Justia Ohio Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2004 and 2007, two fires broke out in two separate buildings of the Village Green Apartments. Plaintiffs, tenants of the apartment complex, filed suit against the apartment complex’s landlords, claiming that the buildings had been negligently constructed. The landlords were found liable. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $582,146, punitive damages of $2,000,000, and attorney fees of $1,040,000. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme court affirmed with respect to all issues except the award of punitive damages, holding (1) the amount of punitive damages exceeded the limit prescribed by Ohio Rev. Code 2315.21(D)(2)(a); (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the issue of punitive damages to go to the jury; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the jury to determine that the landlords had failed to comply with Ohio Rev. Code 5321.04 for failure to correct defects occurring in electrical wiring. View "Sivit v. Village Green of Beachwood, L.P." on Justia Law

Appellee was injured when he fell from a ladder-jack scaffold while working as a carpenter on a construction project for his Employers. Appellee sued his Employers, alleging claims of employer intentional tort. The Cincinnati Insurance Company (“CIC”), which insured the Employers under a commercial general liability policy, intervened and filed a complaint seeking a declaration that it had no obligation to indemnify the Employers should Appellee prevail on his employer-intentional-tort claims. The policy contained a provision that excluded coverage for acts committed with the deliberate intent to injure an employee. The trial court granted summary judgment for CIC. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that liability may be imposed without a finding of deliberate intent under the policy. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that an insurance provision that excludes from coverage liability for an insured’s act committed with the deliberate intent to injure an employee precludes coverage for employer intentional torts. View "Hoyle v. DTJ Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose from the death of Seth Cromer at the pediatric intensive-care unit of Children’s Hospital Medical Center. Seth’s mother and father, individually and as administrator, brought this medical-negligence action against the hospital, alleging that Seth’s death was caused by the negligence of multiple hospital employees. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the hospital. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by including an instruction on foreseeability when it instructed the jury on the hospital’s standard of care. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) foreseeability of harm is generally relevant to the determination of the scope of a physician’s duty in a medical-malpractice action, and therefore, giving a foreseeability instruction in such an action is not manifestly incorrect; (2) where the parties in this case did not dispute that the physician understood that the chosen course of treatment carried some risk of harm, the instruction regarding foreseeability was not necessary; and (3) the unneeded jury instruction on foreseeability did not prejudice Plaintiffs’ substantial rights, and therefore, reversal was not justified. View "Cromer v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Akron" on Justia Law

Phillip Pixley brought an employer intentional tort claim arising from injuries he sustained when he was struck by a transfer car in the course of his employment at Pro-Pak Industries, Inc. Pixley alleged that Pro-Pak had not adequately trained its transfer car operator and had deliberately bypassed the transfer car’s safety bumper, causing the safety mechanism that stopped the car to fail. The trial court granted summary judgment for Pro-Pak, concluding that Pixley failed to create a genuine issue of material fact that Pro-Pak had the specific intent to injure him. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Pixley failed to prove that Pro-Pak deliberately removed or disabled the safety bumper on the transfer car that injured him, and therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Pro-Pak. View "Pixley v. Pro-Pak Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Relators, an employee of Precision Directional Boring, LLC and his wife, commenced an action in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court against Precision and Gary Cole, a coworker at Precision. Cole, a resident of Cuyahoga County, was the only party with a connection to that forum. The Cuyahoga County court granted Precision’s motion to transfer for improper venue and transferred the case to the Medina County Common Pleas Court. The case was subsequently transferred back to Cuyahoga County and then again to Medina County. Relators then filed a complaint in the court of appeals seeking writs of mandamus and procedendo to compel the Cuyahoga County court judge to vacate that court’s transfer orders and adjudicate the underlying action on the merits. The appellate court granted Relators’ motion, concluding that venue was proper in Cuyahoga County. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cole’s status as a nominal party prevented Relators from establishing a clear legal right to the vacation of the transfer orders in Cuyahoga county or a clear legal duty by the Cuyahoga County court judge to perform that act, and an appeal would provide an adequate remedy. View "State ex rel. Yeaples v. Gall" on Justia Law

Miles Cobrun was killed after he was struck by a vehicle driven by Robert Shill. Peggy Spaeth, Cobrun’s wife, filed a wrongful-death action against Robert and his insurer. Robert sought additional coverage under the liability policy of his parents issued by Cincinnati Insurance Company (CIC). CIC denied coverage. Robert then filed this declaratory-judgment action seeking a declaration that CIC owed him a duty of indemnification in the wrongful-death case. The trial court consolidated the declaratory-judgment and underlying wrongful-death actions. The trial court granted summary judgment for CIC. The appellate court reversed. At issue before the Supreme Court was the meaning of the term “domicile,” the crucial policy term at issue in regard to coverage for Robert under his parents’ CIC umbrella policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in accordance with this Court’s previous jurisprudence, the definition of domicile is where a person resides, where he intends to remain, and where he intends to return when away temporarily; and (2) under this definition, Robert was not an insured “resident relative” under the umbrella policy at issue. View "Schill v. Cincinnati Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Gerald Renfrow worked for Northern Southern Railway Company as a brakeman for approximately twenty-five years. Gerald, who smoked a pack and a half of cigarettes every day for fifty years, died in 2011 after a battle with lung cancer. Gerald’s widow, Cleo Renfrow, sued Norfolk Southern, alleging that Gerald’s asbestos exposure at Norfolk Southern caused him to develop lung cancer. Norfolk Southern filed a motion to administratively dismiss the complaint, arguing that Cleo failed to proffer the necessary prima facie evidence in support of the claims. The trial court denied the motion for administrative dismissal. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that Cleo had provided sufficient evidence to prevent an administrative dismissal of the action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cleo failed to make the prima facie showing required to withstand administrative dismissal of her tort action alleging an asbestos claim based on lung cancer. View "Renfrow v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co." on Justia Law

Torri Auer filed suit against real-estate broker Keller Williams Home Town Realty (Home Town) and its former real-estate agent, Jamie Paliath, alleging that Paliath had fraudulently induced her to purchase certain properties. Auer pursued her case against Home Town solely on the basis of respondeat superior liability. The jury returned verdicts against Paliath and Home Town, finding that Paliath had committed fraud and that Home Town was vicariously liable for Paliath’s fraud. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court’s error to instruct the jury on scope of agency as it related to Home Town’s vicarious liability was harmless because scope of agency was a matter of law and therefore outside the province of the jury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the instructions given in this case were erroneous and constituted reversible error because, in order to impose vicarious liability, a jury first must make a factual determination that the agent was acting within the scope of her agency when she committed the torts at issue. View "Auer v. Paliath" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was visiting a friend, who was a tenant at an apartment building owned by Defendant, when Plaintiff suffered an injury while descending the common area stairs. Plaintiff sued Defendant, alleging that Defendant had negligently failed to maintain adequate lighting on the premises. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendant, holding (1) since Plaintiff was not a tenant but a business invitee, Defendant only owed her a duty of ordinary care; and (2) the open-and-obvious doctrine applied in this case to negate the duty of ordinary care. The court of appeals reversed, holding that tenants’ guests are entitled to the protections of Ohio Rev. Code 5321.04, that a landlord’s violation of section 5321.04 constitutes negligence per se, and that the open-and-obvious-danger doctrine does not apply when the landlord is negligent per se. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a landlord owes the statutory duty under section 5321.04 to keep all common areas of the premises in a safe condition to a tenant’s guest properly on the premises; and (2) a breach of that duty constitutes negligence per se and obviates the open-and-obvious-danger doctrine. View "Mann v. Northgate Investors, LLC" on Justia Law

After a car accident involving David Fraley and Timothy Oeding, Oeding’s insurer (“Auto-Owners”) placed an investigative hold on Fraley’s truck for several months. Fraley filed a negligence action against Oeding’s estate, Oeding’s employer (“J&R”), and Auto-Owners, alleging, among other things, that Auto-Owners’ investigatory hold caused Fraley intangible economic loss due to the loss of use of the truck. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding (1) the court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over Oeding and J&R solely because their insurer did business in Ohio, and (2) Fraley was not entitled to maintain a direct action against Auto-Owners because he had not obtained a judgment against Auto-Owners’ insureds. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in its determination that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Oeding and J&R because Auto-Owners’ investigatory hold and its communication with Fraley brought Auto-Owners, and by extension J&R and Oeding, within Ohio’s long-arm statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that an Ohio court may not impute an insurance company’s conduct to its nonresident insured for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction over the insured. View "Fraley v. Estate of Oeding" on Justia Law