Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee was involuntarily separated from his employment due to disability. Employee's treating physician later certified that Employee was able to return to work, and Employee was subsequently reinstated to the payroll by Employer. Employee appealed the reinstatement order to the extent that the order did not award him back pay or credit his vacation leave from the date his treating physician certified that he could return to work to the day before he was returned to the payroll. The State Personnel Board of Review dismissed Employee's administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Employee then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel Employer to remit back pay or restore vacation-leave credit. The court of appeals dismissed Employee's complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither Ohio Rev. Code 124.32 nor Ohio Adm. Code 123:1-30-04 required that Employer remit back pay or credit the vacation leave Employee used between the date Employee's treating physician certified that he could return to work to the day before he was returned to the payroll. View "State ex rel. Baroni v. Colletti" on Justia Law

In 1970, while working for Employer, Employee was injured. In 1989, Employee retired. In 2008, Employee applied for permanent total disability (PTD) compensation. The Industrial Commission of Ohio concluded that Employee was permanently and totally disabled without ruling on the credibility of the assertion that Employee retired because of his injury or determining whether his retirement was voluntary or involuntary. The court of appeals granted Employer a limited writ of mandamus that vacated the Commission's order and ordered the Commission to reconsider the matter. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that because a voluntary retirement from the work force prior to asserting PTD precludes the payment of compensation for that disability, the court of appeals was correct in ordering further consideration of whether Employee retired because of his injury and whether his retirement was voluntary. View "State ex rel. Cinergy Corp. v. Heber" on Justia Law

Appellant Cerena Mackey was employed by the Ohio Department of Education when she suffered an industrial injury. After she retired from the workforce, Mackey filed for permanent total disability (PTD) compensation. The Industrial Commission of Ohio granted compensation to Mackey. The Department moved for reconsideration, alleging that the hearing officer had made a clear mistake of law in failing to determine whether Mackey's retirement was voluntary or involuntary. The Commission granted the motion and, after a hearing, vacated the award, finding (1) Mackey's retirement was unrelated to her injuries and was hence voluntary, and (2) Mackey's voluntary retirement foreclosed PTD compensation. Mackey filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, which the court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in (1) reopening the issue of Mackey's PTD eligibility in order to consider the effect of her retirement upon it, and (2) finding that Mackey's retirement was voluntary. View "State ex rel. Mackey v. Dep't of Educ." on Justia Law

Thomas Tindira was a member of Ohio Police and Fire Pension Fund (OP&F) while working as a police officer with Lakewood Police Department. Before he resigned from the department, Tindira filed his application for disability benefits with OP&F, including in his list of disabling conditions PTSD, anxiety disorder, and major depression. The OP&F board of trustees determined that Tindira was disabled but denied his claim for disability benefits. The court of appeals denied Tindira a writ of mandamus to compel appellees, OP&F and its board of trustees, to vacate the board's denial of his claim and to award him disability benefits and attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ, holding that the pension fund and its board abused their discretion in denying disability benefits as Tindira had established his entitlement to the benefits. View "State ex rel. Tindira v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Employee splashed bleach in her left eye while working for Employer. While Employee lost little vision as a result of the accident, Employee experienced other complications, including light sensitivity and reduced depth perception. Employee subsequently underwent a corneal transplant. Employee sought scheduled-loss compensation under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57(B), alleging she had sustained a total loss of vision in her left eye due to the removal of her cornea. A staff hearing officer for Industrial Commission of Ohio agreed and awarded Employee a total loss of use. Employer filed a complaint in mandamus. The court of appeals issued a writ ordering the commission to vacate its order, concluding that the commission had abused its discretion in awarding compensation for a total loss of vision. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals pursuant to State ex rel. Baker v. Coast to Coast Manpower, L.L.C. View "State ex rel. Dolgencorp, Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

After Employee was fired by Employer, Employee filed an action against Employer, claiming wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Employee argued that he was fired because he had expressed concerns about the safety of Employer's workplace to outside parties. Employer asserted it terminated Employee for insubordination. The trial court granted summary judgment to Employer, concluding that Employee failed to articulate a clear specific public policy that was jeopardized by his termination. The appellate court reversed, holding that there was a clear public policy favoring fire safety in the workplace and that retaliation against employees who raise concerns over fire safety violates public policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employee did not articulate a clear public policy applicable to his claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. View "Dohme v. Eurand Am., Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose because the settlement of a personal-injury suit brought by a recipient of workers' compensation benefits against a third-party tortfeasor did not make any provision to repay the statutory subrogee, the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation. The Bureau brought suit against both the recipient of the workers' compensation benefits and third-party tortfeasor under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.931(G) to recover the full amount of its subrogation interest. The trial court held that a two-year limitations period applied and that it had expired. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a six-year limitations period applied and that it had not yet run out. At issue on appeal was whether a claim under section 4123.931(G) brought by a statutory subrogee to recover its subrogation interest is subject to a two-year statute of limitations, the same period applicable to the injured worker's personal-injury suit against the third party, or to a six-year statute of limitations for an action on a liability created by statute. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that the claim in this case was an action upon a liability created by statute and that the statute of limitations was six years. View "Ohio Bureau of Workers Comp. v. McKinley" on Justia Law

The Industrial Commission of Ohio found that Angela Benedetti, Inc. (ABI) violated two newly added specific safety requirements that resulted in an injury to an ABI employee. ABI filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in permitting the injured employee to amend his specific safety requirement violations application and in finding violations of the specific safety requirements. The court of appeals upheld the Commission's order and denied the writ. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, agreeing with the reasoning provided by the court of appeals but not given in this opinion. View "State ex rel. Angelo Benedetti, Inc. v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

Joseph Starkey was injured while working for Builders FirstSource Ohio Valley. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation allowed Starkey's claim for, inter alia, a sprained hip and degenerative osteoarthritis of the left hip. Builders appealed to the county court, challenging Starkey's right to workers' compensation for osteoarthritis. The trial court entered judgment for Builders, holding (1) that a claim for aggravation of a preexisting condition is separate and distinct from a claim for that underlying condition itself, and (2) administrative action on one such claim did not without more confer jurisdiction on the court to consider the other. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Starkey could participate in the fund for degenerative osteoarthritis based on evidence that his work-related injury had aggravated his preexisting medical condition. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that (1) because aggravation of a preexisting medical condition is a type of causation, it is not a separate condition or distinct injury as defined in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.01, and (2) an appeal taken pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512 allows the claimant to present evidence on any theory of causation pertinent to a claim for a medical condition that already has been addressed administratively. View "Starkey v. Builders FirstSource Ohio Valley, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Appellant Aaron Rents, Inc. (ARI) challenged an order from the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation that retroactively reclassified the jobs of certain ARI employees for purposes of workers' compensation premiums. ARI objected to the retroactive reclassification and argued that the bureau had abused its discretion by failing to adequately explain why it rejected ARI's request for prospective reclassification only. The court of appeals denied ARI's writ of mandamus. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that (1) ARI's ability to challenge the bureau's decision was compromised because the order did not explain why retroactive rather than prospective reclassification was favored and (2) further explanation was required as to why the bureau reached its decision in order for the court to determine whether an abuse of discretion occurred. The Court vacated the judgment of the appellate court and granted a limited writ ordering the bureau to vacate its order and issue an amended order including an explanation for its decision. View "State ex rel. Aaron Rents, Inc. v. Ohio Bureau of Workers Comp." on Justia Law