Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Claimant was injured when he fell while trying to cut a tree branch. Claimant filed an application for workers’ compensation benefits alleging that the injury had occurred while he was an employee of Appellee. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation allowed the claim. Appellee purportedly appealed from the order of the Bureau, claiming that Claimant was not his employee at the time of the accident. The Commission concluded that Appellee’s appeal substantially complied with the statutory requirements for an administrative notice of appeal, accepted the appeal as valid, and referred the matter to a district hearing officer. A hearing officer disallowed the claim on the merits, concluding that Claimant was not an employee of Appellee. The Commission affirmed. Claimant filed a complaint for writ of mandamus alleging that the Commission abused its discretion in determining that Appellee’s administrative appeal was valid. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Claimant had an adequate remedy at law by way of an appeal under Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512 regarding the issues he raised in this case, he was not entitled to relief in mandamus. View "State ex rel. Alhamarshah v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Claimant was injured at work and later applied for permanent-total-disability benefits. The Industrial Commission denied the application. Claimant later filed a second application supported a letter from his treating physician, Dr. Karl Metz. The Commission also submitted a report from Dr. Steven Van Auken. A staff hearing officer denied permanent total disability based on the two reports. Claimant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Commission abused its discretion because it failed to consider additional restrictions placed on him in the two reports. A magistrate concluded that the Commission did not abuse its discretion by relying on the reports of Drs. Metz and Van Auken. The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s conclusions of law regarding Van Auken’s opinion but issued a limited writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to clarify Dr. Metz’s opinion or to obtain additional medical evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals abused its discretion in granting the limited writ because its decision was based on speculation that there was a possible conflict in Dr. Metz’s report that could be construed to bar sedentary employment, which did not, by itself, justify the issuance of a limited writ. View "State ex rel. Metz v. GTC, Inc." on Justia Law

Sophia Stevens slipped and fell at work in 1979. Thirty years later, Stevens filed a motion for permanent-total-disability compensation. Through a staff hearing officer, the Industrial Commission initially granted benefits, but the full Commission later reconsidered the staff hearing officer’s order and denied Stevens’s request. Stevens filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Commission abused its discretion when it exercised continuing jurisdiction and denied compensation. The court of appeals (1) concluded that Stevens had not met her burden of proof for mandamus relief on the question of continuing jurisdiction, but (2) determined that Stevens was deprived of due process when one of the three voting commissioners did not attend the hearing. Thus the court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to conduct another hearing with all three commissioners present. The Supreme Court reversed and denied the writ, holding (1) Stevens I properly focused on Stevens’s burden of proof for mandamus relief; (2) this Court’s decision in State ex rel. Sigler v. Lubrizol Corp. requires reversal of the judgment in Stevens II; and (3) the Commission’s order denying permanent-total-disability benefits is supported by the evidence. View "State ex rel. Stevens v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Appellee filed a workers’ compensation claim from a work-related injury that occurred in 2007 while he was employed as a bricklayer for Appellant. Appellee had three other workers’ compensation claims from work-related injuries that occurred in 1992 and 2005. His claim was allowed. Appellee later applied for permanent-total-disability compensation. Appellee’s treating physician and a psychologist opined that Appellee was incapable of working due to his psychological condition caused by the 2007 injury. A staff hearing officer with the Industrial Commission granted Appellee’s application and ordered permanent total disability compensation. The hearing officer apportioned the cost of the award entirely to the 2007 claim. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ, holding that Commission did not err by allocating the entire award to the 2007 claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it attributed the entire award to the 2007 claim. View "State ex rel. Turner Constr. Co. v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Appellant was injured during the scope of his employment. In 2010, the Industrial Commission of Ohio found that Appellant had a six percent permanent partial disability and granted him compensation accordingly. In 2010, the Commission increased the award by four percent for a total of ten percent permanent partial disability. In 2011, the Commission again amended Appellant’s claim to include an additional condition and increased the award by an additional four percent. Appellant filed a complaint in mandamus alleging that the Commission’s order awarding only a four percent increase was not supported by the evidence. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in adopting a percentage of disability that fell within the range suggested by two doctors. View "State ex rel. Romero v. River City Drywall Supply, Inc." on Justia Law

Karen Baker, represented by an attorney with Schiavoni, Bush & Muldowney Co, L.P.A. (“the law firm”), filed an application for an increase in her permanent-partial-disability compensation. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation awarded a total amount of $24,649.50. The law firm subsequently filed a motion with the Bureau seeking payment of its attorney fees out of Baker’s permanent-partial-disability-compensation award. The matter was referred to the full Industrial Commission, which denied the law firm’s motion, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to resolve a fee dispute between a claimant’s counsel and the Bureau and lacked jurisdiction to order the Bureau to pay the requested attorney fees. Baker then filed a complaint in mandamus against the Commission. The Court of Appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Baker and the law firm failed to demonstrate that they had a clear legal right to the relief requested or that the Bureau had a clear duty to pay the fees. View "State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

To establish entitlement to an award for violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), a claimant must show that there was a specific safety rule (SSR) applicable to the employer, that the employer violated that SSR, and that the violation proximately caused the claimant’s injury. Cathy Penwell was injured when her left had was crushed in a hydraulic press. Her workers’ compensation was allowed for various serious injuries. Penwell also applied for a VSSR award, alleging that her injuries were caused by her employer’s failure to provide adequate safety restraints under the applicable safety rule. The Industrial Commission, through its staff hearing officer (SHO), concluded that there was no evidence of a VSSR. Penwell subsequently filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals. The court of appeals agreed with the SHO’s determinations and denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying a VSSR award, and the court of appeals did not reweigh the evidence or otherwise improperly review the case. View "State ex rel. Penwell v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Appellee injured both thumbs in an industrial accident. Following a period of temporary total disability, Appellee returned to light-duty work and, later, to his former position of employment with no medical restrictions. Later that year, Appellee was terminated for violating work rules. Appellee’s physician subsequently placed Appellee on restricted duty, and Appellee applied for an additional period of temporary-total-disability (TTD) compensation. The Industrial Commission awarded Appellee TTD compensation, concluding that Appellee had not voluntarily abandoned his employment and that he remained temporarily and totally disabled. Appellee’s former employer filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Commission abused its discretion in ordering payment of TTD compensation. The Court of Appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was evidence in the record that supported the Commission’s finding that Appellee was entitled to TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Viking Forge Corp. v. Perry" on Justia Law

Appellee, the former chief of the Westlake Fire Department, was suspended for thirty days without pay and demoted from the position of fire chief for violating Ohio Rev. Code 124.34(A). The trial court modified the penalty imposed by the Westlake Civil Service Commission by reversing Appellee’s demotion to the position of firefighter and ordering that Appellee be reinstated to the rank of captain. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a trial court, as part of its de novo review of a civil service commission’s decision pursuant to section 124.34(C), has the authority to modify the disciplinary measures imposed by the commission; and (2) the trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion by reducing the punishment imposed by the commission. View "Westlake Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Pietrick" on Justia Law

Employee filed a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission contending that her employment by Employer had been terminated because she became pregnant. The Commission found that Employer had participated in a discriminatory practice in violation of Ohio Rev. Code 4112. Employer filed a petition for judicial review pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4112.06. The common pleas court granted the Commission’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the petition for review was not timely served on the parties because Employer failed to properly initiate service by the clerk within thirty days of the date the Commission’s order was filed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Employer had one year to obtain service of a petition to review an order of the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Rules of Civil Procedure apply to proceedings initiated pursuant to section 4112.06; and (2) therefore, a petition to review an order of the Commission must be served by a clerk of courts on all parties who appeared before the Commission and on the Commission itself within one year of the date the petition was filed as required by Ohio R. Civ. P. 3(A). View "Hambuechen v. 221 Market North, Inc." on Justia Law