Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant had been employed as a nurse with Progressive Parma Care, LLC since 1995. During her tenure at Parma Care, Appellant was disciplined on several occasions. On April 10, 2008, Appellant was injured at work. On April 16, 2008, the director of nursing terminated Appellant for cause. On April 21, 2008, a physician certified that Appellant was temporarily and totally disabled from all employment beginning on the date of her injury. The Industrial Commission denied Appellant’s request for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, concluding that Appellant’s discharge from employment for violating written workplace rules had been a voluntary abandonment, making Appellant ineligible for benefits, and that the medical evidence did not support Appellant’s claim that she had been temporarily and totally disabled at the time of her termination. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion when it denied her request for TTD compensation. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant compensation for TTD. View "State ex rel. Robinson v. Indus. Comm'n " on Justia Law

Appellant was injured while working for Employer. Appellant’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for a dislocated left shoulder and a torn left rotator cuff, among other injuries. Appellant later requested compensation for the scheduled loss of use of his left upper extremity. The Industrial Commission denied Appellant’s request for benefits by relying on the report of Dr. D. Ann. Middaugh as evidence that Appellant had retained some use of his left arm. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Commission’s finding as an abuse of discretion. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that Dr. Middaugh’s report was some evidence upon which the Commission could rely to deny scheduled loss compensation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was entitled to an award for the scheduled loss of his left arm because (1) Dr. Middaugh’s findings were not consistent with her ultimate conclusion, and consequently, Dr. Middaugh’s report could not be some evidence supporting the Commission’s decision to deny an award for loss of use; and (2) the only other report submitted for consideration with Appellant’s loss-of-uses award stated that, for all practical purposes, Appellant had lost the function of his left arm. View "State ex rel. Wyrick v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio" on Justia Law

George Smith suffered an injury while working for Ohio State University. The Industrial Commission of Ohio allowed Smith’s claim for bilateral inguinal hernia. Tragically, Smith suffered brain damage resulting from postoperative complications from surgery to repair the hernia, leaving him in a persistent vegetative state. A doctor later concluded that Smith had bilateral vision and hearing loss caused by the loss of brain function. Smith sought additional scheduled awards for the loss of vision and hearing. However, no test could be performed to determine whether Smith suffered an actual loss of sight or hearing, and the medical evidence showed that Smith was unable to process sights and sounds because of damage to his brain, not because of any injury to his eyes or ears. The Industrial Commission denied Smith’s request for additional compensation based on the lack of any objective testing showing vision or hearing loss. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s denial of Smith’s claim, holding that the evidence supported a finding that Smith suffered from a loss of brain-stem function, a loss that has not been included in the schedule for compensation set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57. View "State ex rel. Smith v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellant sustained a work-related injury and collected temporary total disability (TTD) compensation on her claim for certain injuries. Appellant later filed an application to add a psychological condition to her claim, at the same time requesting TTD compensation as a result of the condition. A hearing officer approved the additional condition but denied TTD compensation. Appellant subsequently filed another request for TTD compensation. A staff hearing officer awarded TTD compensation. The full Industrial Commission granted reconsideration and denied Appellant’s request for compensation, concluding that Appellant had voluntarily abandoned the entire workforce, and thus the claimed period of disability was not caused by the allowed conditions. Appellant filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellant’s lack of earnings was not due to her psychological condition and that her failure to seek other employment was evidence she had voluntarily abandoned the workforce. View "State ex rel. Roxbury v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Employee was injured while working as a truck driver for Employer. Employee's claim was allowed for the injuries. The next year, Employee returned to work. Two days later, Employer terminated Employee for violating written work rules. A staff hearing officer later denied temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, determining that Employee's termination was a voluntary abandonment of employment that barred compensation for TTD. The court of appeals concluded that the Industrial Commission abused its discretion in determining that Employee was ineligible for TTD compensation based upon his termination from Employer and granted mandamus relief to Employee. The Supreme Court (1) reversed, holding that the Commission's order did not meet the standards of State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm'n because the court did not specifically state the evidence relied upon or explain the reason behind its decision that Employee had voluntarily abandoned his employment with Employer; and (2) returned the matter to the Commission to issue a new order stating the evidence relied upon and explaining its reasoning consistent with Noll. View "State ex rel. Cline v. Abke Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

The Mount Vernon City School District Board of Education terminated Appellant for insubordination for refusing to remove religious displays in his classroom and injecting his personal religious beliefs into his pattern of instruction, all after being forbidden to do so. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence in the record supported Appellant's termination for insubordination in failing to comply with the district's orders to remove religious materials from his classroom. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held that the lower courts did not err in affirming the termination, as there was ample evidence of insubordination to justify the termination decision. View "Freshwater v. Mount Vernon City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Appellant, who worked for Employer, filed a workers' compensation claim that was allowed for hypersensitivity pneumonitis and hypersensitivity-induced reactive upper-airway disease. Claimant returned to work, but after his symptoms returned, he stopped working in 2004. In 2005, a staff hearing officer with the Industrial Commission denied Appellant's request for temporary total disability compensation, concluding that Appellant's smoking-related disease caused his exacerbated symptoms. In 2007, a staff hearing officer awarded Appellant permanent total disability compensation. Employer filed a complaint for mandamus, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court reversed and granted the writ, holding that because the Commission had conclusively established in 2005 that the exacerbation of Appellant's symptoms that forced him to stop working in 2004 was caused by smoking, not by the allowed conditions in his claim, the Commission erred by determining that Appellant's decision to stop working was not a voluntary abandonment of the workforce. View "State ex rel. Kelsey Hayes Co. v. Grashel" on Justia Law

A public employer (Employer) and an employee organization representing the Employer's employees (Union) operated pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. After the Union began negotiations for a successor contract, Employer held a board meeting during which Union representatives picketed outside the building. The picketing was related to the successor contract negotiations. Employer later filed an unfair-labor-practice charge with the State Employment Relations Board (SERB), alleging that the Union had violated the requirement of Ohio Rev. Code 4117.11(B)(8) that employee-union picketers give their employers and SERB ten days' notice before they engage in informational picketing. SERB found that the Union had committed an unfair labor practice by failing to give the required notice before picketing. The appellate court reversed, holding that the notice requirement was unconstitutional when applied to informational picketing. The Supreme Court affirmed, not on constitutional grounds but based on its statutory interpretation, holding (1) the notice requirement of section 4117.11(B)(8) does not apply to picketing that is merely informational in nature and unrelated to a concerted refusal to work; and (2) therefore, the statute did not apply to the picketing activity in this case, and the failure to give notice did not constitute an unfair labor practice. View "Mahoning Educ. Ass'n of Dev. Disabilities v. State Employment Relations Bd." on Justia Law

Billy Black was employed as a press operator for Park Ohio Industries, Inc. when he injured his back. Black subsequently retired, after which he did not pursue vocational training or seek other employment. Several years later, Black applied for permanent total disability (PTD) compensation. A hearing officer with the Industrial Commission denied the application on the grounds that Black's retirement was both voluntary and an abandonment of the entire workforce. The Tenth District Court of Appeals granted a limited writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to vacate its order denying PTD compensation to Black. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and denied the writ, holding that because the record contained some evidence to support the Commission's decision that Black's retirement was voluntary and not injury-induced, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in determining that Black was ineligible for PTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Black v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio" on Justia Law

Appellant injured his knee while working and was awarded temporary total disability (TTD) compensation. Several years later, Appellant retired. The next year, Appellant underwent knee surgery and again filed for TTD compensation. A staff hearing officer denied benefits on the grounds that Appellant was ineligible because he had voluntarily retired and abandoned the workforce. Appellant subsequently filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion in relying on the evidence that Appellant had voluntarily retired from the workforce and was no longer eligible for TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Hoffman v. Rexam Beverage Can Co." on Justia Law