Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

J.T., a juvenile, was charged with carrying a concealed deadly weapon for carrying a broken pistol in his waistband that was no longer capable of firing a round. J.T. was found delinquent. The Supreme Court vacated the finding of delinquency, holding (1) an inoperable pistol that is not used as a bludgeoning implement is not a “deadly weapon” for purposes of Ohio Rev. Code 2923.12, which prohibits carrying a concealed weapon; and (2) therefore, there was insufficient evidence in this case to support J.T.’s finding of delinquency for carrying a concealed weapon. View "In re J.T." on Justia Law

In 1992, while he was still a minor, Appellant was adjudicated delinquent for committing the equivalent of an operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OVI) offense. Appellant was not represented by counsel during the adjudication. In 2011, Appellant was convicted of OVI offenses that became felonies under the enhancing provision of Ohio Rev. Code 4511.19(G)(1)(d). The State added Appellant’s juvenile OVI adjudication to his four prior adult convictions to reach the “five or more” offenses threshold required to enhance his sentence under section 4511.19(G)(1)(d). Appellant moved to suppress the evidence of his juvenile adjudication, arguing that the adjudication violated his constitutional right to counsel. The trial court overruled the motion to suppress. Appellant was subsequently convicted of two counts and used Appellant’s 1992 juvenile adjudication as an OVI enhancement tool. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for resentencing, holding that an adjudication of delinquency may not be used to enhance the penalty for a later offense under section 4511.19(G)(1)(d) when the adjudication carried the possibility of confinement, the adjudication was uncounseled, and there was no effective waiver of the right to counsel. View "State v. Bode" on Justia Law

In December 2012, a reporter for the Cincinnati Enquirer requested the court docket showing the cases Hamilton County Juvenile Court Judge Tracie Hunter had presided over during December. The juvenile court administrator sent to the Enquirer the requested documents, but the documents were redacted to provide only the initials of the juveniles. The Enquirer filed this action in mandamus seeking a writ ordering Judge Hunter to reveal the names of the juveniles. The First District Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Enquirer and ordered Judge Hunter to produce unredacted copies of her docket. In January 2014, the Supreme Court disqualified Judge Hunter from acting as a judge. The Court then dismissed this appeal, as a live controversy no longer existed here because Judge Hunter no longer had power to provide access to the requested records. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hunter" on Justia Law

The question presented in this case was when a juvenile court can conduct an Ohio Rev. Code 2152.83(B)(2) hearing regarding the appropriateness of juvenile-offender-registrant classification for a juvenile adjudged delinquent. Specifically, at issue was whether a juvenile court can conduct a classification hearing at the time of disposition in a case in which a juvenile is committed to a secure facility or whether the court must wait to conduct the hearing until the juvenile is released from the secure facility. The juvenile court in the instant case committed a juvenile to the Department of Youth Services during a disposition hearing and then, at the same hearing, classified the juvenile as a Tier III sex offender/child-victim offender. The juvenile appealed his classification, arguing that it violated section 2152.83(B)(1). The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that if a court commits a child to a secure facility, section 2152.83(B)(1) permits the court to conduct a classification hearing at the time of disposition. View "In re I.A." on Justia Law

The question presented to the Supreme Court here was what evidence a juvenile is entitled to in discovery prior to a bindover hearing. In this case, the State filed a motion asking the juvenile court to relinquish jurisdiction and to have the Juvenile bound over to the general division of the court of common pleas for prosecution as an adult. Because the State failed to obey a court order during discovery to turn over police reports relating to the juvenile’s case, the juvenile court dismissed the case without prejudice. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Juv. R. 24 applies in bindover hearings, which imposes a duty on the prosecuting attorney to disclose to a juvenile respondent all evidence in the State’s possession that is favorable to the juvenile and material either to guilt, innocence, or punishment; and (2) it is an abuse of discretion for a juvenile court to dismiss a case for a prosecuting attorney’s failure to comply with a discovery order without first performing an in camera inspection of the withheld evidence to determine whether the evidence is discoverable under Juv. R. 24. Remanded. View "In re D.M." on Justia Law

In 2010, the juvenile court found H.V. to be delinquent and committed him to a minimum six-month term commitment to the Ohio Department of Youth Services (ODYS). H.V. was subsequently placed on supervised release. Thereafter, H.V. was charged with second-degree felonious assault and with violating the terms of his supervised release. The juvenile court judge revoked H.V.’s supervised release and committed him to a minimum ninety-day commitment to the ODYS. Five days later, the judge found H.V. to be delinquent and committed him to the ODYS for a minimum one year commitment. The court ordered that the ninety-day term imposed for the violation of supervised release would run consecutively to the one-year term imposed for the felonious assault. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a juvenile court has the authority to commit a delinquent juvenile to the ODYS for a minimum period in excess of thirty days for violating his supervised release; and (2) in committing a juvenile to the ODYS for a supervised-release violation, a juvenile court can order that the commitment period be served consecutively to the commitment period imposed for that crime that resulted in the violation of supervised release. View "In re H.V." on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with several offenses stemming from two separate shootings. Appellant was age seventeen when the offenses were committed. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to consecutive terms of life imprisonment without parole. On appeal, Appellant contended that his sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s sentence was proper under Miller v. Alabama because the sentence imposed in this case was not mandatory but, rather, an exercise of the trial court’s discretion; and (2) the trial court did not violate the Eighth Amendment by failing to consider Appellant’s youth as a mitigating factor in sentencing Appellant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Eighth Amendment requires trial courts to consider youth as a mitigating factor when sentencing a child to life without parole for homicide, and the record must reflect that the court specifically considered the juvenile offender’s youth as a mitigating factor at sentencing when a prison term of life without parole is imposed; and (2) because Appellant might not have been given the benefit of the consideration of youth as a mitigating factor, his sentence did not comport with the procedural strictures of Miller. View "State v. Long" on Justia Law

Judge Tracie Hunter of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas presided over the twelve cases against six juvenile defendants underlying this appeal. Judge Hunter issued entries revoking the Cincinnati Enquirer's permission to broadcast, televise, photograph, or record courtroom proceedings. The appellate court granted the Enquirer an alternative writ of prohibition ordering Judge Hunter to stay the enforcement of the documents revoking the Enquirer's permission to broadcast, televise, photograph, or record the courtroom proceedings. Judge Hunter subsequently allowed the Enquirer's reporters into the courtroom but did so subject to certain express conditions, including the condition that the Enquirer not publish the juveniles' names. The Enquirer filed a motion for contempt, arguing that Judge Hunter violated the appellate court's order by making the Enquirer's access to the courtroom subject to conditions. The court of appeals granted the Enquirer's contempt motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in granting the contempt motion for Judge Hunter's noncompliance with the appellate court's alternative writ. View "State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hunter" on Justia Law

The State filed seven complaints against Appellee, a juvenile, alleging that he was delinquent for engaging in conduct that, if he had been an adult, would have constituted rape and gross sexual imposition. During pretrial proceedings, the State sought to introduce statements that two of the alleged victims made to a social worker with the police department. A magistrate concluded that the State was precluded from introducing at trial the out-of-court statements. The State did not move to set aside the magistrate's decision as was its right under the juvenile rules of procedure and failed to perfect an interlocutory appeal pursuant to the juvenile rules of procedure. The case proceeded to trial, where the court dismissed all counts after declining to allow out-of-court statements into evidence. The State appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State is not authorized to pursue a discretionary appeal when it fails to take an appeal as of right in accordance with the applicable rules of procedure. View "In re M.M." on Justia Law

Ohio Rev. Code 2152.83(A)(1) requires that a juvenile court issue on order classifying the child as a juvenile-offender registrant at the time of the child's release from the custody of a secure facility. When he was eighteen years old, Appellant, a native of Haiti, was adjudicated to be a delinquent child and ordered to be committed to the Ohio Department of Youth Services (DYS). After Appellant was released from DYS, he was held in jail until hearings could be conducted to determine his citizenship. When Appellant was released from jail and after he turned twenty-one, he filed a complaint for a writ of prohibition to prevent the juvenile court from proceeding to classify him as a juvenile-offender registrant. Appellant claimed the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to proceed because he was over twenty-one years old and because the court failed to hold a classification hearing within a reasonable time of his release from DYS. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that he juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to classify Appellant, who was no longer a "child" under the applicable statute. View "State ex rel. Jean-Baptiste v. Kirsch" on Justia Law