Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In an earlier litigation, Kleem retained Julian Vanni and Vanni & Associates (collectively, Vanni) to appraise certain real property in dispute between the parties. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Kleem and against Southwest Sports Center. Southwest subsequently filed suit against Kleem and Vanni. The case was assigned to Judge Richard McMonagle. Vanni sought a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge McMonagle from hearing the litigation, arguing that the judge lacked jurisdiction based on the jurisdictional-priority rule, claim preclusion, and witness immunity. The court of appeals dismissed the case, concluding that Judge McMonagle did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction and that Vanni had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge McMonagle did not patently lack jurisdiction and that Vanni had an adequate remedy by way of appeal. View "State ex rel. Vanni v. McMonagle" on Justia Law

Respondent, a candidate for county probate judge, was found to have violated former Jud. Cond. R. 4.4(E) for having received campaign contributions from judicial fundraising events during the judicial campaign that categorized or identified participants by the amount of the contribution made to the event. A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommended that no disciplinary sanction be imposed but that Respondent be ordered to pay the costs and a portion of the complainant's attorney fees. A commission of five judges appointed by the Supreme Court upheld that panel's judgment and ordered Respondent to pay a $1,000 fine, the costs of the proceeding, and a greater portion of attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Respondent did not knowingly violate Jud. Cond. R. 4.4(E) and, even if Respondent's conduct constituted a technical violation of the rule, no sanction would be warranted in this case. View "In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Stormer" on Justia Law

Snyder, admitted to the bar in 1996, allegedly committed 18 violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including charging excessive and nonrefundable fees. Snyder operated SPLS, a foreclosure-defense firm with “of counsel” relationships with out-of-state attorneys. Snyder shared office space with PIC, a business that provided paralegal and support services for Snyder, including interacting with clients on the phone, compiling information, and contacting lenders regarding mitigation options. PIC contracted with a marketing firm that attracted potential clients by sending solicitation letters to homeowners who were behind in mortgage payments. Snyder would enter into an agreement with the client that provided for a flat fee that was deemed earned in full upon the opening of the file. The cost of representation ranged from $1,595 to $2,295; $200 to $500 would be sent to the attorney outside of Ohio who was listed as “of counsel.” Snyder retained $300 for each client, with the balance going to PIC for its services. A panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline concluded that three violations had been proven and recommended dismissal of the others. The board adopted the panel’s findings and recommendation of a public reprimand. No objections were filed. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed. View "Geauga Cnty. Bar Ass'n v. Snyder" on Justia Law

In 2006, a jury convicted Appenzeller on18 felony counts. The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 28 years in prison. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded for merging of certain offenses and resentencing. The trial court again imposed a sentence of an aggregate term of 28 years in prison. The appeals court affirmed. Appenzeller unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief based primarily on a claim that he was denied due process and equal protection when there was a break in the chain of custody of the trial transcript in his direct appeal. The alleged break occurred when Appenzeller’s own appellate attorney checked out the transcript to prepare his brief. The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no violation of court rules or of constitutional rights. View "Appenzeller v. Miller" on Justia Law

Canton attorney Oberholtzer, admitted to the bar in 1989, was charged with client neglect in two family-law matters in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.15(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h). Oberholtzer was nonresponsive and failed to cooperate in the investigation of both matters. After a hearing, a panel of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommended dismissing a charged trust-account violation, but otherwise found violations and recommended suspension from the practice of law for 12 months, with the entire suspension if Oberholtzer fully cooperates with a monitoring attorney, appointed by disciplinary counsel, for the entire period of suspension, and completes a three-hour continuing-legal-education course on law-office management. Neither party filed objections. The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the recommendation. View "Disciplinary Counsel v. Oberholtzer" on Justia Law

Taubman, admitted to the Ohio bar in 1976, admitted to professional misconduct for negligently withdrawing settlement proceeds held in a client guardianship account for his personal use in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) and 8.4(h). The parties stipulated that no aggravating factors existed and to the absence of a prior disciplinary record, a timely good-faith effort to rectify the misconduct, full and free disclosure to the board and a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and Taubman’s good character or reputation. The parties agreed that a stayed six-month suspension was the appropriate sanction; the board recommended adoption of the consent-to-discipline agreement. The Ohio Supreme Court adopted the agreement. View "Disciplinary Counsel v. Taubman" on Justia Law

Ten valuation complaints were filed by a salaried employee on behalf of a corporate entity as the property owner. In each case, the county board of revision (BOR) ordered a decrease in value. The school board argued before the board of tax appeals (BTA) that the original complaints should be dismissed because a salaried employee of the corporation who was not himself a lawyer but purported to act on behalf of the corporate owner signed the complaints. The school board acknowledged that Ohio Rev. Code 5715.19(A)(1) explicitly authorizes salaried corporate employees to file on behalf of the corporate owner but argued that the statute cannot be given effect because that kind of filing constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. The BTA granted the school board's motion and ordered that the appeals be remanded to the BOR to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the complaints properly invoked the jurisdiction of the BOR where the legislature acted within its authority in amending section 5715.19(A)(1) to permit a salaried employee of a corporation who is not a lawyer to file a complaint on behalf of the corporation. Remanded. View "Marysville Exempted Village Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Union County Bd. of Revision" on Justia Law

Counsel for Defendants filed an affidavit with the clerk of the Supreme Court seeking to disqualify Judge Wyatt McKay from presiding over any further proceedings in the underlying case, alleging that the judge's rulings created the appearance of bias or prejudice against Defendants. The Supreme Court denied the affidavit of disqualification, holding (1) the extraordinary circumstances need to subject the judge to disqualification after having presided over lengthy proceedings in the case were not present here; (2) counsel pointed to no action on the part of Judge McKay that demonstrated bias, prejudice, or a disqualifying interest; and (3) counsel failed to overcome the presumptions that the judge followed the law and was not biased. View "In re Disqualification of McKay" on Justia Law

Plaintiff in the underlying complaint filed an affidavit seeking to disqualify Judge Thomas Pokorny from presiding over any further proceedings in her pending case. Plaintiff argued that the judge should be disqualified because (1) Plaintiff had moved to add Judge Pokorny as a defendant in a federal civil action she had filed, (2) the judge was conspiring to deny Plaintiff her right to defend herself and to conceal material facts, (3) the judge was biased against women and pro se litigants, and (4) the judge had scheduled a hearing on Defendant's motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim to declare Plaintiff a vexatious litigator. The Supreme Court denied the affidavit of disqualification, holding (1) naming the judge as a defendant in Plaintiff's federal case did not automatically lead to his disqualification in the underlying state court proceeding; (2) Plaintiff failed to substantiate her claims that the judge was conspiring against her or that the judge was biased against female and pro se litigants; and (3) the fact that the judge scheduled a hearing on Defendant's motion for summary judgment was not grounds for disqualification. View "In re Disqualification of Pokorny" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice and wrongful death action against Defendants. Counsel for Defendants filed affidavits with the clerk of the Supreme Court seeking to disqualify Judge Frank Forchione from presiding over further proceedings in the pending case, alleging that Judge Forchione was prejudiced in favor of Plaintiff because he granted Plaintiff's motion to strike Defendants' jury demand and because the judge lacked judicial objectivity. The Supreme Court denied the affidavits of disqualification, holding (1) rulings that are adverse to a party in a pending case are not grounds for disqualification; and (2) the record did not demonstrate the judge was partial to Plaintiff or that he had a bias against Defendants or their counsel. View "In re Disqualification of Forchione" on Justia Law