Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant brought an original action for a writ of mandamus against his former employers, the Summit County prosecutor and the County (collectively, the County), alleging that the County did not compensate him in accordance with established pay scales for his position and seeking payment of “an amount to cover back pay losses.” The court of appeals denied the writ and also denied Appellant’s motion for sanctions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s right to back pay was not so clear as to justify issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus, and therefore, the court of appeals correctly determined that Appellant failed to carry his burden of proof; and (2) the appellate court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion for sanctions. View "State ex rel. Manley v. Walsh" on Justia Law

After Employee was terminated from his position as a construction-equipment operator with the City of Cleveland, the collective-bargaining unit for construction-equipment operators employed by the City sought a writ of mandamus to compel the City Civil Service Commission to conduct a termination hearing before a neutral referee. The appellate court denied the writ, concluding that Employee had no clear legal right to a termination hearing, that the Commission had no clear legal duty to provide Employee with a hearing before a neutral referee, and that Employee had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Employee had a clear legal right to a hearing to challenge his termination; (2) the City was under a clear legal duty to appoint a referee to conduct a hearing; and (3) a writ of mandamus was the proper remedy because Employee had no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. View "State ex rel. Mun. Constr. Equip. Operators’ Labor Council v. City of Cleveland" on Justia Law

Claimant was terminated from her employment for violating the written attendance policy in her union contract after she was injured at work. Thereafter, Claimant filed for temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation for her work-related injury. The Industrial Commission concluded that, per State ex rel. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Indus. Comm., Claimant’s termination was a voluntary abandonment that barred payment of TTD compensation. Claimant then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the evidence supported the Commission’s finding of voluntary abandonment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Claimant failed to establish that the Commission abused its discretion when it denied her request for TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Parraz v. Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant, his employer, signed a written employment agreement detailing the terms of Plaintiff’s relationship with Defendant. Plaintiff later ceased working for Defendant, believing he had been fired. Defendant, however, believed that Plaintiff had resigned. Plaintiff’s termination became the subject of binding arbitration. The arbitration panel concluded that Plaintiff had been terminated for reasons other than cause and ordered Defendant to reinstate Plaintiff “to the position he held prior to his wrongful termination.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) specific performance is not an available remedy for breach of an employment contract unless it is explicitly provided for in the contract or by an applicable statute; and (2) the arbitration panel in this case exceeded its authority by holding otherwise, as the contract clearly did not entitle Plaintiff to reinstatement. Remanded. View "Cedar Fair, L.P. v. Falfas" on Justia Law

Donald Burkhart (Burkhart) died after developing mesothelioma. Mary Lou Burkhart (Claimant) filed a claim against H.J. Heinz Company (Employer), Burkhart’s former employer, seeking workers compensation benefits. In making her case that Employer had injuriously exposed Burkhart to asbestos, Claimant sought to admit deposition testimony Burkhart had given in a products-liability action he had filed against various asbestos manufacturers. On appeal from the Industrial Commission’s adverse ruling against Claimant, the trial court struck Burkhart’s testimony from the record and granted summary judgment for Employer. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Burkhart’s deposition testimony was admissible because the manufacturers in the asbestos litigation were predecessors-in-interest to Employer for purposes of Ohio R. Evid. 804(B)(1) in that they shared a similar motive to develop Burkhart’s testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Burkhart’s deposition testimony was not admissible pursuant to Rule 804(B)(1) because the asbestos manufacturers that cross-examined Burkhart were neither predecessors-in-interest to Employer nor had a similar motive to develop the deposition testimony through cross-examination. View "Burkhart v. H.J. Heinz Co." on Justia Law

Appellee, an employee of the City of Warren, was appointed deputy bailiff/legal secretary to Judge Gysegem in 2007. In 2010, Appellee discussed with Judge Gysegem her wish to retire and receive Ohio Public Employees Retirement Systems (OPERS) benefits but to continue working for the judge. Consequently, the judge did not issue an entry terminating Appellee’s employment. Appellant, the auditor of the City, claimed he could not certify to OPERS Appellee’s final date and salary, which was required for Appellee to receive OPERS benefits. Appellee filed this mandamus case to compel Appellant to certify her final-earnable-salary date to OPERS. The court of appeals granted the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellant had no direct evidence of Appellee’s retirement, he had no clear legal duty to certify Appellee’s final-earnable-salary date. View "State ex rel. O’’Grady v. Griffing" on Justia Law

One of the exceptions to public employee membership in the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System (OPERS) is set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 145.03, which provides that a student employee is exempt from OPERS membership if the student requests exemption by submitting a form to OPERS, OPERS approves the exemption, and the student is “continuously employed” by the school. OPERS concluded that Appellants, five current and former student employees of Youngstown State University (YSU), had all requested exemptions and were all continuously employed by the university. Appellants filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the exemption forms were invalid and that they were not “continuously employed” within the meaning of section 145.03. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) OPERS correctly interpreted the law to mean that the student employees were continuously employed even though YSU had a policy of terminating student employees at the end of the school year; and (2) OPERS was therefore correct in finding that Appellants needed to sign only one application for exemption from membership in OPERS at or near the time of their initial employment to be exempt from membership. View "State ex rel. Domhoff v. Ohio Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. Bd." on Justia Law

Appellee filed an employment-discrimination action against the Dayton Police Department (DPD) and Major Mitchell Davis, her supervisor, alleging, inter alia, age- and sex-based discrimination in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4112 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. DPD and Davis filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Davis was entitled to immunity on the basis that a supervisor employed by a political subdivision cannot be held individually liable in a discrimination action. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment as it related to Appellee’s claim of sex discrimination under Chapter 4112 and denied the motion as it related to Davis’s claim of immunity. The court of appeals affirmed on the basis that Ohio Rev. Code 2744.03(A)(6)(c), which states that political-subdivision employees, such as Davis, are not entitled to immunity if civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised Code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ohio Rev. Code 4112.01(A)(2) and 4112.02(A) do not expressly impose civil liability on political-subdivision employees so as to trigger the immunity exception in section 2744.03(A)(6)(c). View "Hauser v. Dayton Police Dep’t" on Justia Law

In 2010, almost ten years after he had left his employment with his employer, Formica Corporation, Appellant applied for temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation. The Industrial Commission denied Appellant’s application, concluding that Appellant’s failure to search for work since leaving Formica was evidence that he had abandoned the job market and retired, making him ineligible to receive further compensation. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the evidence supported the Commission’s decision that Appellant intended to voluntarily abandon the workforce when his employment with Formica ended. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err when it determined that the Commission’s order was supported by sufficient evidence that Appellant had already abandoned the entire workforce when he applied for TTD compensation in 2010. View "State ex rel. Floyd v. Formica Corp." on Justia Law

The new owner of an arena football team applied for workers’ compensation coverage. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation concluded that the new owner was a successor employer for workers’ compensation purposes and that it would base the new owners’ premium rate on the experience of the former owner. The new owner filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Bureau abused its discretion by finding that the new owner was a successor to the former owner for workers’ compensation purposes and by failing to adequately explain its decision. A magistrate concluded that the Bureau abused its discretion in transferring the entire experience of the former owner, concluding that if only a portion of the former owner’s business was transferred to the new owner, then the experience rating is transferred in proportion to the business that was transferred. The court of appeals agreed with the magistrate’s decision and granted the new owner’s request for a writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bureau abused its discretion by transferring the entire experience rating of the former owner. View "State ex rel. Cleveland Prof’l Football, LLC v. Buehrer" on Justia Law