Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant injured his back while working as a mechanic for Employer. Six days after the injury, Appellant returned to work with a note from his doctor restricting him to modified duty. Appellant quit his job that same day. Thereafter, Appellant applied for temporary-total-disability compensation. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation denied Appellant’s request on the ground that he had voluntarily quit his job and had not reentered the workforce. The Industrial Commission refused Appellant’s appeal. Appellant filed a complaint in the court of appeals seeking a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluded that Appellant was not fired but had voluntarily quit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellant voluntarily abandoned his position for reasons unrelated to his industrial injury and in denying Appellant’s request for temporary-total-disability compensation. View "State ex rel. Hildebrand v. Wingate Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

Martha Simpson, a doctor of osteopathic medicine, was employed in two state positions. In one position, Simpson and her employer contributed to the State Teachers Retirement System (STRS). In the other, Simpson and her employer contributed to the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS). Members of STRS who are also members in another state retirement system may combine their total contributions and service credits in determining eligibility for benefits. Under STRS statutes, a pension benefit is calculated by determining a final average salary, which is capped under certain conditions. Simpson filed an application for retirement benefits with STRS. STRS applied the cap to Simpson’s combined PERS and STRS salaries when calculating Simpson’s final average salary. As a result, Simpson’s pension benefit was decreased. After unsuccessfully pursuing an administrative appeal, Simpson filed this action in mandamus, requesting a writ ordering the State Teachers Retirement Board to recalculate her retirement benefit by not capping the PERS portion of her salary. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that because STRS administered the pension benefits for Simpson, STRS’s statutes must be applied to the entirety of Simpsons’s retirement contributions. View "State ex rel. Simpson v. State Teachers Ret. Bd." on Justia Law

In 2007, the Industrial Commission allowed the claim of Donna Evert, the surviving spouse of Charles Evert (the Decedent), for death benefits. Evert then filed a motion requesting an award for the Decent’s use of his arms and legs prior to his death. A staff hearing officer denied the motion. More than one year later, Evert filed a motion asking the Commission to exercise continuing jurisdiction to rehear the issue. A staff hearing officer denied the motion. Evert asked the Commission to reconsider its decision. After a hearing with two of the three commissioners attending, the Commission denied reconsideration by a vote of two-to-one. In 2011, Evert filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that she had been denied due process of law when the absent commissioner voted on the motion for reconsideration despite not attending the hearing. The Tenth District Court of Appeals issued a limited writ of mandamus vacating the Commission’s order and ordering a new hearing, concluding that the Tenth Circuit’s then-recent decision in State ex rel. Sigler v. Lubrizol Corp. was depositive. Because the Supreme Court subsequently reversed State ex rel. Sigler v. Lubrizol Corp., the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the court of appeals for additional consideration. View "State ex rel. Evert v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

In 2002, Ruth McCormick slipped and fell while working at a McDonald’s restaurant. McCormick received temporary total disability (TTD) compensation until 2010, when the Industrial Commission terminated McCormick’s benefits based on a doctor’s opinion that McCormick had reached maximum medical improvement. McCormick filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the Commission's decision to terminate benefits was not supported by the evidence, was contrary to law, and was an abuse of discretion because the doctor’s opinion that she had reached maximum medical improvement was factually inaccurate. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the doctor’s report that McCormick had reached maximum level improvement was valid evidence supporting the Commission’s decision to terminate TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. McCormick v. McDonald’s" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging statutory retaliatory-discharge and common-law wrongful-discharge against Hospice of Southwest Ohio, Inc. for firing her for reporting suspected abuse or neglect and against Brookdale Senior Living, Inc. for inducing Hospice to fire her. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims, concluding, as relevant to this appeal, Plaintiff's retaliatory-discharge claim under Ohio Rev. Code 3721.24 failed because Plaintiff did not report the suspected abuse or neglect to the Ohio director of health. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment to the extent it dismissed Plaintiff’s statutory retaliatory-discharge claim, holding that section 3721.24 does not require an employee or other person to report suspected abuse or neglect to the Ohio director of health in order to be protected from retaliation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an employee who reports suspected abuse or neglect of a long-term-care-facility or residential-care-facility resident is not required to report to the Ohio director of health in order to state a claim for retaliatory discharge under section 3721.24; and (2) in this case, Plaintiff’s reporting the suspected abuse or neglect to Brookdale and to the resident’s children triggered the protection of section 3721.24. View "Hulsmeyer v. Hospice of Southwest Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1983, the four fingers of Dennis Varney’s left hand were amputated in a work-related accident. Three fingers were completely reattached and the fourth finger was partially reattached, but the fingers did not regain their full function. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation awarded Varney compensation for the partial loss of use of his four fingers. In 1985 and 1990 two claims were allowed for one-third loss of use of Varney's index finger and for two-thirds loss of use of his other damaged fingers. In 2010, Varney filed a motion for a total loss of use of his index, ring, and little fingers. The Industrial Commission denied the motion. The Court of Appeals granted Varney’s request for a writ of mandamus, concluding that the Commission had applied the wrong legal standard for determining the loss of use of a finger. The Supreme Court reversed and denied the writ, holding that the Commission used the proper standard when examining the medical evidence as it related to the amount of function remaining in Varney’s three fingers and did not abuse its discretion in denying compensation for the total loss of use of those fingers. View "State ex rel. Varney v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Appellee was employed by the village of Cardington from 2000 to 2009. When he discovered that someone was discharging a hazardous chemical that was passing through the village’s wastewater treatment plant (WWTP), Appellee voiced his concerns about the WWTP to the village council. Ultimately, Appellee was instrumental in exposing an automotive-parts manufacturer’s criminal discharge of hazardous chemicals into the public water supply. However, a few months after Appellee reported the problems with the WWTP, the village terminated Appellee for reasons disputed by the parties. Appellee sued the village, claiming that he was fired in violation of Ohio’s whistleblower statute. The trial court granted summary judgment for the village. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Appellee engaged in whistleblowing under the whistleblower statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellee did not satisfy the procedural requirements of the whistleblower statute, and therefore, Appellee did not qualify for whistleblower protection. View "Lee v. Cardington" on Justia Law

WTS Acquisition Corporation purchased Ameritemps, Inc. and then transferred the assets to its wholly owned subsidiary, RFFG, LLC. RFFG continued operating the business under the Ameritemps name. The Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation notified RFFG that it had determined that RFFG was a successor employer for workers’ compensation purposes and that it intended to calculate RFFG’s workers’ compensation premium rate based on Ameritemps’ experience rating. RFFG filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Bureau had abused its discretion when it determined RFFG to be the successor in interest to Ameritemps. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not err in concluding that the decision of the Bureau was supported by the evidence and was not an abuse of discretion. View "State ex rel. RFFG, LLC v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Comp." on Justia Law

Relators, an employee of Precision Directional Boring, LLC and his wife, commenced an action in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court against Precision and Gary Cole, a coworker at Precision. Cole, a resident of Cuyahoga County, was the only party with a connection to that forum. The Cuyahoga County court granted Precision’s motion to transfer for improper venue and transferred the case to the Medina County Common Pleas Court. The case was subsequently transferred back to Cuyahoga County and then again to Medina County. Relators then filed a complaint in the court of appeals seeking writs of mandamus and procedendo to compel the Cuyahoga County court judge to vacate that court’s transfer orders and adjudicate the underlying action on the merits. The appellate court granted Relators’ motion, concluding that venue was proper in Cuyahoga County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cole’s status as a nominal party prevented Relators from establishing a clear legal right to the vacation of the transfer orders in Cuyahoga county or a clear legal duty by the Cuyahoga County court judge to perform that act, and an appeal would provide an adequate remedy. View "State ex rel. Yeaples v. Gall" on Justia Law

Appellee, a home health nurse who provided in-home health-care services to clients of Visiting Nurse Association of Mid-Ohio (VNA), was injured in a vehicle collision while she was traveling to the home of a patient. Appellee had decided to transport her children and two friends to a mall on her way to the patient’s home. The Industrial Commission allowed Appellee’s claim for a neck sprain. VNA appealed. The trial court granted summary judgment for VNA, concluding that Appellee was on a personal errand at the time she was injured. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the accident and injury arose out of and occurred in the course of Appellee’s employment. Specifically, the court determined that although Appellee had intended to drop her passengers off at the mall, she had the dual intent to travel to her patient’s home, and when she was injured, she had not yet diverted from that path. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the doctrine of dual intent or dual purpose is not recognized in Ohio for purposes of determining eligibility for workers’ compensation benefits. Remanded. View "Friebel v. Visiting Nurse Ass’n of Mid-Ohio" on Justia Law