Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Frank Bilaver left his job with Fluid Line Products after Fluid Line denied him an extended leave of absence. Bilaver later applied for temporary total disability (TTD) compensation, which the Industrial Commission of Ohio denied after finding that Bilaver's decision to leave Fluid Line constituted a voluntary abandonment of employment that barred compensation. The court of appeals upheld the Commission's decision. Bilaver appealed, arguing that his departure from Fluid Line was involuntary because he did not quit his job but was instead fired in a manner that did not comply with State ex rel. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Indus. Comm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) State ex rel. Baker v. Indus. Comm. controlled in this case, and (2) lacking evidence that Bilaver secured another job and was prevented from doing it by his industrial injury, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying TTD compensation. View "State ex rel. Bilaver v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Employee was injured in an industrial accident in 1987. The last injury-related bill submitted to either self-insured Employer or its third-party administrator (collectively, Employer) was paid in 1997. In 2008, Employee asked Employer to authorize further treatment. Employer denied the request, relying on former Ohio Rev. Code 4123.52, under which claim inactivity in excess of ten years permanently closed a worker's compensation claim. In an effort to toll the statute, Employee revived an issue relating to a 1998 doctor's visit and requested a hearing on the payment of that outstanding bill. An Industrial Commission staff hearing officer ordered Employer to pay the outstanding bill. The court of appeals vacated the decision and directed the Commission to issue a new order denying payment of the bill. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission abused its discretion in ordering the bill to be paid because the visit related to a low-back condition that was not allowed in Employee's claim and there was no evidence establishing a potential connection between Employee's 1987 injury and his 1998 back symptoms. View "State ex rel. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Patient filed an action seeking recovery for injuries following a medical procedure Doctor performed on him allegedly without his informed consent. The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Doctor. The district court reversed. At issue on appeal was whether a claimant must present expert testimony on each element of the cause of action for failure to obtain informed consent to establish a prima facie case. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the verdict of the trial court, holding (1) expert medical testimony is required to establish both the material risks and dangers involved with a medical procedure and that an undisclosed risk or danger actually materialized and proximately caused injury to the patient; (2) if a patient fails to present medical expert testimony that it is more likely than not that an undisclosed risk of a surgical procedure actually materialized and proximately caused injury, then a trial court may properly grant a directed verdict; and (3) because there was no evidence to support each element of Patient's informed-consent claim in this case, the trial court properly directed a verdict. View "White v. Leimbach" on Justia Law

Appellant suffered an industrial injury and never returned to any type of employment. Appellant filed for permanent total disability compensation (PTD) six years later. The Industrial Commission of Ohio denied Appellant's application in an order that emphasized Appellant's refusal to participate in vocational rehabilitation. Appellant filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals, alleging that the Commission had abused its discretion in denying PTD. The court of appeals concluded that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in deciding to hold Appellant accountable for his failure to participate in vocational rehabilitation when there was no evidence that he would not benefit from such services. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that (1) contrary to Appellant's suggestion, illiterate persons are neither unemployable nor, once injured, inherently permanently and totally disabled; and (2) Appellant was medically capable of sustained remunerative employment, so his rehabilitation potential was germane to the analysis. View "State ex rel. Gonzales v. Morgan" on Justia Law

Employee suffered an industrial injury and received surgery on his right shoulder, after which Employee returned to work for self-insured Employer. Employee experienced renewed shoulder complaints four years later and asked Employer to add new shoulder conditions to Employee's workers' compensation claim and authorize surgery to correct them. Employer and the Industrial Commission denied Employee's request after finding that the proposed procedure was unrelated to the conditions allowed in Employee's workers' compensation claim. At issue on appeal was a doctor's report upon which the Commission based its decision. The court of appeals granted a limited writ in mandamus that ordered the Commission to reconsider the application after finding inconsistencies within the report. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that none of the alleged inconsistencies noted in the doctor's report affected the viability of the doctor's opinion that further surgery was not reasonably related to the allowed conditions, and therefore, the report was evidence supporting the Commission's decision. View "State ex rel. George v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Patrick Donohoe died from injuries sustained in a workplace accident. His widow, Catherine, filed an application for additional workers' compensation benefits, claiming that Patrick's accident resulted from his employer's violation of specific safety requirements (VSSRs) governing the construction industry. The Industrial Commission of Ohio denied her application. The court of appeals vacated the order and returned the cause to the Commission for further consideration. Both Catherine and the employer appealed. At issue on appeal was (1) whether the Commission staff hearing officer's order, which could be interpreted in different ways, was deficient; and (2) whether the Commission erred by denying Catherine's application because there were no eyewitnesses to the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an order that can engender two viable, yet irreconcilable, interpretations is too ambiguous to withstand scrutiny; (2) an order that is potentially based on an erroneous belief that a VSSR cannot issue in the absence of eyewitnesses is clearly an abuse of discretion; and (3) therefore, the court of appeals was correct in returning the cause to the Commission for clarification and consideration of all the evidence. View "State ex rel. Donohoe v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Employee was involuntarily separated from his employment due to disability. Employee's treating physician later certified that Employee was able to return to work, and Employee was subsequently reinstated to the payroll by Employer. Employee appealed the reinstatement order to the extent that the order did not award him back pay or credit his vacation leave from the date his treating physician certified that he could return to work to the day before he was returned to the payroll. The State Personnel Board of Review dismissed Employee's administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Employee then filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus to compel Employer to remit back pay or restore vacation-leave credit. The court of appeals dismissed Employee's complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither Ohio Rev. Code 124.32 nor Ohio Adm. Code 123:1-30-04 required that Employer remit back pay or credit the vacation leave Employee used between the date Employee's treating physician certified that he could return to work to the day before he was returned to the payroll. View "State ex rel. Baroni v. Colletti" on Justia Law

The superintendent of insurance, in her capacity as the liquidator of an insolvent insurer, filed an action in the county court of common pleas against an independent accounting firm that provided auditing services to the insurer, alleging negligence and that the firm had received preferential or fraudulent payments. The accounting firm moved to dismiss the complaint or to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause that was contained in an engagement letter signed by the insurer and accounting firm. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that because the liquidator had not signed the arbitration agreement, there was a presumption against arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed but in part for different reasons, holding that the liquidator was not bound by the insurer's agreement when the liquidator's claims did not arise from the contract that contained the arbitration provision. View "Taylor v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P." on Justia Law

Appellee was injured by a falling tree located near, but outside, an easement maintained by Utility Company. Utility Company had hired Service Contractor to inspect trees along its power lines and to remedy any situation in which trees or vegetation might affect the lines. Appellee filed suit against Appellants, Utility Company and Service Contractor, alleging that they were liable for Appellee's injuries based upon their failure to inspect, maintain, and remove the tree or to warn the landowner and the public of the danger raised by the tree. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellants, concluding that they owed no duty to Appellee and that Appellee was not a third-party beneficiary under the Appellants' contract. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the contract was ambiguous regarding whether Appellee had enforceable rights as an intended third-party beneficiary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) for an injured party to qualify as an intended third-party beneficiary under a written contract, the contract must indicate an intention to benefit that third party; and (2) because the contract between Appellants did not indicate an intent to benefit Appellee, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Appellants. View "Huff v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

In 1970, while working for Employer, Employee was injured. In 1989, Employee retired. In 2008, Employee applied for permanent total disability (PTD) compensation. The Industrial Commission of Ohio concluded that Employee was permanently and totally disabled without ruling on the credibility of the assertion that Employee retired because of his injury or determining whether his retirement was voluntary or involuntary. The court of appeals granted Employer a limited writ of mandamus that vacated the Commission's order and ordered the Commission to reconsider the matter. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that because a voluntary retirement from the work force prior to asserting PTD precludes the payment of compensation for that disability, the court of appeals was correct in ordering further consideration of whether Employee retired because of his injury and whether his retirement was voluntary. View "State ex rel. Cinergy Corp. v. Heber" on Justia Law