Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This matter was before the Supreme Court on a motion for reconsideration filed by Appellant, Acordia of Ohio, LLC (the LLC). The Supreme Court granted the motion. In Acordia I, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, concluding that while the noncompete agreements of employees (Appellees), who were originally employed by a contracting employer, transferred by operation of law following merger with the LLC, the language found in those agreements precluded the LLC from enforcing them as if it had stepped into the shoes of the original contracting employer. Upon reconsideration, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) the language in Acordia I stating that the LLC could not enforce the employees noncompete agreements as if it had stepped into the original contracting company's shoes was erroneous; and (2) the LLC here may enforce the noncompete agreements as if it had stepped into the shoes of the original contracting companies, provided that the noncompete agreements are reasonable under the circumstances of this case. View "Acordia of Ohio, LLC v. Fishel" on Justia Law

Appellant filed an application for permanent total disability (PTD). The Industrial Commission of Ohio found Appellant was capable of sedentary sustained remunerative employment and denied her request for PTD. Appellant filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion. The court of appeals denied the mandamus action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commission's conclusion that Appellant's allowed conditions did not foreclose sustained remunerative employment was not an abuse of discretion; (2) the Commission did not abuse its discretion in failing to view Appellant's rehabilitation efforts favorably; and (3) the Commission did not improperly factor the economic climate into the PTD equation. View "State ex rel. Guthrie v. Indus. Comm." on Justia Law

This was an original action in mandamus by relator, JobsOhio, asking the Supreme Court to (1) find that legislation authorizing the creation of JobsOhio to promote economic development in the state and to assume responsibility for the merchandising and sale of alcohol in the state was constitutional, and (2) compel respondent, the Ohio Department of Commerce director, to execute an agreement to transfer the state's liquor business to JobsOhio. The Supreme Court dismissed the cause because it did not properly invoke the original jurisdiction of the court, as it essentially sought either a declaratory judgment or an advisory opinion on the constitutionality of the statute rather than presenting a justiciable controversy. View "State ex rel. JobsOhio v. Goodman" on Justia Law

Bay Mechanical & Electrical Corporation, a specialty mechanical contractor, challenged a sales-tax assessment issued by the tax commissioner with respect to Bay's purchase of allegedly taxable employment services. During the audit period, Bay purchased the services from two entities. Bay treated the personnel supplied by the entities as "permanent-assignment" employees, and therefore regarded the attendant employment services as exempt pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 5739.01(JJ)(3). The commissioner denied the exemption on the ground that the evidence offered by Bay was insufficient to prove entitlement to the exemption. The board of tax appeals (BTA) affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the BTA acted reasonably and lawfully when it upheld the tax commissioner's sales-tax assessment against Bay because the contracts and testimony offered by Bay did not satisfy the one-year and permanent-assignment criteria of section 5739.01(JJ)(3). View "Bay Mech. & Elec. Corp. v. Testa" on Justia Law

Employee was suspended from his position with City and, therefore, was not working when City discharged him. Employee subsequently filed an action against City for retaliatory discharge under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.90. Employee alleged he did not learn he had been discharged until almost six weeks after the date City claimed the discharge occurred. The trial court ruled the allegation was not relevant to, and did not delay the commencement of, the ninety-day period following the discharge for the employer to receive written notice of Employee's claim that his discharge had been retaliatory under section 4123.90. The court, therefore, found Employee's ninety-day notice letter untimely. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in general, "discharge" in section 4123.90 means the date the employer issued the notice of employment termination, not the date of the employee's receipt of that notice or the date of the employee's discovery of a section 4123.90 cause of action; but (2) the facts of this case may require an exception to the general rule. Remanded. View "Lawrence v. Youngstown" on Justia Law

This was an appeal from a judgment denying the request of Appellant for a writ of mandamus to compel Appellee, Columbus State Community College, to provide access to its complaint files, litigation files, and certain e-mails, and to award statutory damages and reasonable attorney fees. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant did not establish by the requisite clear and convincing evidence that Columbus State violated Ohio Rev. Code. 149.43 by denying her record requests and that the court of appeals did not err by (1) denying Appellant's request for access to the requested complaint and litigation files, as Appellant's request was overbroad; (2) denying Appellant's request for e-mails based on her claim that Columbus State had violated section 149.43(B)(2) by not initially organizing its records so that work-related e-mails could be retrieved based on sender and recipient status, as section 149.43(B)(2) does not expressly require public offices to maintain e-mail record so they can be retrieved based on sender and recipient status; and (3) determining that Columbus State had complied with section 149.43(B)(2). View "State ex rel. Zidonis v. Columbus State Cmty. Coll." on Justia Law

Certain individuals who worked for American Chemical Society (ACS) founded Leadscope Inc. and later received a patent for technology similar to that on which they worked while at ACS. ACS filed a lawsuit against Leadscope. A newspaper subsequently published an article about the suit quoting ACS's counsel. In pertinent part, the jury returned verdicts in favor of Leadscope on its counterclaims for defamation and unfair competition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court (1) upheld the appellate court's decision affirming the trial court's denial of ACS's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the unfair competition claim, holding (i) a party alleging a claim for unfair competition must show the action is baseless and the opposing party had the intent to injure the party's ability to be competitive, and (ii) the jury instructions here did not meet that test, but the jury could not reasonably have made any other determination with proper instructions; and (2) reversed the appellate court's finding that the trial court properly overruled ACS's motion for JNOV on Leadscope's counterclaim for defamation, holding (i) ACS's statements were not defamatory, and (ii) a client is vicariously liable for its attorney's defamatory statements only if the client ratified the statements. View "Am. Chem. Soc'y v. Leadscope, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant, a classified civil-service employee, filed a writ of mandamus to compel appellees, the Miami County Sheriff's Office and Sheriff Charles Cox, to reinstate him pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 145.362 to his previous deputy-sheriff position and salary or to a similar position and salary and to award him back pay and benefits. The court of appeals held that Appellant had an adequate remedy by way of a civil-service appeal to the State Personnel Board of Review (SPBR) from the sheriff's office's refusal to perform the requested actions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) classified civil-service employees like Appellant have an adequate remedy by administrative appeal to SPBR from an employer's refusal to reinstate them to their salaries and former positions; and (2) Appellant waived his claim that the collective-bargaining agreement between the sheriff's office and the employee union prevented him from instituting an appeal to SPBR. View "State ex rel. Byers v. Sheriff'Âs Office" on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working for Employer. Five years later, Employee was fired for violating the company's attendance policy. Employee's termination was later the basis for the Industrial Commission of Ohio's denial of his request for temporary total disability compensation (TTC). The Commission found that Employee's discharge amounted to a voluntary abandonment because it was consequence of behavior that Employee willingly undertook. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the deliberate misconduct necessary to support a finding of voluntary abandonment could not be imputed to Employee. The Supreme Court affirmed and issued a limited writ of mandamus that vacated the Commission's order and returned the cause to it for further consideration, as the hearing officer did not carefully examine the totality of the circumstances in finding that a simple allegation of misconduct existed to preclude temporary total disability compensation. View "State ex rel. Brown v. Hoover Universal, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant worked in the classified position of human-services hearing manager with the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS). In December 2004, Appellant was assigned additional duties. Appellant was not informed that the assumption of these duties would move his position to the unclassified service. In December 2005, ODJFS suspended Appellant for violations of the code of conduct and subsequently removed him from his position. Appellant appealed his removal to the State Personnel Board of Review (SPBR), basing his appeal on Ohio Rev. Code 124.11(D), which grants state employees who move from classified positions to unclassified the positions the right to resume the classified position held before the appointment to the unclassified position. The SPBR found that Appellant was an unclassified employee when he was suspended and dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court of common pleas and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel ODJFS and its director to reinstate him to his previous classified position of human-services hearing manager or a substantially equal position, without the duties assigned to him in December 2004 that moved his position into the unclassified service. Remanded. View "State ex rel. Barley v. Dep't of Job & Family Servs." on Justia Law