Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee, the administrator of the estate of Karen Parrish, filed wrongful-death and survival action arising from the allegedly negligent care and death of Parrish. The case proceeded to a jury. At the close of Appellee's opening statements, Appellants moved for directed verdict, asserting that Appellee had failed to meet the burden of establishing a case of medical malpractice against them because Appellee had failed to set forth in his opening statement a standard of care and causation. The trial court granted the motion for directed verdict and entered judgment in favor of Appellants. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court was required to consider both the opening statement and the complaint before determining whether a directed verdict was appropriate. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding that a trial court is not required to consider allegations contained in the pleadings when ruling on a motion for directed verdict made on the opening statement of an opponent, but the trial court may consult the pleadings in liberally construing the opening statement in favor of the party against whom the motion is made. Remanded. View "Parrish v. Jones" on Justia Law

In an earlier litigation, Kleem retained Julian Vanni and Vanni & Associates (collectively, Vanni) to appraise certain real property in dispute between the parties. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Kleem and against Southwest Sports Center. Southwest subsequently filed suit against Kleem and Vanni. The case was assigned to Judge Richard McMonagle. Vanni sought a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge McMonagle from hearing the litigation, arguing that the judge lacked jurisdiction based on the jurisdictional-priority rule, claim preclusion, and witness immunity. The court of appeals dismissed the case, concluding that Judge McMonagle did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction and that Vanni had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Judge McMonagle did not patently lack jurisdiction and that Vanni had an adequate remedy by way of appeal. View "State ex rel. Vanni v. McMonagle" on Justia Law

As a result of a surgery to remove a cyst at the lowest part of his spinal cord, Plaintiff permanently lost bladder, bowel, and sexual function. Plaintiff and his wife filed this action against Defendant, a neurosurgeon who diagnosed the cyst but who did not participate in the surgery. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment against Defendant. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred by admitting, over objection, as an exhibit an illustration from a learned treatise; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to submit to the jury a properly drafted interrogatory offered by Defendant; (3) the trial court erred by prohibiting Defendant from presenting evidence of "write-offs" to contest Plaintiffs' medical bills without a foundation of expert testimony on the reasonable value of the medical services rendered; and (4) the court's errors, taken together, deprived Defendant of a fair trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "Moretz v. Muakkassa" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Ohio Rev. Code 9.86, which provides immunity to state employees unless the employee acts manifestly outside the scope of employment, with malicious purpose, or in bad faith. Michael McNew visited the Ohio State University Medical Center (Center) complaining of a painful hemorrhoid, nausea, diarrhea, and fatigue. McNew consulted with Dr. Syed Husain, a faculty member who was also employed by the school's nonprofit medical-practice corporation, but neither a medical student nor a resident was present during the treatment. Four days after McNew was discharged, he died from an undiagnosed cerebral hemorrhage caused by thromboytopenia. Plaintiffs brought this action against the Center in the court of claims. Plaintiffs also filed a civil action against Husain in the common pleas court, which the court stayed pending a determination by the court of claims regarding Husain's immunity from suit. The court of claims concluded that Husain was immune from suit under section 9.86. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, in treating McNew, Husain served the interests of the Center and acted within the scope of employment. Therefore, Husain was entitled to personal immunity pursuant to section 9.86. View "Ries v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

After sustaining injuries while sledding in the City of Circleville's park, Jeremy Pauley and his mother filed a civil action against the City, alleging that the City acted negligently, recklessly, and wantonly in dumping debris in the park, which resulted in a physical defect that caused Jeremy's injuries. The trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the City was immune from suit under Ohio Rev. Code 1533.181, the recreational user immunity statute. Plaintiffs appealed, contending that section 1533.181 does not apply when a property owner makes the property more dangerous "without promoting or preserving recreational activities." The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Jeremy was a recreational user as defined in the statute, the City was not liable for his injuries. View "Pauley v. Circleville" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs in this case were 100 current or former residents or owners of homes on State Road in Parma who sought damages caused by the continual flow of gasoline from a gas station's infrastructure into a sanitary sewer main located on State Road. Plaintiffs named as defendants various private and public entities, including Cuyahoga County. The County filed a motion seeking judgment on the pleadings on the theory that Plaintiffs' causes of action had not been filed within the two-year statute of limitations applicable to political subdivisions pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 2744.04. The trial court denied the motion. The County appealed. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court's denial of the County's motion was not a final, appealable order over which the appellate court had jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the denial of a public subdivision's dispositive motion asserting a statute-of-limitations defense pursuant to section 2744.04 is not a final, appealable order. View "Riscatti v. Prime Props. Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

Danielle Laurence sued Stephen Stillwagon and Ace Doran seeking damages for personal injuries she suffered in an automobile accident. In discovery, Laurence produced her medical records. Laurence subsequently dismissed her case. Meanwhile, Todd Leopold and his wife sued Stillwagon, Ace Doran, and Laurence, seeking recovery for injuries sustained in the same accident and asserting that Laurence's negligence caused the accident. Laurence moved for a protective order seeking to preclude counsel from using the medical records she produced in her lawsuit. The trial court denied the motion, and the appellate court affirmed, determining that Laurence waived her physician-patient privilege with respect to the accident by filing a claim of personal injury against Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that pursuant to the statute establishing the physician-patient privilege, at least two separate provisions applied and specified that the statements made by Laurence to her physician were no longer privileged. View "Leopold v. Ace Doran Hauling & Rigging Co." on Justia Law

Appellee, who worked for the City of North Ridgeville, was assaulted and raped by a co-worker while at work. Appellee filed this action against the City for, among other causes of action, intentional, willful, and wanton disregard for the safety of others in selecting and controlling the co-worker, which was an employer intentional tort. The trial court denied the City's motion for summary judgment on Appellee's employer-intentional-tort claim. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that because an intentional tort may arise out of the employment relationship between a political subdivision and its employee, the City did not establish that it was entitled to immunity as a matter of law on that claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a civil action by an employee of a political subdivision alleging an intentional tort against her employer may fall within the Ohio Rev. Code 2744.09(B) exception to political-subdivision immunity; and (2) the City did not establish that it was entitled to political-subdivision immunity on Appellee's employer-intentional-tort claim as a matter of law. View "Vacha v. City of N. Ridgeville" on Justia Law

Appellant was a political subdivision for purposes of the governmental-immunity provisions of Ohio Rev. Code 2744. Appellee sued Appellant, asserting several claims. Appellant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming political-subdivision immunity. Appellant then unsuccessfully sought to file an amended answer raising political-subdivision immunity as an affirmative offense. Thereafter, the trial court granted summary judgment to Appellant on two of Appellee's claims. After Appellant appealed the trial court's denial of leave to file an amended answer, the case proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee on two of its remaining claims. Appellant filed a second appeal from the judgment. While Appellant's appeals were pending, the Supreme Court held that Appellant's first appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed with a trial of any claim subject to the political-subdivision immunity defense. The court of appeals subsequently dismissed Appellant's appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for leave to file an amended answer to raise the affirmative defense of political-subdivision immunity precluded Appellant from enjoying the benefits of the alleged immunity; and (2) the court of appeals therefore possessed jurisdiction to determine Appellant's appeal of that order. View "Supportive Solutions, LLC v. Elec. Classroom of Tomorrow" on Justia Law

Maria Marusa was driving her car when it was struck by a police cruiser driven by a police officer (Officer). Marusa and her daughter (collectively, Appellants) were injured in the accident. Appellants filed suit against Marusa's insurer (Insurer), seeking damages to compensate for medical expenses and pain and suffering. Insurer answered that it was not obligated to pay damages because even though the policy included uninsured-motorist coverage and the officer was an uninsured motorist, Appellants were not "legally entitled to recover" because Officer was immune under the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Law (OPSTLL). The trial court granted summary judgment for Insurer, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the language of the policy unambiguously provides uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage when the insured is injured by an owner or operator who is immune under the OPSTLL. View "Marusa v. Erie Ins. Co." on Justia Law