Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was injured during the scope of his employment. In 2010, the Industrial Commission of Ohio found that Appellant had a six percent permanent partial disability and granted him compensation accordingly. In 2010, the Commission increased the award by four percent for a total of ten percent permanent partial disability. In 2011, the Commission again amended Appellant’s claim to include an additional condition and increased the award by an additional four percent. Appellant filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that the Commission’s order awarding only a four percent increase was not supported by the evidence. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in adopting a percentage of disability that fell within the range suggested by two doctors. View "State ex rel. Romero v. River City Drywall Supply, Inc." on Justia Law

Karen Baker, represented by an attorney with Schiavoni, Bush & Muldowney Co, L.P.A. (“the law firm”), filed an application for an increase in her permanent-partial-disability compensation. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation awarded a total amount of $24,649.50. The law firm subsequently filed a motion with the Bureau seeking payment of its attorney fees out of Baker’s permanent-partial-disability-compensation award. The matter was referred to the full Industrial Commission, which denied the law firm’s motion, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve a fee dispute between a claimant’s counsel and the Bureau and lacked jurisdiction to order the Bureau to pay the requested attorney fees. Baker then filed a complaint in mandamus against the Commission. The Court of Appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Baker and the law firm failed to demonstrate that they had a clear legal right to the relief requested or that the Bureau had a clear duty to pay the fees. View "State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

To establish entitlement to an award for violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), a claimant must show that there was a specific safety rule (SSR) applicable to the employer, that the employer violated that SSR, and that the violation proximately caused the claimant’s injury. Cathy Penwell was injured when her left had was crushed in a hydraulic press. Her workers’ compensation was allowed for various serious injuries. Penwell also applied for a VSSR award, alleging that her injuries were caused by her employer’s failure to provide adequate safety restraints under the applicable safety rule. The Industrial Commission, through its staff hearing officer (SHO), concluded that there was no evidence of a VSSR. Penwell subsequently filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals. The court of appeals agreed with the SHO’s determinations and denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying a VSSR award, and the court of appeals did not reweigh the evidence or otherwise improperly review the case. View "State ex rel. Penwell v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Appellee injured both thumbs in an industrial accident. Following a period of temporary total disability, Appellee returned to light-duty work and, later, to his former position of employment with no medical restrictions. Later that year, Appellee was terminated for violating work rules. Appellee’s physician subsequently placed Appellee on restricted duty, and Appellee applied for an additional period of temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation. The Industrial Commission awarded Appellee TTD compensation, concluding that Appellee had not voluntarily abandoned his employment and that he remained temporarily and totally disabled. Appellee’s former employer filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Commission abused its discretion in ordering payment of TTD compensation. The Court of Appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was evidence in the record that supported the Commission’s finding that Appellee was entitled to TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Viking Forge Corp. v. Perry" on Justia Law

Appellee, the former chief of the Westlake Fire Department, was suspended for thirty days without pay and demoted from the position of fire chief for violating Ohio Rev. Code 124.34(A). The trial court modified the penalty imposed by the Westlake Civil Service Commission by reversing Appellee’s demotion to the position of firefighter and ordering that Appellee be reinstated to the rank of captain. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a trial court, as part of its de novo review of a civil service commission’s decision pursuant to section 124.34(C), has the authority to modify the disciplinary measures imposed by the commission; and (2) the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion by reducing the punishment imposed by the commission. View "Westlake Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Pietrick" on Justia Law

Employee filed a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission contending that her employment by Employer had been terminated because she became pregnant. The Commission found that Employer had participated in a discriminatory practice in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4112. Employer filed a petition for judicial review pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4112.06. The common pleas court granted the Commission’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the petition for review was not timely served on the parties because Employer failed to properly initiate service by the clerk within thirty days of the date the Commission’s order was filed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Employer had one year to obtain service of a petition to review an order of the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings initiated pursuant to section 4112.06; and (2) therefore, a petition to review an order of the Commission must be served by a clerk of courts on all parties who appeared before the Commission and on the Commission itself within one year of the date the petition was filed as required by Ohio R. Civ. P. 3(A). View "Hambuechen v. 221 Market North, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant injured his back while working as a mechanic for Employer. Six days after the injury, Appellant returned to work with a note from his doctor restricting him to modified duty. Appellant quit his job that same day. Thereafter, Appellant applied for temporary-total-disability compensation. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation denied Appellant’s request on the ground that he had voluntarily quit his job and had not reentered the workforce. The Industrial Commission refused Appellant’s appeal. Appellant filed a complaint in the court of appeals seeking a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ, concluded that Appellant was not fired but had voluntarily quit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Appellant voluntarily abandoned his position for reasons unrelated to his industrial injury and in denying Appellant’s request for temporary-total-disability compensation. View "State ex rel. Hildebrand v. Wingate Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

Martha Simpson, a doctor of osteopathic medicine, was employed in two state positions. In one position, Simpson and her employer contributed to the State Teachers Retirement System (STRS). In the other, Simpson and her employer contributed to the Public Employees Retirement System (PERS). Members of STRS who are also members in another state retirement system may combine their total contributions and service credits in determining eligibility for benefits. Under STRS statutes, a pension benefit is calculated by determining a final average salary, which is capped under certain conditions. Simpson filed an application for retirement benefits with STRS. STRS applied the cap to Simpson’s combined PERS and STRS salaries when calculating Simpson’s final average salary. As a result, Simpson’s pension benefit was decreased. After unsuccessfully pursuing an administrative appeal, Simpson filed this action in mandamus, requesting a writ ordering the State Teachers Retirement Board to recalculate her retirement benefit by not capping the PERS portion of her salary. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that because STRS administered the pension benefits for Simpson, STRS’s statutes must be applied to the entirety of Simpsons’s retirement contributions. View "State ex rel. Simpson v. State Teachers Ret. Bd." on Justia Law

In 2007, the Industrial Commission allowed the claim of Donna Evert, the surviving spouse of Charles Evert (the Decedent), for death benefits. Evert then filed a motion requesting an award for the Decent’s use of his arms and legs prior to his death. A staff hearing officer denied the motion. More than one year later, Evert filed a motion asking the Commission to exercise continuing jurisdiction to rehear the issue. A staff hearing officer denied the motion. Evert asked the Commission to reconsider its decision. After a hearing with two of the three commissioners attending, the Commission denied reconsideration by a vote of two-to-one. In 2011, Evert filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that she had been denied due process of law when the absent commissioner voted on the motion for reconsideration despite not attending the hearing. The Tenth District Court of Appeals issued a limited writ of mandamus vacating the Commission’s order and ordering a new hearing, concluding that the Tenth Circuit’s then-recent decision in State ex rel. Sigler v. Lubrizol Corp. was depositive. Because the Supreme Court subsequently reversed State ex rel. Sigler v. Lubrizol Corp., the Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the court of appeals for additional consideration. View "State ex rel. Evert v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

In 2002, Ruth McCormick slipped and fell while working at a McDonald’s restaurant. McCormick received temporary total disability (TTD) compensation until 2010, when the Industrial Commission terminated McCormick’s benefits based on a doctor’s opinion that McCormick had reached maximum medical improvement. McCormick filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, alleging that the Commission's decision to terminate benefits was not supported by the evidence, was contrary to law, and was an abuse of discretion because the doctor’s opinion that she had reached maximum medical improvement was factually inaccurate. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the doctor’s report that McCormick had reached maximum level improvement was valid evidence supporting the Commission’s decision to terminate TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. McCormick v. McDonald’s" on Justia Law