Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee Sutton injured his back while on the job at Tomco. Sutton reported the injury to Tomco's president, after which Sutton was fired. Sutton filed suit against Tomco asserting a statutory claim for unlawful retaliation under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.90 and a tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The trial court granted Tomco's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and Sutton appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment against Sutton on the statutory claim and reversed the judgment against Sutton on the public-policy claim, holding that the discharge violated public policy as expressed in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.90. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute expresses a clear public policy prohibiting retaliatory employment action against injured employees; (2) Ohio recognizes a common-law tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy when employees are retaliated against after they are injured on the job but before they file, institute, or pursue a workers' compensation claim; and (3) the remedies available for wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy against retaliatory employment actions are limited to those listed in the statute.

Appellant Jamey Baker was struck in the right eye by a piece of metal while working for appellee. After the piece was removed and the laceration of the cornea was repaired, Baker underwent cataract surgery. Immediately following the accident and prior to the cataract surgery several months later, Baker experienced an eight percent visual impairment. At issue was whether the surgical removal of the lens of an eye in the course of treatment for a workplace injury entitles the injured worker to compensation pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 42123.57(B) for a total loss of sight. A staff hearing officer with the Bureau of Workers' Compensation granted an award for a total loss of vision in the right eye, and the Industrial Commission vacated the order. The court of appeals denied Baker's writ of mandamus, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court calculated Baker's loss of sight based on the percentage of vision actually lost as a result of the injury, prior to any corrective surgery. Because Baker's loss of uncorrected vision did reach the statutory threshold of twenty-five percent, Baker's injury was not compensable under the statute.