Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee Timothy Rhodes mailed a public records request to the police department of the city of New Philadelphia requesting certain reel-to-reel tape recordings made by the police dispatch department. The department, however, had disposed of the recordings. Rhodes filed a complaint for civil forfeiture under Ohio Rev. Code 149.351(B) after finding that the police department had unlawfully erased the records without the requisite approval. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court determined there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Rhodes was actually aggrieved by the violations. At trial, the jury found that Rhodes had not been aggrieved by the unauthorized disposition of the requested public records. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court should have granted the portion of Rhodes's motion for summary judgment claiming he was an aggrieved party. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, holding that a party is not aggrieved by the destruction of a record when the party's objective in requesting the record is not to obtain the record but to seek a forfeiture for the wrongful destruction of the record. View "Rhodes v. New Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Gulf Underwriters Insurance issued a general liability policy to United Foundries with an endorsement for employer's liability coverage, known as a stop-gap endorsement. David Ward filed a complaint against his employer, United, alleging claims for employer intentional tort and seeking damages. While the case was pending, United filed an action against Gulf for a declaration that Gulf had a duty to defend and indemnify United for the claims asserted by Ward. The trial court granted summary judgment to United. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding (1) an exclusion in a stop-gap endorsement stating that the insurance does not apply to bodily injury resulting from an act that is determined to have been committed by an insured with the belief that an injury is substantially certain to occur does not require a final determination by either a judge or jury before the insurer can refuse to defend a claim alleging a substantial-certainty employer intentional tort: and (2) that the claims stated in the underlying complaint were neither potentially nor arguably covered under the terms of the policy, and thus, Gulf had no duty under the policy to defend United. View "Ward v. United Foundries, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Juan Lackey, who drove trucks for Penske Truck Leasing Company, injured his knee at work. After surgery was performed, Lackey returned to work and filed retirement papers with Penske. Nothing in his retirement documents indicted that Lackey's retirement was connected to the industrial injury. Following his retirement, Lackey requested temporary total disability compensation (TTC). A district hearing officer for Lackey, the state industrial commission, denied the request, finding Lackey had voluntarily retired for reasons unrelated to his injury and Lackey's retirement constituted a voluntary abandonment of the entire labor market. On appeal, a staff hearing officer affirmed. Lackey appealed to the commission, and the commission denied the appeal. The court of appeals denied Lackey's mandamus action after finding the commission's findings were supported by evidence. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the commission did not abuse its discretion in finding that Lackey's retirement was unrelated to his injury, and, accordingly, Lackey could receive postretirement TTC only if he were gainfully employed elsewhere and prevented from doing that job by his industrial injury. View "State ex rel. Lackey v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellant Luiz Paneto injured his left foot and ankle at work. After surgery, Paneto still used a cane to walk and had a limp. Paneto moved appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio for scheduled loss compensation, alleging a total loss of use of his left leg. The commission denied the application after finding Paneto's loss of use was not total. After being awarded permanent total disability (PTD) compensation, Paneto reapplied for total-loss-of-use compensation, alleging his PTD award was a new or changed circumstance that warranted reconsideration of the previous denial. The commission disagreed and further appeal was refused. The court of appeals upheld the commission's order. After Paneto filed his notice of appeal the commission terminated Paneto's PTD compensation after learning Paneto concealed his full-time employment. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, finding (1) because the PTD compensation was terminated, it is not a new or changed circumstance sufficient to permit the commission to reopen the issue of scheduled loss benefits; and (2) the evidence supports the commission's determination that Paneto did not have a total loss of use, which negates the need for any further discussion.

Appellant Fairfield City Schools (Fairfield) sought reimbursement for a total disability compensation award given to one of its employees. Edward Carpenter, Jr. had hypertension since 1995. In 2002, he injured his back while at work. Mr. Carpenterâs injury resulted in a considerable amount of disability compensation. In 2008, Fairfield requested handicap reimbursement from the Ohio Bureau of Workersâ Compensation for at least part of the disability payments it made to Mr. Carpenter. Fairfieldâs application alleged that Mr. Carpenterâs pre-existing hypertension is a cardiac disease that delayed his recovery from back surgery, contributing to prolonged disability payments. The Bureau rejected Fairfieldâs application as âinsufficient to establish cardiac disease as a pre-existing condition.â Fairfield appealed the Bureauâs decision multiple times. With every appeal, Fairfield added additional doctorâs reports and Bureau datasheets to support its argument that hypertension is a cardiac disease. The court of appeals eventually denied Fairfieldâs appeal and application for a writ of mandamus. The appellate court found that the Bureau had exclusive authority to weigh the evidence Fairfield submitted, and the Bureau could find Fairfieldâs evidence insufficient to prove hypertension was a cardiac disease. Fairfield appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court agreed with the Bureauâs and appellate courtâs decisions. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs judgment.

Appellee John Reinhold is an appraiser. He performed appraisals on three properties in 2001 and 2002 that served as collateral for three separate mortgage loans made by Airline Unionâs Mortgage Company (AUM). Appellee completed the last of these appraisals on June 12, 2002. In these various transactions, Appellant Flagstar Bank received and reviewed Appelleeâs appraisals and accordingly purchased the mortgage loans from AUM. These properties were later subjected to foreclosure actions leaving deficiencies on the loans. Flagstar filed a complaint against AUM and Appellee. In the complaint, Flagstar alleged that the three appraisals were materially inaccurate and that the actual fair market value of each of these properties was significantly lower than the appraised values. Appellee denied any professional negligence and filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. Flagstar appealed this decision. The appellate court affirmed the trial courtâs judgment. The Supreme Court found that the record supported the lower courtsâ decisions to grant Appellee summary judgment. The Court disagreed with Flagstar that the state âdelayed damagesâ rule applied in this case, and used the âdiscovery rule.â The Court affirmed the appellate courtâs decision.

Appellee Loudin appeals judgment from the lower court that found that her medical-malpractice claim could survive summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirms the appellate court's holding, and remands the case to the trial court to decide an award of damages for infliction of emotional distress. Appellant received regular breast cancer screenings from Appellant Radiology & Imaging Services, and had always received normal prognoses. During self-examination, Appellee detected a lump that was found to be cancerous. Experts testified the lump grew from one to two centimeters between 2003 and 2004, the years when Appellee received "normal" mammograms. Appellee commenced suit against Appellant asserting medical negligence claims; appellant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Appellants characterized the complaint as one solely for infliction of emotional distress, and that Appellee had not established a medical malpractice claim. Because both parties' arguments relied on facts outside the pleadings, the trial court converted the appellant's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, and granted appellant's motion against all claims for relief in the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding the metastasis of cancer is a compensible physical injury and that the medical negligence claim should have survived summary judgment. The Supreme Court granted this discretionary appeal, and affirmed the appellate court's judgment.

In this appeal, the Supreme Court interpreted an exclusion in a homeowner's insurance policy that denied coverage for claims "arising out of" premises that are owned by the insured, but are not an insured location under the policy. Appellee Westfield Insurance provided Appellants Michael and Marilyn Hunter's insurance on their Ohio home; the Hunters hold an additional policy for any personal liability that arises from bodily injury or property damages. The Hunters also own a farm in Indiana that is not a named insured location under the Westfield policy. The Hunters purchased liability insurance for the Indiana property from co-appellant Grinell Mutual Reinsurance Company. Children playing on the Indiana property suffered bodily injuries on the property, and brought suit against the Hunters for negligence. The Hunters applied to Westfield seeking indemnification under their personal liability policy. Westfield brought a declaratory judgment action against the Hunters and Grinell seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the Hunters for claims asserted in the Indiana lawsuit. At trial, the court reasoned that the claims raised by the injured children "arose out of" premises that were not insured by Westfield, therefore Westfield had no duty to indemnify the Hunters for personal liability claims. Grinnell appealed to the Supreme Court for discretionary review, and secured an order from the appellate court certifying that its decision in this case was in conflict with that of another state appellate court. On review of the lower courts' holdings, the Supreme Court found that the Westfield policy does exclude coverage for claims arising from the Indiana property, or any claims based solely on the insured's ownership of the property on which the injury occurred.