Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Relator, a trucking company, sought a writ of mandamus compelling Respondents, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles (BMV) Registrar and the Department of Public Safety Director, to provide an unredacted, noncertified copy of the driving records of the trucking company's employee at cost. This case was consolidated with a direct appeal from the Tenth District Court of Appeals involving the same parties and the same issues but a different driving record. The BMV refused to provide the copies at cost but instead, following the BMV rule, required Relator to specify the basis for its entitlement to an unredacted copy and to pay a $5 fee for a certified copy. Relator claimed it should be able to receive an unredacted copy at cost under the Public Records Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth District in one case and denied the writ in the other case, holding (1) the BMV properly promulgated the rule at issue under its rule-making procedure; and (2) therefore, disclosure of the records was prohibited under the Driver's Privacy Protection Act and its counterpart in Ohio unless Relator could demonstrate a permissible use. View "State ex rel. Motor Carrier Serv., Inc. v. Rankin" on Justia Law

A truck driver (Driver) was injured in 2005 in a traffic accident for which he was cited. Because it was his third moving violation in one year, Driver was dropped from his employer's liability insurance policy, and consequently, the employer fired him. The Industrial Commission initially concluded that Driver was not eligible for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation because his discharge was a voluntary abandonment of employment. A year later, a staff hearing officer approved a request for TTD compensation, concluding that Driver's discharge was not voluntary abandonment under the recently decided State ex rel. Gross v. Indus. Comm'n. The Commission invalidated the hearing officer's decision. The court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to award benefits or to reconsider the denial of benefits in accordance with Gross. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Driver was discharged for the same misconduct that caused his industrial injury, the discharge was not tantamount to a voluntary abandonment of employment that precludes TTD compensation; and (2) the Commission abused its discretion when it reconsidered the order on the basis of res judicata. View "State ex rel. Haddox v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

K&D Enterprises, through its manager, Mid-America, contracted to purchase an apartment complex. Prior to the closing, K&D Enterprises created a new company, Euclid-Richmond Gardens, and assigned its rights under the purchase agreement to that new company. Euclid-Richmond Gardens hired K&D Group, Inc., a property-management company, to manage the apartment. K&D Group hired former employees of Mid-America and assumed the operations of the complex. The Bureau of Workers' Compensation later conducted an audit and determined K&D Group was the successor in interest to the business operations of Mid-America, a determination that authorized the Bureau to base K&D Group's experience rating, in part, on Mid-America's past experience, which included a large workers' compensation claim. After K&D Group's administrative appeal was denied, K&D Group unsuccessfully filed a mandamus action in the court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and issued the writ of mandamus, holding that K&D Group was not a successor in interest for purposes of workers' compensation law, and thus, the Bureau abused its discretion when it transferred part of Mid-America's experience rating to K&D Group. View "State ex rel. K&D Group, Inc. v. Buehrer" on Justia Law

Employee worked in the aisle of a warehouse where he sustained injuries when a co-worker operating a sideloader struck him. Employee sued Employer, asserting the company had deliberately intended to injure him by directing him to work in the aisle with knowledge that injury was substantially certain to occur. The trial court granted Employer's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Employee failed to show Employer intended to injure him. The court of appeals reversed, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact that Employer objectively believed the injury to Employee was substantially certain to occur. At issue on appeal was the recently enacted statute, Ohio Rev. Code 2745.01(A), which specifies that an employer is not liable for an intentional tort unless the employee proves the employer had the intent to injure or believed the injury was "substantially certain" to occur. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred by ignoring the statutory definition of "substantially certain" and holding Employer could be held liable for Employee's injuries if "objectively believed" the injury was substantially certain to occur; and (2) no evidence existed that Employer deliberately intended to injure Employee by directing him to work in the warehouse aisle. View "Houdek v. ThyssenKrupp Materials N.A., Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal presented issues regarding the scope of a workers' compensation appeal in common pleas court pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512. Specifically, the appeal concerned whether, in that proceeding to determine a claimant's right to participate in the workers' compensation fund, the court was limited to considering those issues that were specifically determined by the Industrial Commission below, or whether the de novo nature of the proceeding obligated the claimant to present and the court to consider all the evidence necessary for determining the claimant's right to participate. The court of appeals rejected the claimant's claim that the trial court erred in placing the burden on him to establish any injury-relatedness or causation in his section 4123.512 appeal because those issues were not considered in the administrative rulings. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that the de novo nature of a section 4123.512 appeal proceeding puts in issue all elements of a claimant's right to participate in the workers' compensation fund. View "Bennett v. Adm'r, Bureau of Workers Comp." on Justia Law

This workers' compensation case came before the Supreme Court on an appeal of right from the court of appeals' judgment granting Claimant a writ of mandamus ordering the Industrial Commission to vacate its August 6, 2009 order. Appellants, Industrial Commission and Claimant's employer, sought to reinstate the August 6 order, which vacated a previously allowed claim for temporary total disability compensation on the grounds that a later statement by Claimant's examining physician had repudiated that same physician's earlier certifications that the disabling injury had not yet reached maximum medical improvement. On appeal, Claimant argued that the Commission lacked adequate grounds to exercise continuing jurisdiction, which it needed in order to invalidate the earlier order. The court of appeals granted mandamus relief, finding that the subsequent repudiating opinion of Claimant's examining physician could not be relied upon by the Commission to support the exercise of continuing jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission abused its discretion in exercising continuing jurisdiction over this case. View "State ex rel. Knapp v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to resolve a conflict between the Third and Tenth District Courts of Appeals. The issue was whether after a claimant's right to participate in the workers' compensation fund has been established, a trial court abuses its discretion under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512(F) when it awards the claimant his or her costs related to the conditions for which the trier of fact determined the claimant was ineligible to participate in the fund. The Court held (1) when a claimant's right to participate in the workers' compensation fund is established on appeal, section 4123.512(F) requires the trial court to award the claimant his or her costs; (2) under section 4123.512, a trial court is not required to apportion costs based on the outcome of a particular claim and/or condition; and (3) accordingly, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by awarding costs under section 4123.512(F) when it reimburses a claimant for costs incurred on appeal without regard to the outcome of a particular claim and/or condition. View "Holmes v. Crawford Machine, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether Appellant, Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services (ODJFS), properly denied applications for federal wage subsidies filed by Appellees, three former employees of American Standard who later were reemployed at a lower wage before they reached the age of fifty. The Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission denied Appellees' eligibility for the subsidies. The court of common pleas reversed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that because ODJFS offered a reasonable interpretation of ambiguous language in the federal statute that established the wage subsidies, ODJFS did not improperly deny the applications. View "Lang v. Dir., Ohio Dep't of Job & Family Servs." on Justia Law

Appellee was working as an apprentice lineman for Appellant, an electrical-utility construction contractor, when he came into contact with an energized line and received an electric shock, which caused severe burns. Appellee filed this action against Appellant, alleging workplace intentional tort in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2745.01 and common law. He alleged that Appellant knew with substantial certainty that he would be injured when working alone in an elevated lift bucket near energized high-voltage power lines without the use of protective rubber gloves and sleeves. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) protective rubber gloves and sleeves are personal items that an employee controls and do not constitute "an equipment safety guard" for purposes of section 2745.01(C), and an employee's failure to use them, or an employer's failure to require an employee to use them, does not constitute the deliberate removal by an employer of an equipment safety guard; and (2) consequently, Appellee failed to establish a rebuttable presumption of intent pursuant to section 2745.01(C), and Appellant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Hewitt v. L.E. Myers Co." on Justia Law

Appellant unsuccessfully sought postretirement total disability compensation (TTC). The Industrial Commission of Ohio denied Appellant's application after finding that she had voluntarily abandoned the work force when she took disability retirement for a condition that was unrelated to her workplace injury. The court of appeals agreed and denied Appellant's request for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals pursuant to State ex rel. Corman v. Allied Holdings, Inc. and State ex rel. Pierron v. Indus. Comm'n, holding that the Commission did not did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reinstate TTC, as Appellant voluntarily removed herself from the work force by taking disability retirement because she still had the physical ability to work. View "State ex rel. Rouan v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law