Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Donald Burkhart (Burkhart) died after developing mesothelioma. Mary Lou Burkhart (Claimant) filed a claim against H.J. Heinz Company (Employer), Burkhart’s former employer, seeking workers compensation benefits. In making her case that Employer had injuriously exposed Burkhart to asbestos, Claimant sought to admit deposition testimony Burkhart had given in a products-liability action he had filed against various asbestos manufacturers. On appeal from the Industrial Commission’s adverse ruling against Claimant, the trial court struck Burkhart’s testimony from the record and granted summary judgment for Employer. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Burkhart’s deposition testimony was admissible because the manufacturers in the asbestos litigation were predecessors-in-interest to Employer for purposes of Ohio R. Evid. 804(B)(1) in that they shared a similar motive to develop Burkhart’s testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Burkhart’s deposition testimony was not admissible pursuant to Rule 804(B)(1) because the asbestos manufacturers that cross-examined Burkhart were neither predecessors-in-interest to Employer nor had a similar motive to develop the deposition testimony through cross-examination. View "Burkhart v. H.J. Heinz Co." on Justia Law

Appellee, an employee of the City of Warren, was appointed deputy bailiff/legal secretary to Judge Gysegem in 2007. In 2010, Appellee discussed with Judge Gysegem her wish to retire and receive Ohio Public Employees Retirement Systems (OPERS) benefits but to continue working for the judge. Consequently, the judge did not issue an entry terminating Appellee’s employment. Appellant, the auditor of the City, claimed he could not certify to OPERS Appellee’s final date and salary, which was required for Appellee to receive OPERS benefits. Appellee filed this mandamus case to compel Appellant to certify her final-earnable-salary date to OPERS. The court of appeals granted the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Appellant had no direct evidence of Appellee’s retirement, he had no clear legal duty to certify Appellee’s final-earnable-salary date. View "State ex rel. O’’Grady v. Griffing" on Justia Law

One of the exceptions to public employee membership in the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System (OPERS) is set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 145.03, which provides that a student employee is exempt from OPERS membership if the student requests exemption by submitting a form to OPERS, OPERS approves the exemption, and the student is “continuously employed” by the school. OPERS concluded that Appellants, five current and former student employees of Youngstown State University (YSU), had all requested exemptions and were all continuously employed by the university. Appellants filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the exemption forms were invalid and that they were not “continuously employed” within the meaning of section 145.03. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) OPERS correctly interpreted the law to mean that the student employees were continuously employed even though YSU had a policy of terminating student employees at the end of the school year; and (2) OPERS was therefore correct in finding that Appellants needed to sign only one application for exemption from membership in OPERS at or near the time of their initial employment to be exempt from membership. View "State ex rel. Domhoff v. Ohio Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. Bd." on Justia Law

Appellee filed an employment-discrimination action against the Dayton Police Department (DPD) and Major Mitchell Davis, her supervisor, alleging, inter alia, age- and sex-based discrimination in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4112 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. DPD and Davis filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Davis was entitled to immunity on the basis that a supervisor employed by a political subdivision cannot be held individually liable in a discrimination action. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment as it related to Appellee’s claim of sex discrimination under Chapter 4112 and denied the motion as it related to Davis’s claim of immunity. The court of appeals affirmed on the basis that Ohio Rev. Code 2744.03(A)(6)(c), which states that political-subdivision employees, such as Davis, are not entitled to immunity if civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised Code. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ohio Rev. Code 4112.01(A)(2) and 4112.02(A) do not expressly impose civil liability on political-subdivision employees so as to trigger the immunity exception in section 2744.03(A)(6)(c). View "Hauser v. Dayton Police Dep’t" on Justia Law

In 2010, almost ten years after he had left his employment with his employer, Formica Corporation, Appellant applied for temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation. The Industrial Commission denied Appellant’s application, concluding that Appellant’s failure to search for work since leaving Formica was evidence that he had abandoned the job market and retired, making him ineligible to receive further compensation. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that the evidence supported the Commission’s decision that Appellant intended to voluntarily abandon the workforce when his employment with Formica ended. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err when it determined that the Commission’s order was supported by sufficient evidence that Appellant had already abandoned the entire workforce when he applied for TTD compensation in 2010. View "State ex rel. Floyd v. Formica Corp." on Justia Law

The new owner of an arena football team applied for workers’ compensation coverage. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation concluded that the new owner was a successor employer for workers’ compensation purposes and that it would base the new owners’ premium rate on the experience of the former owner. The new owner filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Bureau abused its discretion by finding that the new owner was a successor to the former owner for workers’ compensation purposes and by failing to adequately explain its decision. A magistrate concluded that the Bureau abused its discretion in transferring the entire experience of the former owner, concluding that if only a portion of the former owner’s business was transferred to the new owner, then the experience rating is transferred in proportion to the business that was transferred. The court of appeals agreed with the magistrate’s decision and granted the new owner’s request for a writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Bureau abused its discretion by transferring the entire experience rating of the former owner. View "State ex rel. Cleveland Prof’l Football, LLC v. Buehrer" on Justia Law

Appellant had been employed as a nurse with Progressive Parma Care, LLC since 1995. During her tenure at Parma Care, Appellant was disciplined on several occasions. On April 10, 2008, Appellant was injured at work. On April 16, 2008, the director of nursing terminated Appellant for cause. On April 21, 2008, a physician certified that Appellant was temporarily and totally disabled from all employment beginning on the date of her injury. The Industrial Commission denied Appellant’s request for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, concluding that Appellant’s discharge from employment for violating written workplace rules had been a voluntary abandonment, making Appellant ineligible for benefits, and that the medical evidence did not support Appellant’s claim that she had been temporarily and totally disabled at the time of her termination. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion when it denied her request for TTD compensation. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant compensation for TTD. View "State ex rel. Robinson v. Indus. Comm'n " on Justia Law

Appellant was injured while working for Employer. Appellant’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for a dislocated left shoulder and a torn left rotator cuff, among other injuries. Appellant later requested compensation for the scheduled loss of use of his left upper extremity. The Industrial Commission denied Appellant’s request for benefits by relying on the report of Dr. D. Ann. Middaugh as evidence that Appellant had retained some use of his left arm. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Commission’s finding as an abuse of discretion. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluding that Dr. Middaugh’s report was some evidence upon which the Commission could rely to deny scheduled loss compensation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was entitled to an award for the scheduled loss of his left arm because (1) Dr. Middaugh’s findings were not consistent with her ultimate conclusion, and consequently, Dr. Middaugh’s report could not be some evidence supporting the Commission’s decision to deny an award for loss of use; and (2) the only other report submitted for consideration with Appellant’s loss-of-uses award stated that, for all practical purposes, Appellant had lost the function of his left arm. View "State ex rel. Wyrick v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio" on Justia Law

George Smith suffered an injury while working for Ohio State University. The Industrial Commission of Ohio allowed Smith’s claim for bilateral inguinal hernia. Tragically, Smith suffered brain damage resulting from postoperative complications from surgery to repair the hernia, leaving him in a persistent vegetative state. A doctor later concluded that Smith had bilateral vision and hearing loss caused by the loss of brain function. Smith sought additional scheduled awards for the loss of vision and hearing. However, no test could be performed to determine whether Smith suffered an actual loss of sight or hearing, and the medical evidence showed that Smith was unable to process sights and sounds because of damage to his brain, not because of any injury to his eyes or ears. The Industrial Commission denied Smith’s request for additional compensation based on the lack of any objective testing showing vision or hearing loss. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s denial of Smith’s claim, holding that the evidence supported a finding that Smith suffered from a loss of brain-stem function, a loss that has not been included in the schedule for compensation set forth in Ohio Rev. Code 4123.57. View "State ex rel. Smith v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellant sustained a work-related injury and collected temporary total disability (TTD) compensation on her claim for certain injuries. Appellant later filed an application to add a psychological condition to her claim, at the same time requesting TTD compensation as a result of the condition. A hearing officer approved the additional condition but denied TTD compensation. Appellant subsequently filed another request for TTD compensation. A staff hearing officer awarded TTD compensation. The full Industrial Commission granted reconsideration and denied Appellant’s request for compensation, concluding that Appellant had voluntarily abandoned the entire workforce, and thus the claimed period of disability was not caused by the allowed conditions. Appellant filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus, which the court of appeals denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellant’s lack of earnings was not due to her psychological condition and that her failure to seek other employment was evidence she had voluntarily abandoned the workforce. View "State ex rel. Roxbury v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law