over further proceedings in the pending case, alleging that Judge Forchione was prejudiced in favor of Plaintiff because he granted Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendants' jury demand and because the judge lacked judicial objectivity. The Supreme Court denied the affidavits of disqualification, holding (1) rulings that are adverse to a party in a pending case are not grounds for disqualification; and (2) the record did not demonstrate the judge was partial to Plaintiff or that he had a bias against Defendants or their counsel. View "In re Disqualification of Forchione" on Justia Law

This case involved a medical-malpractice claim filed well after the statute of repose set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 2305.113(C). Timothy and Tracy Ruther sued a doctor and medical facility, claiming that the doctor had failed to properly assess, evaluate and respond to abnormal laboratory results including very high liver enzymes. The court of appeals held that section 2305.113(C), as applied to the facts of this case, violated the right-to-remedy clause of the Ohio Constitution, relying in part upon Hardy v. VerMeulen. The Supreme Court overruled Hardy and reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) Plaintiffs, whose cause of action for medical malpractice did not accrue until after the statute of repose had expired, were not deprived of a vested right; (2) Plaintiffs failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to their claim; and (3) therefore, the medical malpractice statute of repose found in section 2305.113(C) does not extinguish a vested right and thus does not violate the Ohio Constitution. View "Ruther v. Kaiser" on Justia Law

This appeal involved three rulings in a medical-malpractice trial. Appellee suffered a stroke during brain surgery performed at Appellant, the Cleveland Clinic. Appellee sued the clinic, claiming its surgeon had struck a ventricle, thus causing the stroke. A verdict was entered for the clinic. The court of appeals found the trial court abused its discretion in (1) allowing the clinic to use demonstrative evidence recreating the surgery that was provided to Appellee's counsel ten minutes before the expert using it testified; (2) ordering counsel for Branch not to argue an inference that because the best piece of evidence was not saved, it must have been adverse to the clinic; and (3) instructing the jury that evidence of alternative medical approaches was not evidence of negligence. the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the jury verdict for the clinic, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in any of the rulings at issue. View "Branch v. Cleveland Clinic Found." on Justia Law