Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

While receiving permanent total disability compensation, Appellant Donald McNea's was engaged in the illegal sale of narcotics. Appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio terminated McNea's benefits after finding that he had engaged in sustained remunerative employment while receiving those benefits. McNea filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of appeals. The court found no abuse of discretion had occurred and denied the writ. McNea appealed, challenging the Commission's finding that he was performing, or capable of performing, sustained remunerative work while receiving benefits, a determination that generated a declaration of overpayment for compensation paid during that period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not abuse its discretion in characterizing McNea's remunerative employment as sustained, and the Commission did not violate McNea's due process rights by terminating his benefits while he was in prison. View "State ex rel. McNea v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Rick Warner was a construction worker who had periods of unemployment each year that were the result of seasonal layoffs. After being injured at work, Warner asked the Industrial Commission of Ohio to establish his average weekly wage (AWW) for the purpose of awarding future compensation. At issue was the treatment to be accorded those weeks of unemployment in calculating Warner's AWW. A commission staff hearing officer excluded from the wage total the amount of unemployment compensation received but included in the weekly divisor the number of weeks that Warner did not work. The court of appeals subsequently issued a limited writ of mandamus ordering the commission to further consider Warner's request. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of appeals judgment ordering further consideration of the adequacy of Warner's job search, as, in setting the AWW, any period of unemployment due to causes beyond the employee's control shall be eliminated from the weekly divisor; and (2) reversed the portion of the court of appeals judgment ordering the commission to include the amount of Warner's unemployment compensation from his wage total. View "State ex rel. Warner v. Indus. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Appellants, homeowners, filed suit against Centex Homes, alleging various causes of action, including breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranty, and failure to perform in a workmanlike manner. Centex Homes moved for summary judgment, arguing that Appellants had waived all warranties except the specific limited warranty that Centex Homes provided in the sales agreements. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded for a trial on Appellants' tort claims that Centex Homes breached its duty to construct their homes in a workmanlike manner using ordinary care, as (1) in Ohio a duty to construct houses in a workmanlike manner using ordinary care is imposed by law on all home builders; and (2) a home buyer cannot waive his right to enforce the home builder's duty to construct the house in a workmanlike manner. Remanded. View "Jones v. Centex Homes" on Justia Law

Employee filed a workers' compensation claim against Employer, which was denied by the Industrial Commission. Employee filed a notice of appeal but failed to name as an appellee the administrator of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation. Employee later filed a motion for leave to amend his petition, this time naming the administrator as a party pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4123.512. The court of common pleas dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and denied Employee's motion to amend his petition. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Employee's failure to name the administrator in the notice of appeal did not deprive the court of common pleas of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 4123.412's requirements that a party appealing from an Industrial Commission order name the administrator as a party of the appeal and serve the administrator with notice of the appeal are not jurisdictional requirements; and (2) Employee perfected his appeal by amending the complaint to name the administrator as a party and then notifying him by serving him with a copy of the amended complaint, thus vesting the common pleas court with jurisdiction to rule on his motion to amend. View "Spencer v. Freight Handlers, Inc." on Justia Law

Lisa Mullins, the widow and administrator of the estate of Charles Mullins, filed a complaint against Appellants, a doctor and a medical facility, alleging negligence in the treatment of Charles that resulted in his death. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the estate. The court of appeals remanded the matter, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on Lisa's alleged contributory negligence and denying Appellants' motion for a new trial. On remand, Lisa filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge sitting in the court of common pleas from retrying the issue of the medical negligence of Appellants at a second jury trial. The court of appeals granted the writ to prevent the judge from retrying the negligence issue in the case against Appellants. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and denied the writ, holding that the court erred in determining that a retrial of the negligence claim against Appellants patently and unambiguously violated the court's mandate in the prior appeal. View "State ex rel. Mullins v. Court of Common Pleas (Curran)" on Justia Law

Employee alleged that his political-subdivision Employer committed an intentional tort against him and engaged in negligent conduct. Employer filed a motion for summary judgment on the claims, alleging immunity from suit under the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act. The trial court denied the motion, concluding (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed, and (2) the express exception to immunity contained in the Act did not apply because Employee's claims did not arise out of the employment relationship. The appellate court affirmed and concluded that the express exception to immunity in the Act prevented Employer from raising immunity pursuant to the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the exception to the Act removed the protection of immunity for a political-subdivision employer for injuries to its employees that arise out of the employment relationship, and a political subdivision was at risk for liability in intentional-tort suits that satisfied the terms of Ohio Rev. Code 2745.01. View "Sampson v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

Employee injured his back while working for Employer. Employee returned to light-duty work but complained about his job duties. Employer offered him another position within his physical limitations, but Employee resigned. Employee subsequently filed a motion for temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. The Industrial Commission of Ohio initially denied the request. After Employee's claim was additionally allowed for another medical condition, Employee filed a new motion for TTD benefits. The Commission awarded Employee benefits based on new and changed circumstances from the Commission's previous order. The court of appeals issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to vacate its second order and to enter an order denying TTD compensation, concluding that the Commission had abused its discretion when it relied on the additionally allowed medical condition as a new and changed circumstance since the previous order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employee did not present evidence to justify the Commission's exercise of continuing jurisdiction; and (2) Employee was ineligible to receive TTD compensation for the period requested because his injury was not the reason that he could not return to his former position of employment. View "State ex rel. Akron Paint & Varnish, Inc. v. Gullotta" on Justia Law

The Eighth District Court of Appeals certified a conflict between its decision in this case and a decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals on the question of whether Ohio Rev. Code 2315.21(B), as amended by S.B. 80, was unconstitutional, in violation of the Ohio Constitution, because it was a procedural law that conflicted with Ohio R. Civ. P. 42(B). Section 2315.21(B) created a substantive right to bifurcation in tort actions when claims for compensatory and punitive damages had been asserted. The state Court of Appeals held that section 2315.21(B) was unconstitutional because it conflicted with Rule 24(B), in violation of the separation of powers required by the state Constitution, by purporting to "legislate a strictly procedural matter already addressed by the Civil Rules." The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that section 2315.21(B) creates, defines, and regulates a substantive, enforceable right to separate stages of trial relating to the presentation of evidence for compensatory and punitive damages in tort actions and therefore takes precedence over Rule 42(B) and does not violate the Ohio Constitution, as it is a substantive law that prevails over a procedural rule. View "Havel v. Villa St. Joseph" on Justia Law

Law Firm filed a verified petition for a writ of mandamus to compel Housing Authority to provide copies of all records that documented any and all instances of lead poisoning in the last fifteen years in any dwelling owned or operated by Housing Authority. The court of appeals (1) granted Law Firm's motion for summary judgment regarding the request for lead-poisoning documents and ordered Housing Authority to produce the documents, and (2) granted $7,537 in attorney fees to Law Firm. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) to the extent that Law Firm's request properly sought the lead-poisoning records, the court of appeals did not err in granting the writ of mandamus to compel Housing Authority to provide access to them; (2) the personal identifying information in Housing Authority's lead-poisoning documents was not obtainable under the Public Records Act, but the remainder of the completed forms was subject to disclosure; and (3) the court of appeals erred in awarding attorney fees to Law Firm. Remanded. View "State ex rel. O'Shea & Assocs. Co., L.P.A. v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

Appellant filed for disability-retirement benefits with Appellee, the Ohio Police and Fire Pension Fund (OP&F), claiming that he was disabled as a result of the performance of his official duties of the police department. The OP&F board denied Appellant's application for benefits. Appellant subsequently requested a writ of mandamus to compel the OP&F board to award him disability-retirement benefits. The court of appeals denied the writ, determining that the report of a psychiatrist supported the board's determination that Appellant was not permanently and totally disabled due to a psychiatric or psychological impairment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) OP&F did not abuse its discretion by relying on the psychiatrist's report to support its decision; and (2) Appellant waived his argument that the OP&F board abused its discretion in denying him benefits because he was also physically disabled from continuing work. View "State ex rel. Kolcinko v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund" on Justia Law