Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee filed a workers' compensation claim against Employer, which was denied by the Industrial Commission. Employee filed a notice of appeal but failed to name as an appellee the administrator of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation. Employee later filed a motion for leave to amend his petition, this time naming the administrator as a party pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512. The court of common pleas dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and denied Employee's motion to amend his petition. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Employee's failure to name the administrator in the notice of appeal did not deprive the court of common pleas of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 4123.412's requirements that a party appealing from an Industrial Commission order name the administrator as a party of the appeal and serve the administrator with notice of the appeal are not jurisdictional requirements; and (2) Employee perfected his appeal by amending the complaint to name the administrator as a party and then notifying him by serving him with a copy of the amended complaint, thus vesting the common pleas court with jurisdiction to rule on his motion to amend. View "Spencer v. Freight Handlers, Inc." on Justia Law

Employee injured his back while working for Employer. Employee returned to light-duty work but complained about his job duties. Employer offered him another position within his physical limitations, but Employee resigned. Employee subsequently filed a motion for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. The Industrial Commission of Ohio initially denied the request. After Employee's claim was additionally allowed for another medical condition, Employee filed a new motion for TTD benefits. The Commission awarded Employee benefits based on new and changed circumstances from the Commission's previous order. The court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to vacate its second order and to enter an order denying TTD compensation, concluding that the Commission had abused its discretion when it relied on the additionally allowed medical condition as a new and changed circumstance since the previous order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee did not present evidence to justify the Commission's exercise of continuing jurisdiction; and (2) Employee was ineligible to receive TTD compensation for the period requested because his injury was not the reason that he could not return to his former position of employment. View "State ex rel. Akron Paint & Varnish, Inc. v. Gullotta" on Justia Law

Appellant filed for disability-retirement benefits with Appellee, the Ohio Police and Fire Pension Fund (OP&F), claiming that he was disabled as a result of the performance of his official duties of the police department. The OP&F board denied Appellant's application for benefits. Appellant subsequently requested a writ of mandamus to compel the OP&F board to award him disability-retirement benefits. The court of appeals denied the writ, determining that the report of a psychiatrist supported the board's determination that Appellant was not permanently and totally disabled due to a psychiatric or psychological impairment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) OP&F did not abuse its discretion by relying on the psychiatrist's report to support its decision; and (2) Appellant waived his argument that the OP&F board abused its discretion in denying him benefits because he was also physically disabled from continuing work. View "State ex rel. Kolcinko v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund" on Justia Law

Frank Bilaver left his job with Fluid Line Products after Fluid Line denied him an extended leave of absence. Bilaver later applied for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, which the Industrial Commission of Ohio denied after finding that Bilaver's decision to leave Fluid Line constituted a voluntary abandonment of employment that barred compensation. The court of appeals upheld the Commission's decision. Bilaver appealed, arguing that his departure from Fluid Line was involuntary because he did not quit his job but was instead fired in a manner that did not comply with State ex rel. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Indus. Comm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm. controlled in this case, and (2) lacking evidence that Bilaver secured another job and was prevented from doing it by his industrial injury, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Bilaver v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Employee was injured in an industrial accident in 1987. The last injury-related bill submitted to either self-insured Employer or its third-party administrator (collectively, Employer) was paid in 1997. In 2008, Employee asked Employer to authorize further treatment. Employer denied the request, relying on former Ohio Rev. Code 4123.52, under which claim inactivity in excess of ten years permanently closed a worker's compensation claim. In an effort to toll the statute, Employee revived an issue relating to a 1998 doctor's visit and requested a hearing on the payment of that outstanding bill. An Industrial Commission staff hearing officer ordered Employer to pay the outstanding bill. The court of appeals vacated the decision and directed the Commission to issue a new order denying payment of the bill. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission abused its discretion in ordering the bill to be paid because the visit related to a low-back condition that was not allowed in Employee's claim and there was no evidence establishing a potential connection between Employee's 1987 injury and his 1998 back symptoms. View "State ex rel. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellant suffered an industrial injury and never returned to any type of employment. Appellant filed for permanent total disability compensation (PTD) six years later. The Industrial Commission of Ohio denied Appellant's application in an order that emphasized Appellant's refusal to participate in vocational rehabilitation. Appellant filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion in denying PTD. The court of appeals concluded that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in deciding to hold Appellant accountable for his failure to participate in vocational rehabilitation when there was no evidence that he would not benefit from such services. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that (1) contrary to Appellant's suggestion, illiterate persons are neither unemployable nor, once injured, inherently permanently and totally disabled; and (2) Appellant was medically capable of sustained remunerative employment, so his rehabilitation potential was germane to the analysis. View "State ex rel. Gonzales v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Employee suffered an industrial injury and received surgery on his right shoulder, after which Employee returned to work for self-insured Employer. Employee experienced renewed shoulder complaints four years later and asked Employer to add new shoulder conditions to Employee's workers' compensation claim and authorize surgery to correct them. Employer and the Industrial Commission denied Employee's request after finding that the proposed procedure was unrelated to the conditions allowed in Employee's workers' compensation claim. At issue on appeal was a doctor's report upon which the Commission based its decision. The court of appeals granted a limited writ in mandamus that ordered the Commission to reconsider the application after finding inconsistencies within the report. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that none of the alleged inconsistencies noted in the doctor's report affected the viability of the doctor's opinion that further surgery was not reasonably related to the allowed conditions, and therefore, the report was evidence supporting the Commission's decision. View "State ex rel. George v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Patrick Donohoe died from injuries sustained in a workplace accident. His widow, Catherine, filed an application for additional workers' compensation benefits, claiming that Patrick's accident resulted from his employer's violation of specific safety requirements (VSSRs) governing the construction industry. The Industrial Commission of Ohio denied her application. The court of appeals vacated the order and returned the cause to the Commission for further consideration. Both Catherine and the employer appealed. At issue on appeal was (1) whether the Commission staff hearing officer's order, which could be interpreted in different ways, was deficient; and (2) whether the Commission erred by denying Catherine's application because there were no eyewitnesses to the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an order that can engender two viable, yet irreconcilable, interpretations is too ambiguous to withstand scrutiny; (2) an order that is potentially based on an erroneous belief that a VSSR cannot issue in the absence of eyewitnesses is clearly an abuse of discretion; and (3) therefore, the court of appeals was correct in returning the cause to the Commission for clarification and consideration of all the evidence. View "State ex rel. Donohoe v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

The State Employment Relations Board (SERB) appointed Kay Kingsley as an administrative law judge (ALJ), which was a classified position. Several years later, the General Assembly enacted H.B. 1, which changed the position of SERB ALJ from the classified service to the unclassified service. That same year, SERB terminated Kingsley's employment. Kingsley requested a writ of mandamus to declare H.B. 1 unconstitutional as applied to her and to order SERB to recognize her as a classified employee and to reinstate her to her former ALJ position. The court of appeals dismissed Kingsley's mandamus complaint, determining that Kingsley had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of an administrative appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Kingsley did not set forth a viable claim for the requested extraordinary relief in mandamus as she had an adequate remedy by way of civil-service appeal to raise her claims. View "State ex rel. Kingsley v. State Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

For several years, Appellant Paul Lane worked for the City. Later, the interim city manager terminated Lane's employment for disciplinary reasons. Lane subsequently submitted to the City's personnel director a request for a hearing from the City Personnel Appeals Board regarding his termination. Via letter, the City declined Lane's request. Lane filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellees, the City and Board, to conduct a hearing and issue a determination on the merits of his appeal, reinstate him to his position of employment, and award back pay and corresponding employment benefits. The court of appeals denied the writ, determining that Lane had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by administrative appeal from the Board's decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that in the absence of a final, appealable order by the Board on Lane's request for a hearing, he did not have an adequate remedy by way of administrative appeal to raise his claims. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Lane v. Pickerington" on Justia Law