Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1994, Appellant was injured in the course and scope of his employment. In 2010, during the course and scope of his employment for a new employer, Appellant was injured. In 2012, Appellant requested temporary-total-disability compensation for the period beginning December 8, 2011. The Industrial Commission denied compensation, concluding that Appellant had not presented persuasive medical evidence establishing that Appellant’s 1994 industrial injury rendered him temporarily and totally disabled as of December 8, 2011. Appellant filed a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus that would require the Commission to vacate its order denying compensation and to award temporary-total-disability benefits beginning December 8, 2011. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s request for compensation for the period beginning December 8, 2011. View "State ex rel. Ritzie v. Reece-Campbell, Inc." on Justia Law

Employee was injured during the course of his employment with Precision Steel Services, Inc. Employee received compensation for his medical expenses and lost wages. Two years after the accident, Employee applied for an additional award for violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR). The Industrial Commission granted a VSSR award to Employee, determining that Precision Steel violated the safety regulations in Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-5-14(G)(1) and 4123:1-5-15(B) and that those violations proximately caused Employee’s injury. Precision Steel then filed this mandamus action. The court of appeals issued a limited writ, concluding that Precision Steel violated Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-5-15(B) and ordering that the Commission readjudicate Employee’s claim based on Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-5-14(G)(1). The Supreme Court reversed and granted a writ of mandamus requiring the Commission to vacate its order and to issue a new order denying Employee’s application for an additional award for VSSR, holding (1) neither Ohio Adm. Code 4123:1-5-14(G) nor 4123:1-5-15(B) establishes a specific safety requirement in the context of this case; and (2) therefore, the Commission’s decision that Precision Steel violated the rules was an abuse of discretion. View "State ex rel. Precision Steel Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Employee, an ironworker, was injured in a fall while working for Employer, a subcontractor on a bridge project. Employee’s workers’ compensation claim was allowed for multiple injuries sustained in the fall. Two years after the incident, Employee applied for an additional award for Employer’s violation of a specific safety requirement (VSSR), alleging that his fall was caused by Employer’s violation of numerous specific safety regulations. A staff hearing officer with the Industrial Commission granted a VSSR award. Employer filed a complaint and an amended complaint in mandamus, seeking a writ that would compel the Commission to vacate its order and to refund all additional compensation that had been paid by Employer as a result the VSSR award. Employer asserted that the Commission abused its discretion by finding that Employer violated a specific safety requirement because Employee’s injuries were the result of his failure to wear the appropriate personal protective equipment. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion when it issued a VSSR award, and therefore, the court of appeals properly denied Employee’s request for a writ of mandamus. View "State ex rel. Armstrong Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

After a pretermination hearing, the Lockland School District Board of Education terminated Appellant’s contract of employment. Appellant appealed, arguing that Lockland had violated the Open Meetings Act by failing to hold the pretermination hearing in public. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Lockland. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a public employee can require that a hearing about his employment status be held in public under Ohio Rev. Code 121.22(G)(1) only when he is otherwise entitled to a public hearing; and (2) Appellant in this case was not otherwise entitled to a public hearing. View "Stewart v. Lockland Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

In 2011, Appellee submitted a disability-retirement application to the Ohio Public Employees Retirement System and its board of trustees (together, “the Board”). The Board rejected Appellee’s claim for benefits. The Board also rejected Appellee’s appeal, finding that she was not permanently disabled. Appellee then filed suit for a writ of mandamus. The Court of Appeals granted the writ and ordered the Board to award benefits. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion by independently reevaluating the medical evidence and substituting its judgment regarding weight and credibility for that of the Board. View "State ex rel. Woodman v. Ohio Pub. Employees Ret. Sys." on Justia Law

Appellant was injured in the course and scope of his employment with the City of Columbus, Division of Fire. The Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund granted Appellant’s application for a partial-disability retirement. Appellant subsequently accepted a position as a deer herd manager with Crosswoods Whitetails, LLC. Appellant applied to the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation for wage-loss compensation to partially compensate him for the difference between his average weekly wage as a firefighter and his lower earnings from Crosswoods. A hearing officer with the Industrial Commission denied Appellant’s application. Appellant filed this action in the court of appeals seeking a writ of mandamus. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence demonstrated that Appellant failed to make “consistent, sincere, and best attempts to obtain suitable employment” that would eliminate the wage loss, and therefore, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s request for wage-loss compensation. View "State ex rel. Oldaker v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

In 2003, Appellee was injured while working for Appellant. In 2011, Appellee applied for permanent-total-disability compensation and submitted a report from his treating physician, Dr. Oscar DePaz. A hearing officer relied in part on the report of Dr. DePaz as support for the decision to award Appellee permanent-total-disability compensation. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that the Industrial Commission had abused its discretion when it ordered compensation to begin on the date of Dr. DePaz’s report and claiming that Dr. DePaz’s report did not find that Appellee’s disability was solely the result of his medical impairment. The court of appeals denied Appellant’s request for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion by (1) relying on the date of the DePaz report as the date on which to begin paying the award; and (2) determining that, based on the entire report, the DePaz opinion was evidence of permanent total disability based on the medical factors alone, thereby eliminating the need for further consideration of the nonmedical disability factors. View "State ex rel. Tradesmen Int’l v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

The State Teachers Retirement Board (STRB) denied the application of Jason Menz, an elementary school principal, for disability-retirement benefits on the grounds that Menz did not meet the criteria for permanent disability. Menz subsequently filed an action in mandamus in the court of appeals. The court of appeals granted a writ, concluding that STRB had abused its discretion in denying Menz disability benefits because both the treating physician and the independent physician had acknowledged that Menz had a condition that would prevent his return to work for at least one year. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Menz met the statutory criterion for an award of disability-retirement benefits under the relevant statute. View "State ex rel. Menz v. State Teachers Ret. Bd." on Justia Law

Appellant was injured in 2003 while working for Appellee. In 2010, Appellant applied for permanent total disability compensation. Kiva Shtull, M.D. examined Appellant on behalf of the employer and concluded that Appellant was capable of full-time employment. Craig Johnson, Ph.D., performed a vocational assessment and concluded that Appellant was capable of sedentary physical activity. A staff hearing officer denied Appellant’s application, determining that Appellant was vocationally capable of returning to work or going into a rehabilitation program. Appellant filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the staff hearing officer abused his discretion by relying on the reports of Shtull and Johnson. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was evidence in the record to support the Commission’s denial of permanent-total-disability compensation. View "State ex rel. Lacroix v. Indus. Comm’n" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation conducted an adult of WFAL Construction and determined that WFAL owned back premiums as an “employer” subject to the Workers’ Compensation Act because those working for WFAL in 2009 were employees, not independent contractors as WFAL claimed. WFAL protested the audit findings. An adjudicating committee of the Bureau denied the protest, and the administrator’s designee affirmed. WFAL then filed this action for mandamus relief. The court of appeals concluded that the Bureau appropriately found that WFAL met the statutory criteria to support its decision that WFAL’s workers were employees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that WFAL failed to demonstrate that the Bureau’s decision was an abuse of discretion. View "State ex rel. WFAL Constr. v. Buehrer" on Justia Law