Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee splashed bleach in her left eye while working for Employer. While Employee lost little vision as a result of the accident, Employee experienced other complications, including light sensitivity and reduced depth perception. Employee subsequently underwent a corneal transplant. Employee sought scheduled-loss compensation under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57(B), alleging she had sustained a total loss of vision in her left eye due to the removal of her cornea. A staff hearing officer for Industrial Commission of Ohio agreed and awarded Employee a total loss of use. Employer filed a complaint in mandamus. The court of appeals issued a writ ordering the commission to vacate its order, concluding that the commission had abused its discretion in awarding compensation for a total loss of vision. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals pursuant to State ex rel. Baker v. Coast to Coast Manpower, L.L.C. View "State ex rel. Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

After Employee was fired by Employer, Employee filed an action against Employer, claiming wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Employee argued that he was fired because he had expressed concerns about the safety of Employer's workplace to outside parties. Employer asserted it terminated Employee for insubordination. The trial court granted summary judgment to Employer, concluding that Employee failed to articulate a clear specific public policy that was jeopardized by his termination. The appellate court reversed, holding that there was a clear public policy favoring fire safety in the workplace and that retaliation against employees who raise concerns over fire safety violates public policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employee did not articulate a clear public policy applicable to his claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. View "Dohme v. Eurand Am., Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose because the settlement of a personal-injury suit brought by a recipient of workers' compensation benefits against a third-party tortfeasor did not make any provision to repay the statutory subrogee, the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation. The Bureau brought suit against both the recipient of the workers' compensation benefits and third-party tortfeasor under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.931(G) to recover the full amount of its subrogation interest. The trial court held that a two-year limitations period applied and that it had expired. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a six-year limitations period applied and that it had not yet run out. At issue on appeal was whether a claim under section 4123.931(G) brought by a statutory subrogee to recover its subrogation interest is subject to a two-year statute of limitations, the same period applicable to the injured worker's personal-injury suit against the third party, or to a six-year statute of limitations for an action on a liability created by statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the claim in this case was an action upon a liability created by statute and that the statute of limitations was six years. View "Ohio Bureau of Workers Comp. v. McKinley" on Justia Law

The Industrial Commission of Ohio found that Angela Benedetti, Inc. (ABI) violated two newly added specific safety requirements that resulted in an injury to an ABI employee. ABI filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in permitting the injured employee to amend his specific safety requirement violations application and in finding violations of the specific safety requirements. The court of appeals upheld the Commission's order and denied the writ. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the reasoning provided by the court of appeals but not given in this opinion. View "State ex rel. Angelo Benedetti, Inc. v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

Joseph Starkey was injured while working for Builders FirstSource Ohio Valley. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation allowed Starkey's claim for, inter alia, a sprained hip and degenerative osteoarthritis of the left hip. Builders appealed to the county court, challenging Starkey's right to workers' compensation for osteoarthritis. The trial court entered judgment for Builders, holding (1) that a claim for aggravation of a preexisting condition is separate and distinct from a claim for that underlying condition itself, and (2) administrative action on one such claim did not without more confer jurisdiction on the court to consider the other. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Starkey could participate in the fund for degenerative osteoarthritis based on evidence that his work-related injury had aggravated his preexisting medical condition. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) because aggravation of a preexisting medical condition is a type of causation, it is not a separate condition or distinct injury as defined in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.01, and (2) an appeal taken pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512 allows the claimant to present evidence on any theory of causation pertinent to a claim for a medical condition that already has been addressed administratively. View "Starkey v. Builders FirstSource Ohio Valley, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Appellant Aaron Rents, Inc. (ARI) challenged an order from the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation that retroactively reclassified the jobs of certain ARI employees for purposes of workers' compensation premiums. ARI objected to the retroactive reclassification and argued that the bureau had abused its discretion by failing to adequately explain why it rejected ARI's request for prospective reclassification only. The court of appeals denied ARI's writ of mandamus. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that (1) ARI's ability to challenge the bureau's decision was compromised because the order did not explain why retroactive rather than prospective reclassification was favored and (2) further explanation was required as to why the bureau reached its decision in order for the court to determine whether an abuse of discretion occurred. The Court vacated the judgment of the appellate court and granted a limited writ ordering the bureau to vacate its order and issue an amended order including an explanation for its decision. View "State ex rel. Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Ohio Bureau of Workers Comp." on Justia Law

Appellant Cheryl Waiters was employed by the city of Cleveland. When the city discharged Waiters from employment, the union of which Waiters was a member filed a grievance and later demanded arbitration. The arbitrator found the city had discharged Waiters without just cause and ordered that she be reinstated to employment. Waiters then filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel her reinstatement to her former position with back pay and an award of attorney fees. The city subsequently reinstated Waiters to her former job. The court of appeals denied Waiters's writ, concluding that her claim for reinstatement was moot and that she failed to establish her entitlement to back pay or attorney fees. Waiters appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that (1) Waiters's reinstatement claim was rendered moot when she was reinstated; (2) as a bargaining-unit employee who was represented by the union in the grievance and arbitration process, Waiters was relegated to the arbitration proceeding in which the dispute concerning the amount of back pay she would be entitled to was being decided; and (3) Waiters was not entitled to attorney fees. View "State ex rel. Waiters v. Szabo" on Justia Law

Appellant Juan Lackey, who drove trucks for Penske Truck Leasing Company, injured his knee at work. After surgery was performed, Lackey returned to work and filed retirement papers with Penske. Nothing in his retirement documents indicted that Lackey's retirement was connected to the industrial injury. Following his retirement, Lackey requested temporary total disability compensation (TTC). A district hearing officer for Lackey, the state industrial commission, denied the request, finding Lackey had voluntarily retired for reasons unrelated to his injury and Lackey's retirement constituted a voluntary abandonment of the entire labor market. On appeal, a staff hearing officer affirmed. Lackey appealed to the commission, and the commission denied the appeal. The court of appeals denied Lackey's mandamus action after finding the commission's findings were supported by evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that Lackey's retirement was unrelated to his injury, and, accordingly, Lackey could receive postretirement TTC only if he were gainfully employed elsewhere and prevented from doing that job by his industrial injury. View "State ex rel. Lackey v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

After appellee Mary Williams was hired as a full-time residential social worker at appellant Bridgeway, Inc., a community mental health center, Bridgeway offered Williams a promotion. The promotion was conditioned on the requirement that Williams obtain certification as a Licensed Independent Social Worker (LISW) within 15 months. Because Williams did not obtain her LISW certification within the time required, she was terminated. Williams' application for unemployment compensation was disallowed by the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, which determined that Williams had been discharged with just cause. On appeal, the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission affirmed. The court of common pleas denied Williams's subsequent appeal. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Williams's requirement to obtain an LISW certification was not fairly applied to other program managers. Bridgeway appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that when employment is expressly conditioned upon obtaining or maintaining a license or certification and an employee agrees to the condition and is afforded a reasonable opportunity to obtain or maintain the license or certification, an employee's failure to comply with that condition is just cause for termination for unemployment compensation purposes. View "Williams v. Ohio Dep't of Job & Family Servs. " on Justia Law

Appellant Luiz Paneto injured his left foot and ankle at work. After surgery, Paneto still used a cane to walk and had a limp. Paneto moved appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio for scheduled loss compensation, alleging a total loss of use of his left leg. The commission denied the application after finding Paneto's loss of use was not total. After being awarded permanent total disability (PTD) compensation, Paneto reapplied for total-loss-of-use compensation, alleging his PTD award was a new or changed circumstance that warranted reconsideration of the previous denial. The commission disagreed and further appeal was refused. The court of appeals upheld the commission's order. After Paneto filed his notice of appeal the commission terminated Paneto's PTD compensation after learning Paneto concealed his full-time employment. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, finding (1) because the PTD compensation was terminated, it is not a new or changed circumstance sufficient to permit the commission to reopen the issue of scheduled loss benefits; and (2) the evidence supports the commission's determination that Paneto did not have a total loss of use, which negates the need for any further discussion.